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PREFACE
In 2015, the Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) and the
African Tax Institute at the University of Pretoria launched a project to
identify the links between corruption, money laundering and tax crimes in
Africa. The project promotes the concepts of good tax governance and the
importance to economic development of a tax system that is transparent
and free of corruption. The project explores how law enforcement agencies
and tax authorities can best cooperate to counter corruption and bribery.
The project was initially aimed at three focus countries, namely, Ghana,
Nigeria and South Africa, but soon was extended to other African
countries. This is a joint initiative with the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) and is also supported by the World Bank.
This book brings together a series of background papers prepared for the
Conference on Inter-Agency Co-operation and Good Tax Governance in
Africa held at the University of Pretoria in July 2016. After a rigorous
double peer-review process, the papers were revised by the authors. We
express our gratitude to and acknowledge the services of the following peer
reviewers: Tom Balco; Carika Fritz; Leon Gerber; Willem Jacobs;
Benjamin Kujinga; Thabo Legwaila; Annet Oguttu; Dirk Scholtz; David
Solomon; and Xeniya Yeroshenko.
Finally, we express our sincere gratitude to all the research and
administrative assistants who contributed to the Good Tax Governance in
Africa Project. This book pays tribute to their efforts.
Jeffrey Owens, Rick McDonell, Riël Franzsen and Jude Amos
Vienna and Pretoria
November 2017
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FOREWORD
Over the past three years, the Institute for Austrian and International Tax
Law at the Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) was
engaged in a partnership with the African Tax Institute (ATI) at the
University of Pretoria. With the support of the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the partners engaged in a project that
brought together officials, business, academics, as well as international and
regional organisations to discuss and identify solutions to illicit financial
outflows from Africa.
The project has involved research, workshops, training seminars and
conferences, all aimed at providing practical solutions which the
participating countries can use to counter such outflows. It has also helped
to develop a core of young researchers that can carry on this work,
providing African governments with the analyses and facts to confront this
problem.
It has been a privilege for the Institute for Austrian and International
Tax Law and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to be
associated with this initiative. WU is the largest business school in Europe,
and the Institute is one of the leading global centres in the area of
international taxation, with over 60 researchers and professors from more
than 40 countries, including many from Africa. UNODC has decades-long
experience in assisting United Nations member states to prevent economic
crimes and combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and
has had the privilege of working with governments and competent
authorities dealing with Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) in most African countries to improve
the effective implementation of national and international AML/CFT
laws and policies. It also assists regionally through African Financial
Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional bodies. In assisting African
countries to strengthen institutions, legal frameworks and operational
capacities, it helps them to prevent and disrupt economic crimes, to
identify and counter illegal activities and to confiscate and dispose of
stolen assets. 
We are pleased that this book brings together a number of papers that
were prepared by post-graduate researchers as background papers for a
major conference held in Pretoria, South Africa, in July 2016 and which
was opened by the Honourable Pravin Gordhan, the then Minister of
Finance of South Africa. This publication will enable a wider audience to
benefit from the discussions on key issues and hopefully will contribute to
the ongoing debate on illicit financial flows and good tax governance.
Michael Lang 
Head of the Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law Vienna University of
Economics and Business (WU)
and
Jean Luc Lemahieu
Director, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Information, UN Office on
Drugs and Crime, Vienna
November 2017
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1Jeffrey Owens and Rick McDonell
1 Introduction
This book examines the linkages between money laundering, bribery,
corruption and tax evasion in Africa, and how to counter these illicit
financial flows (IFFs) requires a whole government approach and a
reassessment of existing international instruments. To fully understand the
issues discussed by the various authors, it is essential to understand recent
developments in the international environment.
The period from the 1980s to the mid-1990s was marked by the
progressive liberalisation and deregulation of international trade,
investment and financial flows. Increasingly dense networks of cross-
border economic relationships resulted, as financial centres were forced to
compete with each other to attract international financial flows. With the
decline of non-tax barriers to the mobility of capital, the significance of
low or preferential tax regimes as a factor in making investment
decisions increased.1 In 1996 the heads of the G-7 states sought to
bring these developments to a head. In their final Communiqué issued
following the Lyon Summit, they acknowledged:2 
Globalisation is creating new challenges in the field of tax policy. Tax
schemes aimed at attracting financial and other geographically mobile
activities can create harmful tax competition between states, carrying the risk
of distorting trade and investment [and] leading to the erosion of national tax
bases. We strongly urge the [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)] to vigorously pursue its work in this field, aimed at
establishing a multilateral approach under which countries could operate
individually and collectively to limit the extent of these practices.
1 See A Easson & EM Zolt ‘Tax incentives’ World Bank Institute 3-4, (2007) http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTPA/Resources/EassonZoltPaper.pdf (accessed
20 October 2017). 
2 See G7 Communiqué, Lyon  21 July 1996 (See AP Archive).
INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION AND
GOOD TAX GOVERNANCE
IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW
2    Overview
2 OECD harmful tax competition initiative
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
responded to the call by the G-7 for a return to the status quo ante through
its ‘harmful tax competition’ project, which called for the development of
‘measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax competition on
investment and financing decisions and the consequences for national tax
bases’.3 In 1998, the OECD published its first report entitled ‘Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue’.4 The report identified two
primary contributors to the harmful tax competition developing between
states – the so-called ‘tax haven’ jurisdictions5 and preferential tax
regimes.6 The latter predominantly were phenomena of OECD member
states, and were to be dealt with internally by a process of domestic and
peer review, while secrecy jurisdictions were subject to a more
confrontational and interventionist approach. The report announced the
creation of the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, which was tasked with
identifying non-OECD member jurisdictions that met the criteria for
designation as a secrecy jurisdiction. A follow-up report published in 2000
identified 35 such jurisdictions, which were to be identified in a future ‘List
of uncooperative tax havens’ unless they made a commitment to
eliminating harmful tax practices by 2005. 7 Any jurisdiction that failed
3 OECD Council at Ministerial Level, Communiqué (21-22 May 2006) para 15(xv).
4 OECD Harmful tax competition: A n emerging global issue (OECD Publication
Service: Paris 1998) (OECD 1998 Report).
5 ‘Tax havens’ are characterised in the OECD 1998 Report by four main factors:
(i) imposing no, or only nominal tax; (ii) a lack of effective exchange of information
with other countries; (iii) a lack of transparency; and (iv) investment with no
substantial activities. The application of the term ‘tax haven’ remains controversial
and contested. It is often conflated with the term ‘offshore financial centre’ – itself an
equally amorphous term that, from the perspective of land-locked ‘onshore’
jurisdictions such as Switzerland and Lichtenstein, usefully glosses over the fact that
everywhere is ‘offshore’ of everywhere else. Accordingly, this article adopts the Tax
Justice Network’s preferred terminology of ‘secrecy jurisdiction’, where the more
pertinent distinction is one between ‘here’ and ‘elsewhere’.
6 ‘Preferential tax regimes’ are characterised in the OECD 1998 Report by four main
factors: (i) the regime imposes low or no taxes on the relevant income (from
geographically mobile financial and other service activities); (ii) the regime is ring-
fenced; (iii) the regime lacks transparency, eg the details of the regime or its
application are not apparent, or there is inadequate regulatory supervision or
financial disclosure; and (iv) there is no effective exchange of information with respect
to the regime. Note that ring-fencing occurs when a tax regime is partially or fully
isolated from the domestic markets of the country providing the regime. It may take
a number of forms, including excluding resident taxpayers from taking advantage of its
benefits; and/or excluding enterprises that benefit from the regime from operating in
the domestic market.
7 OECD ‘Towards global taxation: Progress in identifying and eliminating harmful tax
practices’ Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council and Recommendations by the
Committee on Fiscal Affairs.
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to comply would be liable to the application of co-ordinated defensive
measures by OECD member states.8
However, Switzerland and Luxembourg had vocally abstained from
endorsing both the 1998 and 2000 reports,9 arguing that they
represented a partial and imbalanced approach that resulted in the
unacceptable protection of countries with high levels of taxation, while the
incoming United States (US) Treasury Secretary had expressed concern to
the G-7 Finance Ministers.
The intervention by the US reflected ideological unease with the
OECD’s increasing encroachment upon fiscal sovereignty. Traditionally,
taxation was seen as an inherent or essential component of sovereign
status, and any infringement of a state’s right to self-determination
concerning its system of taxation would be regarded as an infringement on
sovereignty itself.10 Instead, the US sought to align the work being done
by the OECD on harmful tax practices with the work being done by the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and others on anti-money-
laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT). This shifted the
focus of the project towards transparency and information exchange as
mechanisms to be used in the detection and prevention of illicit financial
flows.
3 Emphasis on misuse of corporate vehicles
In February 2000, the FATF had undertaken a review of the rules and
practices that impaired the effectiveness of money laundering prevention
and detection systems, and concluded:
Shell corporations and nominees are widely used mechanisms to launder the
proceeds from crime, particularly bribery (eg to build up slush funds). The
ability for competent authorities to obtain and share information regarding
the identification of companies and their beneficial owner(s) is therefore
essential for all the relevant authorities responsible for preventing and
punishing money laundering.11
8 Interestingly, the Report only envisaged the application of defensive measures against
non-cooperative secrecy jurisdictions; no corresponding provision was made for
similar measures to be invoked against non-cooperative OECD member states with
preferential tax regimes. See R Woodward ‘The OECD’s harmful tax competition
initiative and offshore financial centres in the Caribbean Basin’ in R Ramsaran (ed)
The fiscal experience in the Caribbean: Emerging issues and problems (University of the West
Indies: St Augustine, Trinidad 2004) 623-625.
9 See JC Sharman Havens in a s torm: The struggle for global tax regulation (Cornell
University Press: Ithaca 2006) 61; DM Ring ‘Democracy, sovereignty and tax
competition: The role of tax sovereignty in shaping tax co-operation’ (2009) 9 Florida
Tax Review 12-13.
10 A Christians ‘Sovereignty, taxation and social contract’ (2009) 18 Minnesota Journal of
International Law 99.
11 Cited in FATF ‘The misuse of corporate vehicles, including trust and company
service providers’ 13 October 2006.
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In April 2000, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) had also
highlighted a number of prudential and market integrity concerns arising
from their review of what they termed ‘problematic’ secrecy jurisdictions.
They specifically expressed concern at the ease with which corporate
vehicles – such as companies, trusts, foundations, partnerships, and other
types of legal persons and arrangements12 – could be created and dissolved
in these jurisdictions, and the lack of availability of timely information on
their beneficial ownership.13 The FSF subsequently issued a formal
request to the OECD to examine the vulnerability of corporate vehicles to
misuse for illicit purposes, and stressed the importance of ensuring that the
authorities in each jurisdiction had the ability to obtain and share
information on the beneficial ownership and control of corporate vehicles
established in their jurisdictions.
In May 2001, the OECD issued its Report on the Misuse of
Corporate Vehicles for Illicit Purposes to the G-7 Finance Ministers and
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).14 The report found that almost all
economic crimes involve the misuse of corporate vehicles: Money
launderers exploit cash-based ‘front’ businesses and other legal entities to
disguise the source of their illicit gains; corrupt officials conduct
transactions through bank accounts opened under the names of
corporations and foundations; and individuals hide or shield their wealth
from tax authorities and other creditors through trusts and partnerships.15
In order to successfully combat and prevent the misuse of corporate
vehicles for these purposes, the report concluded that it was essential that
all jurisdictions establish effective mechanisms enabling their authorities to
obtain, on a timely basis, information on the beneficial ownership and
control of corporate vehicles established in their own jurisdictions, and
that such information must be capable of being shared with other
authorities both domestically and internationally.16
12 The term ‘legal arrangements’ refers to express trusts or other similar legal
arrangements (eg fiducie, treuhand and fideicomiso, while ‘legal persons’ refers to any
entities other than natural persons that can establish a permanent customer
relationship with a financial institution or otherwise own property (eg companies,
bodies corporate, foundations, anstalt, partnerships, or associations and other
relevantly similar entities). See FATF ‘Glossary of the FATF Recommendations’
October 2012.
13 Financial Stability Forum ‘Report of the Working Group on Offshore Centres’ 5 April
2000, http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0004b.pdf ?page_moved=1
(accessed 19 October 2017). 
14 Cited in OECD Behind the corporate veil: Using corporate entities for illicit purposes (OECD
Publication Service: Paris 2001) 3, https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/4370
3185.pdf (accessed 19 October 2017).
15 As above.
16 OECD (n 13 above) 7-8.
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The OECD report was followed by a succession of others exploring
similar policy concerns, ensuring that the issue of corporate vehicle misuse
and financial transparency remained firmly on the public agenda.17
4 Improving the legal framework for information 
exchange: Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention
In 2005, significant amendments were made to article 26 of the OECD
Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital to enable the broader
exchange of information and prevent bank secrecy. Previously, article
26(1) provided for the exchange of ‘information as is necessary for carrying
out the provisions of [the Convention] or of the domestic laws concerning
taxes of every kind and description imposed on behalf of the contracting
states’.18 The revisions to paragraph 1 of article 26 substituted the right
to request and the obligation to provide tax information when it becomes
‘foreseeably relevant’, rather than only when ‘necessary’. A new paragraph
5 was also added to article 26, which made it clear that jurisdictions could
not decline to provide information solely because it was held by banks,
financial institutions, nominees, agents or fiduciaries, or solely because it
was information relating to ownership. The most significant consequence
of the change was that domestic bank secrecy rules, by themselves, no
longer could be used as a basis for declining to provide information.
5 Global responses to the financial crisis
The global financial crises of 2008-2009 brought secrecy jurisdictions back
to the centre of the conversation around illicit financial flows and the need
for greater transparency. Countries around the world were confronted with
damaging combinations of large bailout costs and diminishing corporate
tax receipts, and politicians and bureaucrats were acutely aware of the
need to find additional revenue streams. Spurred on by contemporaneous
media reports and prosecutions arising out of the Swiss UBS bank
scandal19 and the Liechtenstein tax data leak,20 issues of tax evasion and
17 In 2002 the International Trade and Investment Organisation (ITIO) and the Society
of Trust and Estate Practitioners (STEP) commissioned the report ‘Towards a Level
Playing Field: Regulating Corporate Vehicles in Cross-Border Transactions’. In 2006
the FATF issued its paper on ‘The misuse of corporate vehicles’, and in 2010 the
Caribbean FATF published ‘Money laundering using trust and company service
providers’.
18 Our emphasis.
19 During US senate hearings, a Geneva-based whistle-blower from UBS bank, which at
the time was partly owned by the Swiss government, disclosed that UBS was sending
bank officials to US cities to promote the use of its services by high-net-worth
Americans. These officials told the Americans that they could successfully hide their
monies offshore where the monies would remain undetected and untaxed by US tax
6    Overview
tax avoidance21 suddenly found themselves high on the public agenda as
attention turned towards the massive amounts of unreported private
financial wealth concealed in the world’s secrecy jurisdictions.22
5.1 How big is the problem of hidden wealth?23
The most frequently-cited estimate on the global extent of all illicit
financial flows comes from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the
mid-1990s, which provided a ‘consensus range’ of between 2 and 5 per cent
of global gross domestic product (GDP) – or between USD1.47 and
USD3.69 trillion (based on a global GDP of USD73.9 trillion in 2015).24
These figures were endorsed in a recent meta-analysis conducted by
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which
estimated the total illicit financial flows at 3.6 per cent of global GDP or
around USD2.7 trillion (adjusted) annually, of which 2.7 per cent or
USD2 trillion was available for laundering through the international
19 authorities. The US government successfully forced the disclosure of roughly 4 450
account identities of US taxpayers, leading to a host of penalties and prosecutions as
well as a USD780 million fine payable by UBS to the US government. See
AJ Cockfield ‘Big data and tax haven secrecy’ (2016) 18 Florida Tax Review 483 508-
509.
20 The 2008 Lichtenstein tax affair originated when a bank employee surreptitiously
copied bank records listing over 1 400 customers with anonymous bank accounts. A
compact disc with this bank account information was purchased by the German
government for €4,2 million, and eventually was transferred to governments and tax
authorities throughout the world, leading to audits and prosecutions of non-
compliant taxpayers. See Cockfield (n 18 above) 507; M Esterl, GR Simpson &
D Crawford ‘Stolen data spur tax probes’ The Wall Street Journal 19 February 2008.
21 According to the European Commission, ‘tax evasion’ generally comprises illegal
arrangements where tax liability is hidden or ignored, that is, the taxpayer pays less
tax than he or she is supposed to pay under the law by hiding income or information
from the tax authorities. ‘Tax avoidance’ is defined as acting within the law,
sometimes at the edge of legality, to minimise or eliminate tax that would otherwise be
legally owed. It often involves exploiting the strict letter of the law, loopholes and
mismatches to obtain a tax advantage that was not originally intended by the
legislation.
22 JS Henry ‘The price of offshore revisited’ Tax Justice Network July 2012, http://
www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf
(accessed 19 October 2017).
23 Quantitative estimates suffer from a number of methodological shortcomings, which
are exacerbated by inconsistencies in defining predicate offences (eg legality or
otherwise of ‘facilitation payments’ – given to induce foreign public officials to
perform an act or exercise a function); terminological uncertainty; and legal grey
areas (eg not all jurisdictions agree on the dividing lines between ‘tax evasion’, ‘tax
avoidance’ and ‘tax fraud’). Accordingly, the figures cited are imperfect estimates and
based on a combination of inferences from macro-economic data and direct
information collected by law enforcement agencies, financial intelligence units, and
taxation and customs authorities.
24 See World Bank National accounts data 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed 19 October 2017). 
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financial system – around the midpoint of the earlier International
Monetary Fund (IMF) consensus range.25
Of course, not all illicit financial flows are hidden within, or routed
through, secrecy jurisdictions. Of the amounts identified above, the Tax
Justice Network estimates the total amount of private wealth held in
secrecy jurisdictions at somewhere between USD24 to USD36 trillion.26
Other models, based on differing data sets and utilising narrower
assumptions, place the total much lower, at around USD7.6 trillion
(roughly 8 per cent of global GDP). Even following the most conservative
estimates, this results in a global ‘tax gap’ – the difference between tax
actually collected and that which is theoretically due and payable – of
USD190 billion per year.27
While illicit financial flows and the hidden wealth phenomena are
global issues, their impacts are felt disproportionately in the developing
world. It is estimated that developing countries lose USD1 trillion each
year as a result of corrupt or illegal cross-border deals, many of which
involve anonymous companies.28 An Oxfam analysis shows that in Africa
alone, approximately 30 per cent of all financial wealth – a total of
USD500 billion – is held in secrecy jurisdictions. This is estimated to cost
African countries USD14 billion a year in lost tax revenues; enough
money to pay for healthcare that could save the lives of 4 million children,
and to employ enough teachers for every African child to receive an
education.29
At the April 2009 London Summit, G-20 member states again
committed to taking action against non-cooperative secrecy jurisdictions.
Announcing their capacity and willingness to ‘deploy sanctions to protect
our public finances and financial systems’, the G-20 successfully pressured
each of the jurisdictions identified by the OECD as being non-compliant
with existing international standards on tax transparency to enter into a
range of bilateral tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs).30 The
Summit was hailed as a watershed moment for global financial
transparency, with the G-20 leaders declaring at the conclusion of the
25 UNODC ‘Estimated illicit financial flows’; figures in US dollars (USD) extrapolated
from GDP figures and adjusted according to World Bank data as at 2015; see n 23
above.
26 Initial estimates outlined in JS Henry ‘The price of offshore revisited’ updated in
2015; see JS Henry ‘Taxing tax havens’ Foreign Affairs, 12 April 2016.
27 G Zucman The hidden wealth of nations: T he scourge of tax havens (University of
Chicago Press: Chicago 2015).
28 One ‘The trillion-dollar scandal’ http://www.one.org/international/policy/trillion-
dollar-scandal/ (accessed 19 October 2017).
29 Oxfam ‘An economy for the 1%’ https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/
files/file_attachments/bp210-economy-one-percent-tax-havens-180116-en_0.pdf
(accessed 19 October 2017).
30 TIEAs were promoted by the OECD as a means for countries to administer and
enforce their tax and criminal laws by facilitating the exchange of foreign tax
information that can then be used in an examination of a taxpayer.
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Summit that ‘the era of banking secrecy is over’.31 While arguably
premature in light of subsequent critiques of the effectiveness of TIEAs,32
the G-20’s call for jurisdictions to adopt high standards of transparency
and information exchange in tax matters led to the restructuring of the
OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for
Tax Purposes 33 and, ultimately, to amendments being made to the
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters, which laid the foundations for the global shift towards Automatic
Exchange of Information (AEoI).
6 Political response to the offshore leaks disclosures
Another significant turning point in the global push for financial
transparency came in April 2013, when the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) released the first of what would prove to be
several leaks involving vast quantities of financial data taken from within
secrecy jurisdictions.34 The cache of documents comprising the initial
‘offshore secrets’ leaks contained more than 2.5 million records, which
revealed the previously secret dealings of over 120 000 offshore companies
and private trusts, implicating more than 70 000 people from 170 countries
and territories.35 The leaked data provided a unique insight into the
methods by which individuals were using networks of shell and shelf
companies in tax havens to criminally evade taxes, launder illegal
earnings, and finance cross-border terrorism,36 and provided objective
evidence for the severity of the crimes and abusive practices that could be
successfully perpetrated by taking advantage of both a globalised financial
system and incomplete and fragmented national tax and financial
transparency frameworks.
A lack of knowledge about who ultimately controls, owns and
profits from companies and legal arrangements, including trusts, not only
assists those who seek to evade tax, but also those who seek to launder the
proceeds of crime, often across borders. Shell companies can be misused
to facilitate illicit financial flows stemming from corruption, tax evasion
31 See Anti-Corruption Summit London 2016: Communiqué 12 May 2016, https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/anti-corruption-summit-communique
(accessed 19 October 2017).
32 See eg DS Kerzner & D W  Chodikoff ‘The OECD’s war on offshore tax evasion
1996–2014’ in DS Kerzner & D W  Chodikoff (eds) International tax evasion in the
global information age (Palgrave Macmillan: 2016); A  Miller & L  Oats Principles of
international taxation (Bloomsbury Professional: Hampsbury 2012).
33 Previously known as the ‘Forum on Harmful Tax Practices’.
34 Measured at 260 gigabytes, the total size of the leaked files obtained by the ICIJ was
more than 160 times larger than the leak of US State Department documents by
WikiLeaks in 2010. See G Ryle et al ‘Secret files expose offshore’s global impact’ ICIJ,
http://www.icij.org/offshore/secret-files-expose-offshores-global-impact (accessed
19 October 2017).
35 As above.
36 See Cockfield (n 18 above) at 485.
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and money laundering. The misuse of shell companies can be a severe
impediment to sustainable economic growth and sound governance. We
will make a concerted and collective effort to tackle this issue and improve
the transparency of companies and legal arrangements. Improving
transparency will also improve the investment climate, ease the security of
doing business and tackle corruption and bribery. It will support law
enforcement’s efforts to pursue criminal networks, enforce sanctions, and
identify and recover stolen assets.37
The G-8 subsequently committed to taking concrete action, based on
a number of principles considered fundamental to the transparency of
ownership and control of companies and legal arrangements. These
principles later were  largely reiterated by the G-20 in adopting the High-
Level Principles of Beneficial Ownership’ at the Brisbane Summit in
November 2014.
6.1 G-8/G-20 principles of beneficial ownership
• Beneficial ownership is defined in a way that captures the natural person(s)
who ultimately owns or controls the legal person or legal arrangement.
• Legal persons obtain and hold their beneficial ownership and basic
information onshore, and that this information is adequate, accurate, and
current.
• Trustees of express trusts (and other similar legal arrangements) maintain
adequate, accurate and current beneficial ownership information,
including information of settlors, the protector (if any) trustees and
beneficiaries.
• Relevant authorities have timely access to adequate, accurate and current
beneficial ownership information.
• Authorities understand the risks to which their AML/CFT regime is
exposed and implement effective and proportionate measures to target
those risks.
• The misuse of financial instruments and of certain shareholding
structures that may obstruct transparency, such as bearer shares and
nominee shareholders and directors, is prevented.
• Financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and
professions (DNFBPs) are subject to effective AML/CFT obligations to
identify and verify the beneficial ownership of their customers.
• Effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are available for
regulated businesses that do not comply with their obligations.
37 Lough Erne G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207771/Lough_Erne_2013_G8_Leaders_
Communique.pdf (accessed 19 October 2017). 
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• National authorities cooperate effectively domestically and
internationally to combat the abuse of companies and legal arrangements
for illicit activity.
In practice, these principles broadly reiterate requirements regarding the
transparency of ownership and control of companies and legal
arrangements that already had been in place for many years under the
FATF standards.38 Nonetheless, the commitment to action demonstrated
collective buy-in to these issues at the highest political level, and paved the
way for further strengthening of regulatory frameworks.
The European Commission sought to capitalise on this momentum,
passing the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (4th AMLD) in
December 2014. The new Directive brought the EU framework into line
with the revised 2012 FATF Recommendations by extending the scope of
the existing regime and strengthening obligations in a number of areas,
including the risk-based approach, ongoing monitoring requirements,
beneficial ownership identification and record keeping requirements,
politically-exposed persons (PEPs), the scope of predicate offences, and
third party equivalence. Controversially, the 4th AMLD also included
express requirements for EU member states to keep central registries of
accurate and current information on the ultimate beneficial owners of
legal entities. This requirement went beyond the wording of the final G-8
and G-20 Communiqués, which noted only that central registries were a
possible means of achieving compliance, rather than a necessary one. It is
unclear at this point how many jurisdictions will follow the lead of the
EU in mandating central registries for beneficial ownership information,
or how many will choose to make them publicly accessible. The UK and
Ukraine already have implemented public registries, while France, The
Netherlands, South Africa, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Kenya, Ghana and
Denmark have stated their intention to do so. Ireland, Australia, New
Zealand, Indonesia, Jordan, Norway and Georgia reportedly are
38 The FATF Standards comprise the FATF Recommendations, their Interpretive
Notes and applicable definitions in the Glossary. The FATF Recommendations set
out a comprehensive and consistent framework of measures that countries should
implement in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as
the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The first iteration of
the FATF Recommendations was published in 1990 (‘Forty Recommendations’),
and subsequently amended in 2001 to incorporate standards dealing with the issue of
terrorism financing (‘Eight Special Recommendations’). In 2003/04, the FATF made
revisions to the existing Recommendations, and added a Ninth Special
Recommendation (‘40+9 Recommendations’). A comprehensive review was again
conducted in 2012, and the Recommendations were expanded to deal with the
financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to be clearer on
transparency and tougher on corruption.
39 Country Statements from the UK Anti-Corruption Summit 2016 https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/anti-corruption-summit-country-statements
(accessed 19 October 2017) (France, The Netherlands, South Africa, Nigeria,
Afghanistan, Kenya and Ghana); see also Global Witness ‘Anti- corruption summit:
Afghan commitments a step forward in the fight against corruption’ 13 May 2016,
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considering doing the same.39 The 4th AMLD entered into force on 26
June 2017. 
Meanwhile, in July 2016, the European Commission subsequently
published further proposed amendments to reinforce the Directive
(unofficially termed the 5th AMLD), which inter alia will extend the scope
of the central registries to include trusts and other forms of legal
arrangements and enable public access on the basis of a demonstrated
‘legitimate interest’ (which is to be defined by each member state).40
Member states may also choose to grant wider public access at their
discretion although, should they do so, they must have due regard to the
balance between the public interest to combat money laundering and
terrorist-financing (ML/TF) and the protection of the fundamental rights
of individuals, in particular the right to privacy and the protection of
personal data.
However, these proposals have been strongly criticised in a February
2017 opinion issued by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS),
which found that they
significantly broaden access to beneficial ownership information by both
competent authorities and the public, as a policy tool to facilitate and
optimise enforcement of tax obligations. We see, in the way such solution is
implemented, a lack of proportionality, with significant and unnecessary risks
for the individual rights to privacy and data protection.41
The principle of proportionality requires that limitations to personal rights
and freedoms may only be made if they (i) are necessary; and (ii) genuinely
meet objectives of general interest (in this instance, as determined by the
EU) or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Accordingly,
the EDPS has recommended that access to beneficial ownership
information be limited only to those entities in charge of enforcing the law.
The proposed amendments remain under review, with both the European
Commission and European Council waiting for parliamentarians to agree
on their final negotiating positions. 
39 https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/afghanistan/anti-corruption-summit-afgha
n-commitments-step-forward-fight-against-corruption/ (accessed 19 October 2017).
40 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/20-money-
laundering-and- terrorist-financing/ (accessed 20 October 2017).
41 EDPS ‘Opinion on a Commission Proposal amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 and
Directive 2009/101/EC: Access to beneficial ownership information and data
protection implications, 2 February 2017.
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7 Fall-out from the Panama and Paradise Papers 
disclosures
On 3 April 2016, journalists from 107 media organisations in more than 80
countries released the first wave of stories reporting on 2.6 terabytes of
confidential information leaked to the German newspaper Süddeutsche
Zeitung from the database of Mossack Fonseca, the world’s fourth biggest
offshore law firm. The Panama Papers leak contained 11.5 million
documents, representing more data than the US diplomatic cables released
by WikiLeaks in 2010; the Offshore Leaks in 2013; the Luxembourg tax
files in 2014; and the HSBC files in 2015 combined. The files contained the
confidential records of over 214 000 companies, trusts and foundations set
up across the 21 secrecy jurisdictions where Mossack Fonseca operates,
and detailed the involvement of over 14 000 intermediaries (such as
lawyers and tax advisors) who directed their clients to use the firm’s
services. These records revealed details of the previously-hidden financial
dealings of 12 current and former heads of state; 61 associates of current or
former heads of state; and 128 current and former political and public
officials.
The political pressure was increased by the recent revelations, by what
came to be known as the Paradise Papers, which once again highlighted
the need to know who the ultimate owners of opaque vehicles are. There
were over seven million documents that were analysed by the International
Consortium of Journalists, suggesting that there was more than USD350
billion lost every year by countries in illicit flows. It is still too early to see
how governments will deal with the latest revelation.
7.1 G-20 call for action on tax and beneficial ownership 
transparency
At their meeting on 13 April 2016 in Washington DC, the G-20 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank governors called on the FATF and the Global
Forum to consider ways of improving the implementation of the
international standards on transparency, including on the availability of
beneficial ownership information and its international exchange. In
September/October 2016, the FATF and the Global Forum outlined their
initial proposals:
• Greater emphasis must be placed on beneficial ownership in follow-up
processes to both the FATF mutual evaluations and the peer reviews
conducted by the OECD Global Forum. 
• The Global Forum recently agreed upon new Terms of Reference (ToR)
for the second round of peer reviews of the Exchange of Information
Rules (EoIR) Standard. The new ToR require that all jurisdictions have
access to information regarding the beneficial ownership of entities and
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legal arrangements operating in their jurisdictions (as defined by the
FATF), and allow for its international exchange for tax compliance
purposes.
• This new round of reviews, which has just commenced, therefore will
include the assessment of the effectiveness of the implementation of the
beneficial ownership standard and should drive forward improvements in
implementation.
• Enhanced cooperation between the FATF and the Global Forum to
further ensure coherence and mutual reinforcement to ensure work is
mutually supportive, and promote clear and consistent recommendations
to improve implementation.
• Although the scope of FATF and Global Forum assessments differ, some
practical challenges recur in the context of different legal and
administrative systems, for instance how to ensure the accuracy of
ownership information held in a company registry, or how to enable
ownership information to be exchanged between fiscal and law
enforcement authorities, in both directions. For this reason, it is important
to ensure that countries receive clear and consistent recommendations on
how to improve their implementation of the international standards on
beneficial ownership for AML/CFT and tax purposes. This minimises
confusion on the part of assessed countries about what steps they need to
take to improve implementation. The FATF Secretariat and Global Forum
Secretariat will map where the respective standards and assessment
processes coincide, and consider ways to promote clear and consistent
recommendations to countries. 
• Engage with relevant bodies to compile and disseminate examples of
effective implementation for ensuring the availability, timely access to and
exchange of accurate and reliable legal and beneficial ownership
information for tax purposes.
The OECD has also indicated its willingness to the G-20 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank governors to undertake further work in the tax
area relating to beneficial ownership information for legal entities and
arrangements. Specifically, the OECD’s contribution, which is designed to
complement the FATF and Global Forum’s proposals, would focus on the
following components, with progress reported to the G-20 in 2017:42
• Gap analysis: Conduct an analysis to determine whether there are gaps
between tax compliance needs (both civil and criminal) for beneficial
ownership information, and the relevant FATF standards for AML and,
where gaps are identified, suggest possible solutions taking cost benefit
considerations into account;
• Designing structured and electronically searchable data sets of
ownership information: Review the existing data structures and formats
used for the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and the
Common Reporting Standard (CRS), referred to as ‘FATCA/CRS’, and
explore the benefits, costs and issues involved in the wider adoption of the
42 OECD Secretary-General’s tax report to G20 Finance Ministers, October 2016.
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existing FATCA/CRS common structure and related formats for possible
use by other repositories of ownership information such as registries,
designated non-financial businesses and professions.
• Domestic access to beneficial ownership information: Map the current
state of play with respect to the legal ability to countries and jurisdictions
to share or access beneficial ownership information amongst different
agencies domestically, including information received from a treaty party.
With the results of this mapping exercise, explore the possibility of
improving the sharing of beneficial ownership information between
competent authorities as well as other authorities, including tax authorities
in their ‘civil’ tax capacity.
• Improving international access to beneficial ownership information:
Map the current state of play concerning the legal rules with respect to
the ability to obtain beneficial ownership information both in the FATF
and tax domains, and evaluating the practical issues associated with
the existing framework with the goal of improving international access.
8 Conclusion
This is the background against which the chapters in this volume should be
read. This publication focuses on the experience of African countries in
counteracting illicit financial flows, which include bribery, money
laundering, tax evasion and other criminal activities. These studies are part
of a broader project on tax and good governance which were undertaken
over a three-year period.43
43 See http://www.wu.ac.at.at/taxlaw (accessed 19 October 2017).
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Attiya Waris
Abstract
Numerous papers have been published on illicit financial flows. This
includes not only academic papers but policies and reports from
international as well as continental and regional organisations and
institutions globally. The issue of illicit flows thus are being raised not only
at the academic, civil society and public level, but is also discussed by
political leaders. There is a growing body of work surrounding the definition
of the concept and how much is being transferred which remains disputed.
There is also some research into what is being transferred and how it is
being moved. This includes research on the global wealth and value chains
involved and the methods of transfer through the political, economic, legal
and accounting processes in order to facilitate cross-border financial flows.
This research has also successfully been made accessible to the general
public. Although globally there remains a lack of clarity on certain issues,
African states collectively and separately have taken certain steps, first and
foremost, building consensus by producing a joint UNECA/AU High Level
Panel Report on Illicit Financial Flows (HLP Report). This report reflects
the political consensus aimed for by heads of state on the continent. The
next almost inevitable step would be to examine how to implement the HLP
Report by tracking, controlling and stopping illicit financial flows. The
beginning of a meeting of minds between the social, economic, legal,
accounting and political domains was a necessity in order to place the issue
high enough on a political agenda to release the HLP Report. However, it is
now incumbent upon the very same actors and to push for the realisation of
legislative, regulation, policy and practical changes. 
In light of all the information now available to countries globally and
regionally, the issues this chapter deals with are the changes that are actually
taking place on the ground in countries to track, control and stop illicit
financial flows (IFFs). Some of the key areas that play a part in illicit
financial flows include, but are not limited to, anti-money laundering,
banking; taxation and corruption. This chapter, however, will be limited to
the actions taken in Africa at the international, continental, regional and
domestic levels from a treaty, legislative, regulatory, policy and practical
perspective on illicit financial flows to establish whether indeed there is
change on the continent. Part 1 introduces the issue of illicit financial flows.
Part 2 analyses the recommendations made by the HLP Report and
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critiques it. Part 3 analyses whether the continent, regions or countries are
moving in the direction of countering IFFs based on the recommendations
of the HLP Report; what direction is being taken; what steps being
considered and implemented and whether they reflect the HLP Report. Part
4 proposes recommendations based on current developments globally on
what other alternative or additional steps could be considered by African
governments to counter IFFs and Part 5 contains the conclusion.
1 Introduction
Illicit financial flows (IFFs) have been brought onto the international
agenda through the reports of think-tanks and civil society organisations in
an attempt to understand why countries that are rich in resources remain
in a cycle of poverty with growing inequalities.1 Figures reported are as
high as in the trillions of US dollars from developing countries and broken
down to 50 to 70 billion US dollars annually from Africa alone.2 This data
has been correlated to public spending and the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) to show how these losses could have improved living
standards if it had been tracked, controlled or stopped.3 Much of the data
that has been released globally has also been with reference to specific
cases and information on IFFs and the interconnections in one way or
another with many countries globally, and often involve African countries
either singly or in groups. The result is that there have been calls to effect
changes on the ground.4
In addition to the large figures involved and the type of acts
undertaken, the stakeholders are also wide-ranging and across the world
and it may be said that every single person in the world to one extent or
another is included. This includes the users or beneficiaries and the
enablers. Beneficiaries of IFFs include, first, the criminals who receive
money in exchange for the crime committed and, second, those seeking to
merely protect their money due to volatility in their home countries
(legally or illegally earned) and, third, those who explore loopholes in the
laws and regulations. The enablers include the finance professionals (for
example, lawyers, bankers and accountants) involved in the process;
1 GFI Illicit financial flows to and from developing countries: 2005-2014 (2017); TJN
‘Financial secrecy index 2015 results’ 2016, http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/
introduction/fsi-2015-results (accessed 14 December 2017).
2 AU/UNECA ‘Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa’
2015, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_
26feb_en.pdf (accessed 14 December 2017).
3 K Froburg & A Waris ‘Bringing the billions back’ (2010) 32 Global Studies, http://
www.medicusmundi.org/en/playground/rome2013/bringing-the-billions-back.-attiya
-waris.pdf/view?set_language=en (accessed 14 December 2017); A Waris &
M Kohonen ‘Linking taxation to the realisation of the Millennium Development
Goals in Africa’ in Rethinking development in an age of uncertainty Development Studies
Association, University of York, 2011, http://eadi.org/gc2011/waris-109.pdf
(accessed 14 December 2017).
4 Action Aid ‘Sweet nothings: The human cost of tax avoidance in Africa’ Lusaka,
Zambia: Action Aid, 2013; NCA The one billion dollar question (2012).
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government officials that allow and fail to enforce; and those who
deliberately break the law. As a result, concerns raised related to IFFs tend
to involve multiple issues, but may be broken down into the act: criminal
and non-criminal. Criminal activities involved in IFFs are linked to
smuggling (children, arms, narcotics, cash, slavery, stolen art, amongst
others); money laundering; corruption; and bribery and tax evasion. Non-
criminal activities include the use of loopholes in poorly-crafted or absent
laws, regulations and policies. 
Smuggling and other criminal activities have been a long-term concern
in IFF circles and there are treaties5 in place as well as diverse
organisations and government agencies6 working on different parts of the
issue. However, the financial area has not been addressed as effectively.
The non-criminal concerns remain completely ignored. As a result,
initially, tax administrations reacted swiftly across the continent with the
realisation of the necessity of cross-border tax audits which had never
before taken place in neighbouring countries.7 However, IFFs cannot be a
silo placed into one department or one part of a government but, rather,
concerns all sectors of government and governance. 
While this research and public activism have been ongoing, it has also
reached the politicians and policy makers, globally8 and in Africa.9 Since
2012, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African
Commission), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA) have continued to raise the issue of IFFs
to the level of the heads of state of the continent, first through a series of
resolutions, 10 then at the Tana Forum in 2012,11 then through a joint audit
5 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances 1988 (Vienna Convention); United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime 2000 (Palermo Convention); International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999; United Nations
Convention against Corruption 2003 (Merida Convention), among others.
6 FATF, Egmont Group, OECD, WB, IMF, UN, StAR, among others.
7 Action Aid ‘SABMiller to face tax audit in five African countries ActionAid UK’
6 May 2011, https://www.actionaid.org.uk/news-and-views/sabmiller-to-face-tax-
audit-in-five-african-countries-following-actionaid-report (accessed 14 December
2017).
8 ICIJ ‘The Panama papers’, https://panamapapers.icij.org/ (accessed 23 August
2017); ICIJ ‘Swiss leaks: Murky cash sheltered by bank secrecy – International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ https://www.icij.org/project/swiss-leaks
(accessed 29 August 2017); ICIJ ‘Explore the documents: Luxembourg leaks database
– International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’, https://www.icij.org/
project/luxembourg-leaks/explore-documents-luxembourg-leaks-database (accessed
29 August 2017).
9 Action Aid Calling time on tax avoidance (2010).
10 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘236: Resolution on Illicit Capital
Flight from Africa Resolutions 53rd ordinary session ACHPR’ April 2013; African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘193: Resolution on the Renewal of the
Mandate of the Working Group on Economic Social and Cultural Rights in Africa
Resolutions 50th ordinary session ACHPR’ November 2011 http://www.achpr.org/
sessions/50th/resolutions/193/ (accessed 18 August 2017); African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘321: Resolution on the Appointment of the Chairperson
and Reconstitution of the Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and
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of several tax agencies on the continent12 and, most recently, in 2015
through the release of the report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows (HLP Report).13 
The HLP Report breaks new ground, not only for the African
continent, but also for other developing countries and the world. It has
made strong recommendations and taken a clear stand on the issue of IFFs
that has globally caused ripples. However, enforcement continues to be a
weak point. This chapter will reflect on the HLP Report; take stock of the
recommendations made in the HLP Report and critique it; and analyse the
changes that have taken place since the release of the report in 2015 to
establish the level of enforcement that has taken place on the continent as
a result of the HLP Report.14 
2 Unpacking the magnitude of illicit financial flows 
in Africa and the HLP Report 
The HLP Report used figures from several authors to set out the magnitude
of the problem. Global financial integrity was its main point of reference
on the magnitude of IFFs. It supported its approach by quoting Global
Financial Integrity’s (GFI) data that between 2005 and 2014, IFFs from
the south were 4,6 to 7,2 per cent of developing countries' total trade, while
such inflows were 9,5 to 16,8 per cent, with about 3,3 per cent of IFFs over
this period being attributed to fraudulent trade mis-invoicing or ‘transfer
pricing'. They state that since 2012, emerging and developing countries
have lost over a trillion dollars yearly that could have been invested
productively in industry, agriculture, healthcare, education or
infrastructure. The breakdown of where these IFFs are most prevalent in
developing countries is as follows: transnational criminal activities
(counterfeiting (USD923 million to USD1.13 billion)); drug trafficking
(USD426 billion to USD652 billion); illegal logging (USD52 billion to
10 Human Rights Violations in Africa and Renewal of Its Mandate Resolutions 57th
ordinary session ACHPR’ November 2015, http://www.achpr.org/sessions/57th/
resolutions/321/ (accessed 18 August 2017); 316: Resolution on the Appointment of
the Chairperson of the Working Group on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
Africa and Renewal of the Mandate of its Members.
11 ‘Tana 2012 Speeches – Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa’ 378, http://
www.tanaforum.org/old-website-2016/document-view/be28b12a5f4b50eb5378/?ms
=c65396cfa5578d4379af&ps=455jksff2295f7308faf&ls=be28b12a5f4b50eb5 (accessed
1 November 2017). See also A Cobham ‘The impacts of illicit financial flows on peace
and security in Africa’ Tana High Level Forum on Peace and Security in Africa
Discussion Paper (2014) http://www.tanaforum.org/old-website-2016/document
view/be28b12a5f4b50eb5378/?ms=6e5bd68f63445602ef8f&ps=455jksff2295f7308faf
&ls=be28b12a5f4b50eb5378 (accessed 18 August 2017).
12 Within regional groups of countries, a joint audit was conducted of SAB Miller, a UK
multinational corporation (MNC) by the tax officials of South Africa, Ghana, Zambia,
Tanzania and Mauritius. Action Aid, ‘SABMiller to face tax audit in five African
Countries’ ActionAid UK.
13 AU/UNECA ‘Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa’.
14 As above.
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USD157 billion); human trafficking (USD150.2 billion); illegal mining
(USD12 billion to USD48 billion); illegal fishing (USD15.5 billion to
USD36.4 billion); illegal wildlife trade (USD5 billion to USD23 billion);
crude oil theft (USD5.2 billion to USD11.9 billion); small arms and light
weapons trafficking (USD1.7 billion to USD3.5 billion); organ trafficking
(USD840 million to USD1.7 billion); trafficking in cultural property
(USD1.2 billion to USD1.6 billion); thus totaling somewhere between
USD1.6 trillion and USD2.2 trillion. The GFI report estimates that
developing countries lost between USD620 billion and USD970 billion in
illicit outflows in 2014. IFFs from the south are estimated at 4.2 to 6.6 per
cent of total developing country trade for 2014, while inflows were 9.5 to
17.4 per cent. Total IFFs of all developing countries in 2014 were
estimated at USD2.01 to USD3.507 trillion.15
GFI estimates have been criticised, for instance, for making unrealistic
assumptions about trade-related transport costs and ignoring other
explanations for ‘errors'. For example, estimated GFI outflows include
IFFs and trade mis-invoicing estimated from inconsistencies in trade data.
Despite these weaknesses in data, there are other general concerns that
further limit the validity of the data and will more likely result in them
being higher than is being stated. IFFs can only be calculated correctly if
all the figures are passing through formal institutions such as banking
institutions, or customs databases where they may be documented.
Globally, however, cash payments are still prevalent and in Africa as well
as other developing countries it is not merely cash but barter trade in the
micro, small, medium and/or large-scale, depending on the individual
transaction. For example, the exchange of ivory for small arms is a well-
known transaction on the African continent.16 As a result, no exact figures
on IFFs in reality are available to measure the true extent of IFFs. The GFI
figures set out above that are now infamous are those of the billions and
trillions. However, these are limited in different ways to trade mis-
invoicing mis-pricing or even customs data. Criminal activities and their
financing remain undetermined. 
When it comes to actual state-collected data, many African countries,
notwithstanding, do not release their actual books of accounts or budgets.
The reasons given include that, because loan terms are so heavy, the state
is attempting to retain more money for development; hiding corruption; or
even a failure to keep proper records. In 2016, the Zimbabwean
Commissioner-General for Taxation was suspended and investigated
15 GFI Illicit financial flows to and from developing countries: 2005-2014.
16 RCSA ‘The nexus between poaching and proliferation of illicit small arms and light
weapons regional report: Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania’ (Nairobi, Kenya: Regional Centre on Small Arms,
2017) 4.
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regarding issues of corruption.17 He later resigned in 2017.18 Countries in
conflict or those that have in the past had sanctions may not have
accounted at all for certain periods. A recent publication on African data
analysis excluded Zimbabwe and Somalia: Zimbabwe due to a lack of
access to data for the period when they were subjected to sanctions; and
Somalia also lacked access as they were and still are involved in a civil
war.19
There is no data at all on treaty-shopping and abuse for the following
reasons: First, no cost benefit analyses have to date been carried out by
African countries to actually assess this before a treaty is signed or even
periodically after signature to ensure continued relevance and validity of
the treaty and the effect of the abuses and shopping. However, Tanzania
recently passed a law requiring that this be carried out in future not only
before exemptions are granted, but also for capital expenditure separately
in the mining sector.20 However, since tax havens or secrecy jurisdictions
do not allow access to beneficial owners, one cannot ascertain the true
owner of a corporation and its structure in order to do a more detailed
analysis. The unpacking of this data continues to occur only through the
work of leaks and global scandals, such as LuxLeaks;21 Swiss Leaks;22
WikiLeaks;23 the Panama Papers;24 and, more recently, the Apple-Ireland
case25 and the Paradise Papers.26 The HLP Report uses this type of data
as this is all that is currently available, but one must remain fully aware that
the figures, while at best only estimates, seem to be estimates only of one
part of the entire amount of IFFs flowing into and out of the African
continent.
With this background in mind, the AU tasked a high-level panel,
chaired by Thabo Mbeki, to examine IFFs and their impact on Africa’s
17 ‘#Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) Commissioner General, Mr Gershom Pasi
Suspended’ Zimbabwe Today (blog), 6 May 2016, https://zimbabwe-today.com/zimra-
commissioner-general-suspended/ (accessed 14 December 2017).
18 ‘Breaking: Zimra boss Pasi resigns’ The Zimbabwe Independent (blog) 24 May 2017,
https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/05/24/zimra-boss-pasi-resigns/ (accessed
14 December 2017).
19 Waris and Kohonen (n 3 above).
20 N Woodroffe et al Tanzania’s new natural resources legislation: What will change (2017) 6.
21 ICIJ ‘Explore the documents: Luxembourg Leaks Database’ International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, https://www.icij.org/investigations/luxem
bourg-leaks/explore-documents-luxembourg-leaks-database/ (accessed 14 December
2017).
22 ICIJ ‘Swiss Leaks: Murky cash sheltered by bank secrecy, International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists, https://www.icij.org/investigations/swiss-leaks/ (accessed
14 December 2017)
23 WikiLeaks, https://wikileaks.org/ (accessed 23 August 2017).
24 ICIJ ‘The Panama Papers’.
25 ‘Ireland “taking too long” to collect apple tax and may face court’, https://
www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/ireland-taking-too-long-to-collect-apple-
tax-and-may-face-court-1.3089031 (accessed 29 August 2017).
26 ‘Paradise Papers: Secrets of the global elite’ International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists (blog), https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/ (accessed
6 November 2017).
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development.27 The mandate of the panel was to determine the nature and
patterns of IFFs from Africa; to establish the level of IFFs from the
continent; to assess the complex and long-term implications of IFFs for
development; to raise awareness among African governments, citizens and
international development partners of the scale and effect of such financial
outflows on development; and to propose policies and mobilise support for
practices that would reverse such illicit financial outflows.28 
The report recommended that there should be a unified global
architecture on the issue of IFFs in the form of a UN declaration on the
issue of IFFs; that IFFs are to be included in the post-2015 Development
Agenda; and that Africa should initiate steps for the UN to adopt a unified
policy instrument on IFFs. On the issue of the methodology to achieve the
recommendations, the report suggested that, in order to control and stop
IFFs out of the country, with specific reference to multi-national
enterprises (MNEs), mis-invoicing, the arm’s length principle and transfer
pricing needed to be addressed. This effectively ties in with the
international debates on base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) that
includes both the legal and illegal activities that MNEs are engaged in. 
One of the immediate results of the HLP Report was that the AU
raised the issue of IFFs to the presidential level and tasked itself, with the
support of UNECA, to begin to work on the issues and the impact it was
having on the continent as well as recommending changes required in law
and policy. UNECA subsequently released a report by reassessing the data
and recalculated the figures using its own methodology. It also began
unpacking the IFF data available to set out the region most affected, the
countries with the weakest fiscal systems and the sectors with the highest
number of IFFs. 
Since the release of the HLP Report, there have been attempts to assess
the figures by UNECA as well as the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD). The conclusion currently is that the IFFs
from the African continent annually comes to between USD50 and
USD70 billion per annum. 
3 HLP definition of IFFs and priority areas of IFF 
losses
The definition of IFF remains contentious globally. The most common
definition in the literature is the legalistic interpretation of IFFs, which
suggests that IFFs refers to money that is earned, transferred or used in
27 United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa ‘Illicit financial flow: Report of the
High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa’ (2015) https://www.
uneca.org/iff (accessed 18 August 2017).
28 AU/UNECA ‘Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa’.
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contravention of existing laws. In some cases, this money is earned
illegally, such as through organised crime; money laundering; drug
trafficking to embezzlement; terrorist financing; and bribery.29 In other
cases, the money could have been earned legally but transferred out of the
country illegally by circumventing currency controls or customs control.
An example of customs fraud is trade mis-invoicing involving buyers and
sellers presenting fraudulent documentation to customs officials. These
persons falsify the value of their trade by under or over-invoicing their
trade documents so as to be less or more than the actual market value in
order to circumvent the payment of customs duties.30 In other cases,
money could have been earned legally, but the tax on the same is evaded
through illegal means of not complying with countries’ tax laws, for
instance, by deliberately falsifying tax returns and books of account.
Criminal prosecution is required to apprehend the perpetrators of the
above illegal activities.
In terms of the legal interpretation of IFFs, tax evasion, which is
illegal, forms part of IFFs. However, tax avoidance is considered not to fall
under IFFs, since tax literature defines it as involving the arrangement of
one’s affairs to pay less tax by utilising loopholes in tax laws and exploiting
these within legal parameters.31 This interpretation is backed up by earlier
British court decisions, such as Duke of Westminster32 that held the view that
‘every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching
under the appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would be’, and that no
legal or moral obligation rests upon a taxpayer to pay higher taxes than he
or she is legally bound to under the law.33
An alternative approach used by many analysts of IFFs is to define
these more broadly, based on the understanding that ‘illicit’ does not refer
only to the illegal. Indeed, the Oxford English dictionary defines illicit as ‘not
authorised or allowed; improper, irregular; esp not sanctioned by law, rule,
or custom; unlawful, forbidden’, which is much broader than only the
29 RW Baker, Capitalism’s achilles heel: Dirty money and how to renew the free-market system
(John Wiley & Sons, 2005).Raymond Baker has witnessed the free-market system
operating illicitly and corruptly, with devastating consequences. In Capitalism’s
Achilles Heel, Baker takes readers on a fascinating journey through the global free-
market system and reveals how dirty money, poverty, and inequality are inextricably
intertwined. Readers will discover how small illicit transactions lead to massive
illegalities and how staggering global income disparities are worsened by the
illegalities that permeate international capitalism. Drawing on his experiences, Baker
shows how Western banks and businesses use secret transactions and ignore laws
while handling some $1 trillion in illicit proceeds each year. He also illustrates how
businesspeople, criminals, and kleptocrats perfect the same techniques to shift funds
and how these tactics negatively affect individuals, institutions, and countries. 
30 A Oguttu, “Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa – Part 1: Africa’s Response
to the OECD BEPS Action Plan” (UK: ICTD, 2016).
31 A Rapakko, Base company taxation (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989), 39.
32 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminster, Appeal Cases 1 (1936).
33 S Blankenburg and M Khan, ‘Governance and Illicit Flows,’ in Draining development?
controlling flows of illicit funds from developing countries Peter Reuter (ed) (Washington DC:
World Bank, 2012), 21–68.
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illegal.34 According to this view, excessive tax avoidance practices should
be seen as improper and/or not sanctioned by custom, especially given the
backlash against such practices illustrated by the public outrage against
illegitimate but legal commercial activities in the wake of the 2008/2009
global financial crisis, when non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
raised concerns about companies paying little or no corporation tax in the
countries where they do business.35 This prompted investigations by the
United Kingdom on corporations such as Google, Amazon, Starbucks,
Thames Water, Vodafone and Cadbury (before the takeover by Kraft),
which revealed how these companies used aggressive tax avoidance
schemes to shift profits to low-tax countries. This was seen as a failure to
live up to the expectations of societal norms. In line with this second
definition of ‘illicit’ above, aggressive tax avoidance practices by a
multinational enterprise (MNE) would thus be deemed illegitimate and
falling under the broad interpretation of IFFs.
The HLP Report brought consensus from an African perspective by
defining illicit financial flows as
money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilised. These funds typically
originate from three sources: commercial tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and
abusive transfer pricing; criminal activities, including the drug trade, human
trafficking, illegal arms dealing, and smuggling of contraband; and bribery
and theft by corrupt government officials. 
This broader definition of IFFs seems to be truer to the meaning of ‘illicit’.
An even more powerful argument for including aggressive tax avoidance
in illicit financial flows is that it should be considered as harmful and,
therefore, illicit, due to the negative impact that it has on development.36
Therefore, it needs to be measured, tracked and stopped. From a practical
point of view, given that tax avoidance and tax evasion both result from
weak tax laws (that are difficult to interpret and enforce in the case of tax
evasion), it would seem important to measure tax avoidance along with
tax avoidance in order to give a full appreciation of a country’s losses due
to weaknesses in its tax system. In addition, in many cases it is impossible
for the researcher to tell, with the data currently publicly available, whether
a particular flow represents tax evasion or tax avoidance, which is another
argument for measuring them together. 
However, the reason that this broader definition was not only chosen
by the HLP Report, but why it continues to be relevant and important is
34 C Soanes & A Stevenson (eds) The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th ed., Oxford
Reference Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), http://www.oxford
reference.com/views/SEARCH_RESULTS.html?y=0&q=tax&x=0&ssid=711209064
&scope=global&time=0.740406542854625.
35 Christian Aid ‘Death and taxes’ (London: Christian Aid, 2008).
36 AU/UNECA ‘Report of the High Level Panel   on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa’
(2015) http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report
_26feb_en.pdf.
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made clearer through the information emerging in the past two years.
Research conducted, for example, on transfer pricing in Africa reveals that
only 18 countries have transfer pricing legislation. This would mean that
there is no law regulating transfer pricing in the remaining 36 countries of
the continent. Based on this alone, it would mean that the IFFs out of
African countries that are not at all documented would be any type of
transfer pricing arrangement carried out in these 36 countries where it is
neither legal nor illegal: Tax planning thus comes in to take advantage of
this weakness in the law in structuring companies to either reduce their tax
burden or to whiten their black money through corporate structures.37 This
single example, coupled with barter trade as well as cash movements
across the continent, highlights why inclusion of tax avoidance in the
discussion on IFFs becomes so crucial for the definition of IFF and the
need to develop regulatory systems on the African continent.
4 African measures countering illicit financial 
flows
The HLP Report identified three fields of reform at different geographical
levels. This chapter, accordingly, will assess what changes have taken
place in anti-money laundering (AML); taxation and corruption in the past
two years during and after the release of the report at several levels:
globally, continentally, regionally and domestic where possible in their
relationship with IFFs. 
Without specific reference to African involvement, there already has
been some actions taken globally. The United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), after producing a report,38 passed a resolution titled
‘Strengthening international co-operation’ in preventing and combating
illicit financial flows linked to drug trafficking, from the anti-money
laundering perspective.39 There also has been much activity at the level of
the UN Tax Committee as well as at the OECD. However, at the level of
corruption globally, there has been no clear global approach or activity
with the actions being undertaken being part of other actions, such as anti-
money laundering or tax evasion and avoidance. It has been limited
mainly to domestic activity of states and practitioners in conferences with
37 A Waris ‘Transfer pricing in Kenya’ ICTD Working Paper 69 (2017)
38 Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational
organized crimes (Vienna 2011).
39 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Strengthening International Co-
Operation in Preventing and Combating Illicit Financial Flows Linked to Drug
Trafficking, from the Anti-Money-Laundering Perspective, Resolution 58/6, 2015,
C Soanes & A Stevenson (eds) The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th ed., Oxford
Reference Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), http://www.oxford
reference.com/views/SEARCH_RESULTS.html?y=0&q=tax&x=0&ssid=711209064
&scope=global&time=0.740406542854625 (accessed 18 August 2017).
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calls for action, but no specific conventions or policy and, on the other
hand, groupings of states like the G20 and G30 (through the OECD).
4.1 Global level recommendations
The global recommendations of the HLP Report were two-pronged. The
first was to guide Africa on what stand it should take at international fora
and actions they ought to spearhead. The second was with reference to the
approach African states should take in their bilateral and multilateral
relations with non-African states and their global partners. As a result, this
section is divided into these two sub-sections in order to unpack the status
of the recommended measures.
4.2 African action on the global level
The HLP Report called for a UN declaration on the issue of IFFs in Africa
and that it should initiate steps for the UN to adopt a unified policy
instrument on IFFs. However, to date this has not taken place and there
has been no action from African states to draft either a declaration or
policy instrument to be taken forward to the UN. However, in February
2016 the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows (HLPIFF) discussed
its findings with UN member states at a special briefing of the UN
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).40 
In June 2015, after the release of the HLP Report, the AU passed a
special resolution on IFFs,41 where it asked UNECA, the African
Development Bank and regional economic communities (RECs) to submit
annual reports on the progress of the counter-measures to IFFs.42 These
reports, however, have as yet not been released and should have been
available after June 2016. However, despite several attempts to inquire
into the status of this report, nothing has as yet been released.43 The same
resolution also called for the AU, UNECA and the African Capacity
Building Foundation and other development partners to build capacities of
AU member states and institutions, particularly in contract negotiation,
tax management, regulatory and legal frameworks, policies, money
laundering, asset recovery and repatriation, and resource governance for
effective and optimal management and governance of African natural
40 International Institute for Sustainable Development ‘Panel: Addressing illicit financial
flows could help finance SDGs | IISD’s SDG Knowledge Hub | IISD’ February 2016,
http://sdg.iisd.org/news/panel-addressing-illicit-financial-flows-could-help-finance-
sdgs/ (accessed 18 August 2017).
41 African Union ‘Assembly Special Declaration on Illicit Financial Flows: African
Union’ The African Union Commission, February 2015, https://au.int/en/documents/
29831/assembly-special-declaration-illicit-financial-flows (accessed 18 August 2017).
42 African Union (n 33 above) para 4.
43 The author contacted the AU in late 2006 and was told that once it was ready, the
report would be online, but the website accessed on 30 October 2017 showed no report
release.
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resources. The negotiations here seem to be ongoing, but there has been no
official statement on the progress.
The same AU resolution also reiterated that the issue of international
cooperation on IFFs be raised in the post-2015 Development Agenda. This
was done and, although the Addis Ababa report of 2015 does make
reference to IFFs, African states failed to achieve the creation of a UN tax
body which could have taken the form of an upgrade of the UN Tax
Committee. Interestingly, the countries that broke the deadlock in Addis
Ababa included South Africa and Ethiopia, reflecting the fact that, despite
the passing of the AU resolution, the actual coherence of a single African
standpoint seems out of reach as domestic and possibly regional concerns
continue to trump the continental concerns. However, despite this setback,
the Addis Ababa tax initiative was set up to build capacity, and African
countries that joined include Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and
Malawi.44
The report also recommended that the international community
eliminate secrecy jurisdictions, introduce transparency in financial
transfers and crack down on money laundering, and that there be stronger
collaboration between Africa and the US, EU, G8 and G20 for greater
transparency in international banking and the UN, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to play a more coherent and
visible role in tackling IFFs. This seems not to have taken place as yet,
although negotiations seem to be ongoing.
4.3 Bilateral relations between African and non-African 
countries and institutions
In the bilateral relations between African and non-African countries and
institutions, several specific recommendations were made by the HLP
Report. In addition, several other activities continued to take place. These
recommendations are a combination of banking and taxation with
criminal implications. A series of technical recommendations were made
in the HLP Report, some of which already were being implemented.
4.3.1 Mis-invoicing and the Bank for International Settlements
In the case of mis-invoicing, the HLP Report requested that the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) publish the data it holds on international
44 Common African Position (CAP) ‘Addis tax initiative launched: Common African
position on the post-2015 development agenda’ http://cap.africa-platform.org/news/
addis-tax-initiative-launched (accessed 18 August 2017). Other countries included
Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Denmark, Ethiopia, European Commission, Finland,
France, Italy, Germany, Indonesia, South Korea, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, The
Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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banking assets by country of origin and destination in a matrix format,
along the lines of the data published by the IMF for bilateral trade; foreign
direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment, so that it can inform the
analysis of IFFs from Africa.45 It remains unclear whether any attempts
have been made to contact the BIS requesting a change to its data matrices.
However, a brief analysis of their website in June 2017 revealed that the
data still was not available according to the parameters outlined in the
HLP Report. 
4.3.2 Arm’s length principle and free access to comparables databases
In order to resolve issues of the arm’s length principle availability of
comparable pricing data on goods and services, national and multilateral
agencies are to make fully and freely available, and in a timely manner,
data on the pricing of goods and services in international transactions,
according to accepted coding categories. This remains unresolved.
However, several African countries have purchased access to pan-
European databases. Kenya in 2011 purchased the database on
comparables, and the initial use was regarded as successful.46 South Africa
since 2012 also has had access to a comparable database.47 The only other
countries that currently have access in Africa are Algeria48 and Uganda.49
The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), however, currently is
investigating the possibility of the purchase of a database for collective
use.50
The use of the information from the pan-European databases
continues to be contested and, despite this recommendation, it remains
unconvincing whether the databases really are of any long-term use at
all.51 Examples of the use of the database in Kenya seem to be providing
45 Bank for International Settlement BIS Statistical Bulletin, Monetary and Economic
Department, March 2016, https://www.bis.org/statistics/bulletin1603.pdf#page=8
(accessed 18 August 2017).
46 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) ‘Transfer pricing and developing countries – Kenya
2012’ https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/.../trpr_dev_count_app
_d.pdf (accessed 18 August 2017).
47 United Nations ‘Eighth Session of the Committee of Experts on International Co-
operation in Tax Matters’ Financing for Development, South Africa 2011, http://
www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/eighthsession/Chap10_CPSouthAfrica_20120901_v3_HC-
accp.pdf. (accessed 18 August 2017).
48 Deloitte Global transfer pricing country guide 2015 https://www2.deloitte.com/content/
dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-transfer-pricing-country-guide-
2015.pdf (accessed 18 August 2017).
49 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) ‘Transfer pricing and developing countries – Uganda
2012’ https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/transfer-pricing/management-strategy/as
sets/pwc-transfer-pricing-africa-pdf.pdf (accessed 18 August 2017).
50 As above.
51 A Waris ‘International Centre for Tax Development, 5th Annual Centre Meeting
(Presentations) – ICTD’ 2016 http://www.ictd.ac/news-events/2-uncategorised/170-
ictd-5th-annual-centre-meeting (accessed 18 August 2017).
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mixed results.52 However, there is a need to build local databases, but it
remains unclear as to which actions are being taken in this regard. 
4.3.3 Publicly-available disaggregated MNC financial information
In relation to states outside Africa, the report recommended that partners
should require: publicly-available disaggregated financial information on
their MNCs; require beneficial ownership information for incorporation;
elaborate a global governance framework for asset freezing, management
and repatriation. Thus far, this is being discussed in the Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) project at the OECD and the UN Tax Committee
and the actions vary based on whether there is an existing agreement with
the partner country for the exchange of information. 
In the case of Kenya, a request for information provided a positive
response from the UK but a negative response from Germany.53 This
illustrates that there is a lack of clarity on the types of information that may
be requested and how to make a request, as each country still follows a
different domestic law-governed process. However, it identified the need
to have a coherent and single approach to access to information and more
work on transparency from an African perspective on what all companies
working with African states ought to do. Perhaps a template on the
exchange of information from an African perspective would be one way of
resolving this and bring certainty into the discussions. A global endeavour
to counter some issues related to this includes the development of a rule on
country-by-country reporting. However, despite this, the recent Kenyan
experience shows that even in EU states there is no coherent
understanding of what information should be shared despite the OECD
having standard forms.
4.3.4 Transparency and public debt audits
An interesting development on the side of lenders is the Norwegian
government’s plan for an independent audit of all its bilateral debts owed
by seven developing countries.54 Norway has been in the forefront of
efforts to address issues of odious debt. The countries whose debts to
Norway will be audited include Egypt, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
The aims of the audit are to promote financial transparency and to test the
new UN Principles on Responsible Lending and Borrowing, which were
launched by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) in 2012. 
52 A Waris ‘Transfer pricing in Kenya’ ICTD Working Paper Series 69 (forthcoming).
53 As above.
54 IH Kvangraven ‘Exportable’ in How to make the Norwegian debt audit transferable to other
countries. Oslo, Norway: The Norwegian Coalition for Debt Cancellation (SLUG) (2012).
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5 Continental and regional level multilateral 
agreements
Continental-level conventions offer a framework to work towards the
harmonisation and co-ordination of national initiatives. The most
comprehensive existing framework is the African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption.55 A further area in which regional
groupings could take a lead in cooperating is in the use of customs data.
First, by sharing trade price data, countries automatically expand the data
set against which they can judge and identify abnormal pricing – and this
can be done in real time. Second, in the Open Government Guide ‘follow-
the-money’ partnerships, working with major trading partners to identify
abusive pricing happening at each end of the same transactions. Starting
such a process on a regional basis could in its own right be powerful, and
also provide a demonstration to other trade partners of the value of
cooperation. Joint audits, as are being spearheaded by the ATAF, also
need to continue through the sharing of technology and databases at the
regional and continental levels, and the automatic exchange of tax
information among African countries. This is partially being dealt with by
the ATAF.
5.1 Domestic level recommendations
At the domestic level, the HLP Report made several recommendations.
This section will not only canvass the recommendations made by BEPS
and the HLP Report, but also additional attempts that are being made by
African countries. The section is divided into two: the technical issues that
need reform and the administrative reforms.
5.1.1 Technical legal and policy reforms
There have been several reforms of law and policy that have been clearly
identified as crucial to reduce and prevent IFFs. These include transfer
pricing; beneficial ownership; country-by-country reform; and the review
of tax treaties. 
First, each African country should establish a transfer pricing laws and
policy. Currently, only 18 African countries have transfer pricing laws in
their domestic frameworks. This means that whether or not there is a
double taxation agreement (DTA) in place on a cross-border tax issue,
there still is no possibility of monitoring issues of transfer pricing without
55 African Union, 'Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption' (2003).
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a clear legislative framework in place.56 The reform of this law with its
required regulations will mean that African states should require
multinational corporations operating in their countries to provide the
revenue authority and/or their transfer pricing units with a comprehensive
report showing their disaggregated financial reporting on a country-by-
country or subsidiary-by-subsidiary basis. African governments could also
consider developing a format for this reporting that would be acceptable to
multiple African revenue authorities, which would allow for the cross-
border assessment of the growing African owned multinational enterprises
(MNEs).57 An Angolan transfer pricing regime was introduced by
Presidential Decree 147/13 on 1 October 2013, applying to all domestic
and cross-border commercial transactions entered into between qualifying
taxpayers and related entities from 1 January 2013. Order 599/14 of 24
March 2014 sets out a list of ‘major taxpayers’ and their requirements to
prepare a transfer pricing report. The transfer pricing rules present a
number of challenges for affected taxpayers, including a requirement that
transfer pricing documentation should be prepared in Portuguese.58 
Second, intentional or inaccurate stating of price quantity, quality or
other aspects of trade in goods and services to manipulate or evade
taxation should be made illegal. This could take the form of strengthening
the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in a country. However, there
should also be high penalties for the failure to do so as well as criminal
sanctions on chief executive officers, directors and their accountants,
auditors and lawyers. National legislations not always agree on what is
considered a prosecutable financial offence, and this opens avenues for
agents to evade taxes, to move money illegally across borders and launder
it in banking systems. For example, a case study on Botswana, Tanzania
and Zambia found that, while Zambia recognises abusive transfer pricing
as a crime, the other two countries do not.59 The harmonisation of
legislation across countries is necessary to close avenues for ‘criminal
arbitrage’ across national boundaries.
Third, the registry of companies should be bolstered and digitised and
there should be a clear register of companies for tax purposes where
domestically-registered companies and their foreign-related party data
ought to be accessible. 
56 The Tanzanian Regulations allow for unilateral, bilateral and multilateral APAs,
which are valid for a maximum period of five years, subject to annual compliance
requirements. 
57 A Waris ‘Rwanda – understanding transfer pricing’ International Transfer Pricing Journal
http://www.academia.edu/7077530/Rwanda_-_Understanding_Transfer_Pricing
(accessed 18 August 2017).
58 C Becker ‘Status of transfer pricing in Africa (Part I) – Tax – South Africa’ Mondaq
September 2014 http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/340902/tax+authorities/
Status+Of+Transfer+Pricing+In+Africa+Part+I (accessed 18 August 2017).
59 C Goredema ‘Combating illicit financial flows and related corruption in Africa:
Towards a more integrated and effective approach’ (2011) 12 U4 Issue 14.
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Fourth, customs should use available databases to compare prices.
This currently is not in place, and the assessment remains based on an ad
hoc and often case by case basis relying on documentation like receipts,
although the customs officials in some countries check online prices in
making an assessment of goods. The World Customs organisation have a
role to play in this, which to date remains unoccupied as no institutions
have come forward to take up this role as yet at a global level
Fifth, states ought to start collecting trade transaction data. National
and multilateral agencies ought to make fully and freely available, and in
a timely manner, data on the pricing of goods and services in international
transactions. It is not clear whether any countries are specifically doing
this. However, the open data revolution currently taking place has opened
up much information that still leaves out much transactional data. Since
banks already do this through the central bank clearing centre, extending
this should not be difficult to enforce with joining of the databases of the
central bank and with the revenue authority to triangulate the issue.
Sixth, automatic exchange of tax information globally, subject to
national capacity and attention to necessary confidentiality. In several
African countries there have been steps to pass freedom of information
legislation which would allow the revenue authority (RA) in principle to
access the necessary data domestically. However, this remains untested. In
addition, there are discussions on the global accessibility of information to
which African states have added their call internationally, but no similar
issue has been raised domestically. This possibly is as a result of there being
a presumption that African countries mainly will be the recipients of
information. However, in reality, several African countries, including
Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa and Tunisia, will be suppliers of
information as they also house home-grown MNEs. 
Seventh, beneficial ownership information should be provided when
companies are incorporated or trusts and foundations are registered. The
current status in most African countries is that the companies’ registries are
not updated and the digitisation is not complete. In some countries, such
as Kenya, this process has been pending for almost 20 years. The result is
that the issue of a repository that is reliable, up to date and easily
accessible, becomes a problem and, with the added nuance of a beneficial
ownership registry, the structures remain uncrystallised and laws enabling
the collection of this data in most cases have not even been drafted.
Eighth, thus far there seems to have been discussions on country-by-
country reporting in the ATAF and, as a result of the Davis Committee
recommendations, South Africa has commenced with the implementation
of the Country by Country (CbC) Reporting Standard by the South African
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Revenue Service (SARS) will come into effect through regulations this
year.60
Ninth, the review of current and prospective double taxation
conventions, particularly those in place with jurisdictions that are
significant destinations of IFFs, to ensure that they do not provide
opportunities for abuse. Since the discussion on treaty review came to the
forefront, Mauritius has reviewed its treaty with India. Rwanda revoked its
treaty with Mauritius and subsequently signed a revised version which
allowed for the taxation of management services in Rwanda before the
repatriation of the amount to Mauritius. In Mozambique, the government
ceased to sign tax treaties and has started reviewing old treaties, starting
with the treaty with the tax haven of Mauritius. In Nigeria, the Senate and
National Assembly raised queries regarding tax incentives and the
granting of pioneer status to companies, and one of the nation’s anti-
corruption agencies took a special interest in the processes for granting
incentives. Nigeria’s National Assembly issued a directive that the new tax
treaties should go to parliament for review.
Tenth, regional integration arrangements to introduce accepted
standards for tax incentives to prevent harmful competition in the effort to
attract foreign direct investment should be used. Currently there are
discussions in the separate regional blocs of the East African Community
(EAC), Southern African Development Corporation (SADC), Economic
Community for West African States (ECOWAS), the Magreb as well as
Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) to set up the
joint sharing of data as well as a shared model double taxation agreement
(DTA) developed in the East African Community (EAC). Many countries
also are members of ATAF. The harmonisation of legislation across
countries is necessary to close avenues for ‘criminal arbitrage’ across
national boundaries.
Eleventh, policy activities, such as a national action plan to counter
IFFs, should be developed. Thus far, in Africa the only countries to
develop a plan include Burkina Faso, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Niger,
Senegal and Sierra Leone. In addition, these countries are part of the
Partnership on Illicit Finance that include Burkina-Faso, Kenya, Liberia,
Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and the US.61
Finally, join such initiatives as FATF and EITI Institutional support
for these measures. Most African countries already are members of the
regional bodies under the FATF, including Eastern and Southern Africa
60 A Camay ‘Draft regulations for the implementation of country-by-country reporting
published in South Africa – Tax – South Africa’ Mondaq, May 2016, http://
www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/490030/tax+authorities/Be+Cleared+Online
(accessed 18 August 2017).
61 M Mulikelela ‘Times of Zambia: AfDB to curb illicit financial flows’ http://www.
times.co.zm/?p=85754 (accessed 18 August 2017).
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Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), Middle East and North
Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), Inter-Governmental
Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) and
Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC). Only 17
countries are Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) compliant
with four in the process of implementation and one suspended.
5.1.2 Administrative reforms
The HLP Report listed out in detail that there was a need to establish or
strengthen the independent institutions and agencies of government
responsible for preventing IFFs. Included (but not limited to) are financial
intelligence units; anti-fraud agencies; customs and border agencies;
revenue agencies; anti-corruption agencies; and financial crime agencies.
All these agencies should render regular reports on their activities and
findings to national legislatures. Methods should be created for effective
information sharing and co-ordination among various institutions and
agencies. Robust mechanisms should be put in place for supervision of
banks and financial institutions. 
First, setting up the institutions and then putting them in close co-
ordination with each other is crucial.62 The effectiveness of national
initiatives in combating financial crimes often is hampered by inadequate
co-ordination, harmonisation, and cooperation across African countries.
Such discrepancies are widespread across the continent. The framework of
collaboration needs to be among anti-corruption agencies, anti-money
laundering agencies, financial intelligence units, and specialised offices
across other branches of government, including the central bank, the
police, customs services, immigration services, mining and trade ministries
and company registries. They also need to equip their foreign missions
(embassies and official representations at multinational institutions) to
operate as centres for collection and dissemination of information on
financial crime. This cross-agency co-ordination needs to be organised
along the entire length of the ‘information value chain’, from the detection
of suspicious activity to investigation, all the way to prosecution. At
present, efficiency often is hampered by rigid specialisation and the
compartmentalisation of responsibilities and agency mandates. For
example, it often is not clear whether the role of the tax authorities is
restricted to investigating the offence of tax evasion, or whether it extends
to the investigation of associated crimes such as money laundering and the
predicate offences that generated the funds. This lack of clarity on the
institutional mandate hampers effective deterrence and prosecution of
financial crime. In Swaziland, Shanmuga Rethenam, the director of the
defunct iron ore mine, Salgaocar Swaziland, is wanted for a series of
crimes, including fraud, tax evasion and theft of close to E1 billion, and has
62 This was the purpose of the July 2016 conference in Pretoria.
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been charged by the Deputy Public Prosecutor.63 In South Africa, tax
amnesties were being granted to South African nationals with illicit
finances abroad. The first offshore exchange control and income tax
amnesty appeared in 2003, and a second similar amnesty followed in 2010,
with a third announced in the 2016 budget speech. However, in April 2016
the national bank announced that South Africans with illicit offshore
portfolios are not likely to get another amnesty.64
Second, a section focused on international tax issues as well as transfer
pricing should be created. Only nine African countries have transfer
pricing units, with the remaining countries, such as Rwanda, opting not to
have one as they are not adequately staffed to collect tax generally.
Transfer pricing units should as a matter of extreme urgency be situated in
revenue authorities and should be well equipped in accordance with global
best practices. Establishing transfer pricing units may entail the training of
a selection of existing revenue officers in this specialised area. However, as
pointed out, after an initial windfall it remains unclear whether the training
will provide any additional revenue. Despite this, there remains a necessity
for revenue authority staff to have a thorough understanding of the transfer
pricing in order to remain vigilant.65
Third is the employment and building capacity of more staff dealing in
these key sectors. While African countries have undertaken a number of
efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, tax evasion and illicit
financial flows, the scope of these efforts and their degree of effectiveness
remains uneven. Even where relevant agencies have been established, they
often face serious financial, technical and human capacity constraints.
Recently South Africa collaborated with Kenya, Malawi and Rwanda on
different types of capacity-building initiatives.66 Moreover, efforts often
63 L Jele ‘Observer: Salgaocar boss wanted for fraud’ Swazi Observer 15 May 2016, http://
www.observer.org.sz/news/80620-salgaocar-boss-wanted-for-fraud.html (accessed
18 August 2017).
64 IOL Reporter ‘No more breaks for tax dodgers | IOL Business Report’ 18 April 2016,
http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/no-more-breaks-for-tax-dodgers-2010949
(accessed 18 August 2017). Where the owner wants the funds to remain offshore, there
is a 10% penalty on funds that are in breach of exchange control regulations. If the
funds are remitted back to South Africa, only a 5% penalty is payable. These penalties
must be paid from the offshore funds and where there is a lack of available offshore
cash, such as for property holdings, the penalty can be paid from rand-based sources,
but an extra 2% additional penalty is added. ‘There are, of course, also tax
implications, with National Treasury advising that 50 per cent of taxes owing would be
due and payable for the last five tax years. This is a point on which some clients may
need professional tax opinion as there has been no detail given as to how this 50
percent would be computed.’ ‘Interest would be charged on outstanding taxes, but no
penalties would be levied. It is presumed that applicants would need to re-open
previous assessments on their SARS E-filing profile and resubmit tax returns for these
periods,’ he notes. This amnesty application period ran for six months from 1 October
2016.
65 A Waris ‘Taxing intra-company transfers: The law and its application in Rwanda’
(2013) 67 Bulletin for International Taxation 679.
66 OECD Tax administrations and capacity building: A collective challenge (2016) 59.
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are spread too thinly across a multitude of agencies, with little systematic
co-ordination and few synergies among them.67
Finally, improving governance. Ultimately, mechanisms for
combating financial crimes must be part of the broader agenda for
improving economic and political governance on the continent. The
effectiveness of mechanisms for combating financial crime is contingent on
the quality of information and the capacity to generate and manage this
information. Such capacity is in short supply in the majority of African
countries. Most countries lack an adequate stock of qualified forensic
statisticians, investigators and financial crime prosecutors. They also lack
adequate supply of specialised technology and equipment for collecting,
processing, and storing specialised information on financial crime. African
governments, therefore, need to invest in capacity building in the
investigation and prosecution of financial crime. African countries
recognise the importance of tackling IFFs, especially money laundering.
Various countries have taken steps to establish legislation and tighten
existing laws and create anti-IFF mechanisms. African countries have
membership of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against money
laundering in the sub-regions; the Financial Action Task Force; the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; and the Egmont Group of
Financial Intelligence Units. 
However, despite action with regard to the issue of IFFs, Egypt still is
unable to recover an estimated USD11 billion believed to have been
transferred illicitly from the public purse during the era of the former
President Hosni Mubarak to Switzerland as well as other countries in the
European Union (EU) and the US.68 However, there are encouraging
signs and some successes: Nigeria, leading on the IFF share, is also
credited as representing the single most successful case of asset recovery by
a state: USD2.3 billion illicitly transferred by Abacha has been recovered.
However, even this recovery took 10 to 16 years for the two countries to
finalise and, thus, while the money may have been returned, it should
never in the first place have been accepted, and the earnings the banks
made from the money should also be returned to the countries whose
67 A Ennouri ‘Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki refuses to increase investment in
IMF’ Tunisia Live 28 June 2012. 
68 ‘StAR – Stolen asset recovery initiative – Corruption cases – Hosni Mubarak
(Switzerland)’ http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18511 (accessed
9 November 2017); ‘Prominent journalist gives testimony about Mubarak’s wealth’
Egypt Independent 23 May 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com/prominent-
journalist-gives-testimony-about-mubaraks-wealth/; ‘The Middle East in revolt’ Time
22 February 2011, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,
2045328_2045333_2049395,00.html.
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money it was.69 The ‘know-your-client’ principle the banks are supposed
to use seems to have little or no weight in these types of scenarios. No
bankers have been charged for any illegal acts despite the return of the
money.
More recently, the Tunisian government has challenged the legitimacy
of debts inherited from the Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regime.70 In 2012,
President Marzouki refused to endorse a proposal for an increase in
Tunisia’s quota share in the IMF (by about USD370 million), pending the
passage of a Bill to audit the debts incurred under the Ben Ali regime. The
Bill would authorise an investigation to determine whether these debts
were used in the interests of the country or as an ‘instrument of dictatorship
and repression’, in the words of the new President. If Tunisia follows
through with an audit of the Ben Ali debts, this will set a historic precedent
for Africa.71
6 Other piecemeal reforms
In addition to the reforms identified by the HLP Report as being crucial,
additional reforms and actions being undertaken in different countries
include changes in mining in several African mineral-rich countries as well
as VAT reform in order to catch the resources using a different form of
taxation.
6.1 Mining reform in Zambia
In Zambia, the Mines and Mineral Act of 2008 was amended to include
some progressive clauses that aims at closing tax loopholes, and the
government is in the process of reviewing the Zambia Development
Agency Act to ensure that administration of the tax incentive is effective
and transparent. In Malawi, the government is reviewing the Mines and
Mineral Act which addresses the regulation of tax incentives and tax
avoidance.
69 ‘ABACHA loot: Switzerland returns USD723m to Nigeria in 10 years Vanguard News,
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/03/abacha-loot-switzerland-returns-723m-to-
nigeria-in-10-years/ (accessed 9 November 2017); ‘Switzerland to return Sani Abacha
“loot” money to Nigeria’ | World News | The Guardian, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/18/switzerland-to-return-sani-abacha-loot-
money-to-nigeria (accessed 9 November 2017).
70 Y Wong Sovereign finance and the poverty of nations: Odious debt in international law (2012).
71 AfricaFocus ‘Africa: Debt audits and debt repudiation – AllAfrica.Com http://
allafrica.com/stories/201211201721.html (accessed 18 August 2017). See also
A Ennouri ‘Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki refuses to increase investment in
IMF’ Tunisia Live 28 June 2012.
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6.2 VAT and tax-incentive reform in Tanzania 
The Tanzanian Parliament enacted a new Value Added Tax Act 2014 and
Tax Administration Act 2014, which entered into law in February 2015.
These new laws contain provisions according to which all multinationals
now have to pay value-added tax (VAT). Furthermore, the discretionary
powers of ministers in granting tax incentives were removed, tax incentives
for multinationals will be reviewed to ensure compliance with legal tax
requirements, no multinationals will be granted harmful incentives going
forward since a cost-benefit analysis will first have to be conducted, and all
tax incentives will first undergo parliamentary scrutiny. Civil society has
played a positive role in these changes to the law. After the elections, the
increased political will of the new government has seen the restructuring of
the revenue authority leadership. Investigations have begun against those
involved in suspected corruption and theft as well as those involved in
deals that led to the non-payment of taxes and duties by multinational
companies to the revenue authority at the port of entry. These measures
have already resulted in government increasing tax collection from various
sources from 900 billion Tanzanian shillings to 1.7 trillion Tanzanian
shillings in a few months’ time. At the same time, the budget towards
education increased from 3.465 billion Tanzanian shillings (2014/15 FY)
to 3.870 billion Tanzanian shillings (2015/16 FY), an increase of about 5
per cent. 
7 Recommendations
There are additional recommendations that may be useful on a piecemeal
basis, but have not been discussed in the HLP Report and would provide
additional and complementary steps to the already existing measures
against IFFs, most importantly in recognition of the immense differences
that exist in and between African countries, both regionally and across the
continent. The levels of development of fiscal systems, and how they stand
in relation to each other as well as globally, should be mapped. This
mapping must go hand in hand with a strategic approach of not just
ranking countries, but also outlining according to a timeline the steps that
must be put in place to get these countries to reach the levels of their
neighbours and as well as the African standard.
Other recommendations include: first, increasing the remuneration of
civil servants; second, providing clear documentation of incentives and
subsidies and placing these in line in the national budget; third, preparing
publicly available cost benefit analyses of companies before allowing them
to invest in a country; fourth, using smart technology to triangulate data by
updating company registries and triangulation of their digitised contents
with the tax databases as well as the land registries; fifth, changing
procurement practices to allow only those not at all related to government
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to win tenders which will also allow for a clearer separation of state and
business; and sixth, following the Scandinavian concept of placing a
politician’s companies in trust for the duration of his or her political term
and disallowing it from engaging in any government business. 
8 Conclusion
The listing and discussion of all the endeavours recommended and those
being put into effect show a lack of coherence between the continental
recommendations and those being implemented in individual countries.
Some heterogeneity is understandable as independent fiscal states must by
their very nature first address the problems that are of greatest concern to
them. However, some of the important recommendations of the HLP
Report presently exist merely on paper in the African context.
The international fiscal crisis began to unfold as early as 2004 and the
ripple effect is being felt globally. It is crucial that for countries, such as
those in Africa, that reforms be put in place to give a helping hand to not
only recently-emerging and conflict states like South Sudan, but also to
those struggling to understand the complicated nuances of complex
technical issues, such as South Africa and Kenya, while at the same time
being cognisant of the diverse types of mineral-rich economies like the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mozambique as well as
Zambia.
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Abstract
The growing macro-economic policy malaise with illicit financial flows is
indicative of the undesirable consequences in which these flows result. In an
effort to identify an appropriate policy in response to this phenomenon, it is
imperative that the impact of illicit financial flows be considered. This
chapter, through a literature review, illustrates that this phenomenon not
only has adverse economic and social effects, but also has the potential to
threaten the stability of governments. Although the adverse impacts are
significant, it is illustrated that some positive impacts can emanate from
illicit financial flows. The impact of these flows cannot be illustrated without
defining what they are. Thus, the appropriate point of departure is the
provision of a definition adopted in this chapter.
1 Introduction
Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are believed to have grown exponentially in
the age of globalised financial markets. Although the exact magnitude of
IFFs cannot be determined with precision, it is estimated that the value of
IFFs, in the developing region, is worth more than development assistance
received from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries.1 There is a dearth of literature that has sought to
quantitatively determine the impact of IFFs on economies, and even fewer
attempts to quantitatively determine the impact of this phenomenon on
developing economies. However, there are some studies that have
determined the impact of a specific form of illicit flows in the context of
developed and developing countries. The objective of the chapter is to
1 M Herkenrath Illicit financial flows and their developmental impacts: An overview
International Development Policy/Revue internationale de politique de développement
(2014) http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/1863 (accessed 1 February 2006).
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enumerate and provide a brief discussion of the consequences of IFFs that
already have been determined in literature and to determine areas of
further research. This is done in an effort to inform policy choices in
response to IFFs. While studying IFFs with reference to their
consequences may elicit the inception of ‘asymptomatic’ macro-economic
policies, rather than panaceas for the underlying institutional causes of the
phenomenon, it is imperative that the implications be considered in an
effort to emphasise the gravitas of IFFs. This study constitutes a literature
review of research conducted on the impact of IFFs. The study provides a
synopsis not only of the findings made in the literature reviewed, but also
of the methodology employed in order to unearth the respective findings.
It is imperative that the methodology be made explicit as it is of relevance
from a policy perspective.2 The appropriate point of departure is to provide
a concise definition of the term ‘IFF’.
2 Definition of illicit financial flows
The term ‘IFF’ gained popularity in the 1990s. In literature, the term is
commonly used to refer to money and capital flows sourced or attributable
to illegal activities or transferred and used in an illegal manner.3 This
definition suggests that the term IFF is wide enough to encompass illicit
capital flows (ICFs). However, it is imperative that the distinction between
ICFs and IFFs be provided. This is because literature suggests that the
nature the financial flow assumes will determine its impact. 
IFFs can be divided into three categories, namely, criminal, corrupt
and commercial forms.4 Criminal forms of ICFs are capital flows
emanating from criminal or deviant activities. Corrupt capital flows are
capital flows resulting from the bribery of or theft by public officials; and
commercial ICFs emanate from statutorily-prohibited commercial
activities such as falsified asset swaps, the abuse of transfer pricing and tax
evasion. Commercial ICFs are said to amount to two-thirds of all IFFs.5
In traditional economic literature, capital flows refer to flows
specifically allotted for the acquisition of capital stock. ICFs are defined as
unrecorded and untaxed ‘illicit leakage of capital and resources out of a
2 S Blankenburg & M Khan ‘Governance and illicit outflows’ in P Reuter (ed) Draining
development controlling flows from developing countries (2012) 23.
3 Global Financial Integrity issues: Illicit financial flows (2015) http://www.gfintegrity.org/
issue/illicit-financial-flows/ (accessed 1 February 2016); The World Bank Illicit
financial flows (2016) http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialmarketintegrity/
brief/illicit-financial-flows-iffs (accessed 17 May 2016); United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa Illicit financial flows: Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit
Financial Flows from Africa 51-59 http://www.uneca.org (accessed 1 February 2016).
4 RW Baker Capitalism’s Achilles heel: Dirty money and how to renew the free market system
(2005) 6.
5 Eurodad ‘Addressing development’s black hole: Regulating capital flight’ Eurodad
Report 8 May 2008 8.
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country’.6 ICFs amount to the appropriation of domestic wealth where
such appropriation puts the wealth out of the reach of domestic
authorities.7 
It is suggested that not all forms of ICFs have a negative impact on
economic growth or the political settlement of a jurisdiction. The notion
that all forms of ICFs have a negative impact finds its origin in the premise
that when all capital flight is retained domestically it will yield a higher
social rate of return.8 This premise does not consider the possibility that
some forms of ICFs may have positive or neutral effects. An example of
such a flow would be a flow that is rendered illegal or illicit as a result of
ill-considered laws aimed at protecting domestic monopolies.9
Furthermore, the impact of ICFs can be direct or indirect in nature.
The direct consequences of ICFs have an immediate impact on a county’s
economic development through a reduction in revenue or a reduction in
private domestic investment. The indirect consequences of ICFs include
effects on the social and political structures in existence in the country in
which the illicit capital flows are observed.10 
For purposes of this chapter, IFFs are defined as all financial flows
with negative effects on economic growth, whether indirect or direct, and
where such consequences are borne by the political settlement in a
country.11 This definition does not include all forms of ICFs, but only
those with a negative effect on economic growth.
Common to all forms of IFFs is the concealment of the illicit nature of
these flows and their conversion into usable assets through money
laundering. Money laundering is defined as the act of obscuring the illicit
nature of proceeds of illicit activities,12 and in itself an illicit activity.
Seemingly the definition implies that not only is money laundering in itself
an IFF, but it is predicated by illicit activities resulting in illicit flows.
Significant strides have been made, in literature, to determine the impact
of money laundering. The discussion of the impact of IFFs thus
commences with a synopsis of the impact of money laundering.
6 S Kapoor Haemorrhaging money: A Christian Aid briefing on the problem of illicit capital
flight (2007) 12.
7 K Heggstad & O-H Fjeldstad ‘How banks assist capital flight from Africa: A literature
review’ 6 January 2010 12.
8 B Schneider The road to international financial stability: Are key financial standards the
answer? (2003) 16; RE Cumby & RM Levich ‘On the definition and magnitude of
recent capital flight’ in DR Lessard & J Williamson (eds) Capital flight and third world
debt (1987) 26.
9 Blankenburg & Khan (n 3 above) 63.
10 Blankenburg & Khan 23.
11 Blankenburg & Khan 26.
12 L de Koker ‘The combatting of money laundering and financing of terrorism’ in
L de Koker Money laundering (2015) (ed) lexisnexisbutterworths.co.za (accessed
1 February 2016).
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3 Impact of illicit financial flows
A literature review by Unger illustrates the effect of money laundering on
society and the economy. The author, from an observation of literature,
identifies the consequences of money laundering as including:
• distortions on consumption; 
• distortions on investment and savings; 
• artificial increases in prices; 
• unfair competition; 
• changes in imports and exports; 
• negative and positive effects on growth rates; 
• effects on output, income and employment; 
• lower revenues for the public sector; 
• the compromise of privatisation; 
• changes in demand of money and exchange rates and interest; 
• distortion on capital flows; 
• risk to financial sector stability;13 
• distortion of economic statistics; 
• increased crime such as corruption and bribery; 
• increase in crime; and 
• a compromise of political institutions.14 
Despite the nexus between money laundering and IFFs, it would be
imprudent to impute the consequences of money laundering onto all forms
of IFFs. This is because, as discussed above, not all forms of IFFs,
particularly ICFs, have a direct or indirect negative effect on economic
growth. However, due to the relationship between money laundering and
IFFs, an analysis of the effects of money laundering provides a good
indication of the potential effects of IFFs. 
13 UK Ogbodo & EG Mieseigha ‘The economic implications of money laundering in
Nigeria’ (2013) 3 International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and
Management Sciences 173.
14 B Unger ‘The amounts and the effects of money laundering’ Report for the Ministry of
Finance, Utrecht School of Economics and Australian National University for the
Ministry of Finance, Amsterdam (2006) 82-95.
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3.1 Negative spill-overs of illicit financial flows
3.1.1 Economic impacts
Employment
The nexus between IFFs and money laundering has been explained above.
The laundering of illicit proceeds has adverse effects on job creation. This
is because such laundering does not require labour-intensive activity but
produces what is referred to as ‘sterile assets’.15 This is in accordance to a
study by Bartlett which seeks to determine the impact of money laundering
on economic development in developing economies by the imputing
findings observed from an economic literature review. The study begins by
describing the three stages of money laundering, which are the placement
stage; the layering stage; and the integration stage. It proceeds to
differentiate between forms of money-laundering flows innate to
developing countries, which include domestic flows; returning flows;
inbound flows; outbound flows; and flow-through funds. Domestic flows
are defined as the laundering of the proceeds of crime in the jurisdiction in
which the funds arose. Returning flows are defined as funds that arose
from illicit activities in the jurisdiction to which they return subsequent to
being laundered abroad. Inbound flows are defined as the proceeds of
criminal activities carried out in a different jurisdiction but which are
ultimately integrated into a country separate to the one where the predicate
offence took place. Outbound flows are defined as funds that are
essentially comprised of illicit capital flight, and flow-through funds are
defined as funds that are laundered domestically but are redirected to a
separate jurisdiction following such laundering, thus having little to no
impact on the economy.16 The study considers the effect of money
laundering across three different sectors, namely, the financial sector; the
real sector; and the external sector. Of relevance to employment is the
effect of money laundering on the real sector.17 
The author suggests that money laundering has the most direct effect
on the real sector. The author asserts that money that is not laundered
through the financial sector is laundered through less productive
activities.18 In an effort to justify this assertion, the author makes reference
to a study prepared for the Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis
Centre which applies an input-output model in an effort to determine the
lost economic activity as a result of money laundering. The study infers
15 BL Bartlett ‘The negative effects of money laundering on economic development’
Report for the Asian Development Bank Regional Technical Assistance Project 5967,
Countering Money Laundering in the Asian and Pacific Region (2002) 2.
16 Bartlett (n 16 above) 3.
17 Bartlett 4.
18 Bartlett 17.
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that the loss of employment is depicted in the difference between the level
of real estate purchases as a result of legitimate expenditure and the
purchase of real estate as a result of money laundering. The assumption
made in the study is that legitimate purchases often are made across all
types of property, while properties purchased through money laundering
usually are residential in nature. The study finds that money laundering
results in a loss of jobs due to the acquisition of ‘sterile’ assets, such as
residential properties. It is worth noting that the acquisition of commercial
property is likely to generate economic productivity, whereas the
acquisition of residential property increases individual wealth. This may
have an indirect positive economic impact as the owner’s purchasing
power is increased. However, it exacerbates unequal wealth distribution in
addition to the negative impact it has on job creation. Furthermore,
Bartlett makes the observation that the adverse effect on job creation not
only is a result of the purchasing of sterile assets, but also a result of the lack
of economic development due to increased corruption and crime. 
Economic stability
The financial sector has been identified as an area of the economy where
IFFs take place. Unsecured loans, money laundering, stock market
manipulation and forgery were identified as activities occurring in the
financial sector to which illicit outflows may be attributed. In addition to
this, the significance of the role of the financial sector in base erosion and
profit shifting is evident in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Actions 4,
8, 9 and 10 of the OECD, which are actions targeted towards the
countering of base erosion and profit shifting that occurs in this sector.
Furthermore, the Financial Action Task Force has identified the need to
ensure adequate regulation and supervision of the financial sector in an
effort to ensure that the banking sector is not used as a money-laundering
apparatus. The ability to combat financial crimes and the minimisation of
IFFs are at the centre of the maintenance of financial integrity. Financial
integrity is imperative to the maintenance of economic stability.
The laundering of IFFs results in the perversion of the financial system
and the integrity of the financial system is seen as the basic requirement for
economic development. This is particularly true for immature developing
financial systems innate to most developing economies.19 Cross-border
IFFs are believed to distort foreign exchange markets and stimulate the
underground exchange market.20 In addition to this, due to the illusive
nature of IFFs, they result in a distortion of national accounts. A study by
Allridge does well to articulate the distortion money laundering has on
19 S Yikona et al (eds) Ill-gotten money and the economy: Experiences from Malawi and
Namibia (2011) World Bank Study 12 http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/
10.1596/978-0-8213-8887-7 (accessed 7 April 2016).
20 P Allridge ‘The moral limits of the crime of money laundering’ (2002) 5 Buffalo
Criminal Law Review 306.
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economic stability. In this study, Allridge employs a literature review, in
order to justify the criminalisation of money laundering by elucidating the
economic ramifications caused by money laundering.
The author makes the observation that money laundering causes
inefficiencies in the financial market. These inefficiencies are believed to be
as a result of the distortion caused by money laundering on investment
decisions. Money laundering encourages the allocation of money to
destinations where the ease of capital control circumvention is the highest,
as opposed to the destination with the most favourable expected rate of
return. This further permeates the inefficient allocation of the world’s
resources.21 It is imperative that the importance of the efficient distribution
of resources be explained. The allocation of most concern is the
distribution of property and the entitlements associated with such
property. This is because property rights enable market participation since,
in the absence of such rights, or in the inefficient distribution of such rights,
a segment of society is excluded from market participation. Financial
markets concern themselves with the efficient allocation of resources (that
is, the allocation of property rights that enable economic participation) and
a distortion in financial markets manifests as a distortion in allocation
efficiency. The theory of efficiency in markets presupposes the existence of
perfect information. However, in the absence of perfect information,
market failures manifest. In a perfectly competitive market, scarce
resources would be allocated as efficiently as possible in order to satisfy the
demands of consumers. However, where markets are imperfect,
government intervention, such as the criminalisation of money laundering,
is permitted in order to rectify these market failures and enable the efficient
allocation of property rights. 
Aside from the gross inequity caused by the inefficient allocation of
resources, there is a growing school of thought that attributes the existence
of the informal sector to non-inclusive property rights systems. It
acknowledges a nexus between the informal sector and property rights
system and denotes the informal sector as a representation of ‘[t]he
people’s struggle to acquire private property rights’.22 In turn, IFFs are
believed to be impacted by the size of the informal sector or underground
economy. In a study by Global Financial Integrity titled ‘Russia: Illicit
financial flows and the role of the underground economy’,23 the authors
use the size of the underground economy as a proxy for governance and
suggest the existence of a link between the size of the underground
economy and IFFs. In this study the authors employ a least squares
regression model and identify a positive correlation between the size of the
underground economy and IFFs. The authors suggest that, according to
21 As above.
22 H de Soto The other path: The invisible revolution in the Third World (1989) 55.
23 S Freitas & D Kar Russia: Illicit financial flows and the underground economy (2013)
www.gfintegrity.org › Reports (accessed 1 February 2016).
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their model, a 1 per cent increase in the size of the underground economy
was correlated with a 7 per cent increase in the size of cross-border
transmitted illicit capital in the period between 1994 and 2011.24 
In addition to the obscured allocation of property rights, IFFs pose a
systemic risk to the financial sector. This is particularly true in the case of
money laundering. Money laundering creates a nexus between the formal
and informal economy by enabling the flow of resources between the two
economies.25 The flow of proceeds of illicit activity into the formal
financial system distorts the integrity of both domestic and global financial
systems.26 
Market failures caused by IFFs not only are evident in the inefficient
allocation of resources and the systemic risk to which the financial system
is exposed, but also are evident in the distortion of exchange rates and
interest rates. IFFs cause an artificial fluctuation in capital inflows and
outflows. Prima facie robust capital imports lead to the appreciation and
depreciation of exchange rates, and this has the potential of having an
adverse impact on legitimate exports and domestic prices. Furthermore, it
creates a distortion in policy choices due to the fact that such policies are
espoused on the volatility of exchange and interest rates as a result of
artificial capital inflows and outflows.27 
Competition
The neo-classical model of competition recognises that in a perfectly
competitive market, scarce resources would be allocated as efficiently as
possible in order to satisfy the demands of consumers.28 This is also
referred to as technical efficiency. However, where the market is imperfect,
inefficiencies result. IFFs are believed to impair fair competition and thus
lead to inefficiency. This is because factors that influence the decisions
concerning the manner in which IFFs are laundered do not concern
themselves with ascertaining the greatest rate of return through
production, but rather with the circumvention of the cost of capital. In an
effort to convert illicit proceeds into usable assets, money launderers
engage in a significant number of purchases at prices that do not always
reflect the market value for the acquired assets. Furthermore, their primary
interest is not in the asset itself but, rather, in the level of concealment
24 D Kar ‘Illicit financial flows from developing countries: 2004-2013’ Global Financial
Integrity Report (2015) 28 http://www.gfintegrity.org (accessed 17 April 2016).
25 K Hinterseer ‘The economics of money laundering’ in K Hinterseer Criminal finance:
The political economy of money laundering in a comparative legal context (2002) 71.
26 A Aluko & M Bagheri ‘The impact of money laundering on economic and financial
stability and on political development in developing countries: The case of Nigeria
(2012) 15 Journal of Money Laundering Control 444.
27 Aluko & Bagheri (n 26 above) 445.
28 P Sutherland et al ‘Introduction to competition law’ in P Sutherland et al Competition
law of South Africa (2013) http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za (accessed 17 April 2014).
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provided by the acquisition of the particular asset. As a result of this, they
are likely to purchase the asset for more than its market value. This creates
an artificial inflation in the price of the assets which may exclude a certain
group of society from the legitimate acquisition of the product. This creates
non-competitive markets.29 Non-competitive markets, which usually take
the form of oligopolies or monopolies, not only result in the minimisation
of individual choices as a result of the inflation of prices,30 but also create
barriers to entry into a particular market, and allow for the abuse of
dominance by way of price manipulation and other practices that may be
considered abusive to consumers. 
It must be noted that, unlike market competition, tax competition is
likely to result in an inefficient allocation of resources. This is because
resource allocation is likely to be motivated by the after tax rate of return
on capital rather than on factors of production. Some scholars are of the
view that the migration of capital into low tax jurisdictions (or tax havens)
increases productivity in high-tax jurisdictions and, implicitly, the
competitiveness of markets. This position suggests that the ability to
relocate taxable profits into low-tax jurisdictions, which results in a
reduced user cost (or pre-tax marginal product of capital) does not divert
activity from non-havens but, instead, prompts investors into increasing
their activity in high-tax jurisdictions.31 However, this position is
speculative and is premised on the observation that the demand for low-tax
jurisdictions increases where multinationals conduct activity in high-tax
jurisdictions.32 Furthermore, criticism suggests that the arguments
proffered in favour of low-tax jurisdictions are premised on the
undesirability of imposing taxes on elastic inputs such as capital and remiss
espoused policy choices.33
Economic growth
The impact of illicit flows on economic development may be observed
from a study by Ndikumana. The author endeavours to determine the
impact of capital flight on economic development. While the term ‘capital
flight’ implies the migration of more than just illicit capital, the author
equates capital flight to IFFs. This is because the author contends that a
significant degree of capital flight is spurred by illicit motives, and alleges
29 J Walker J & B Uger ‘Measuring global money laundering: The Walker Gravity
Model’ (2009) 5 Review of Law and Economics 832.
30 It should be noted that specific practices to which IFFs may be attributes, such as trade
mis-invoicing, may result in the distortion of a consumer’s choice between imported
goods and locally-produced goods due to the circumvention of import duties.
31 MA Desai et al ‘Do tax havens divert economic activity?’ (2005) 90 Economic Letters
222.
32 AJ Weichenrieder & F Xu ‘Are tax havens good? Implications of the crackdown on
secrecy’ Working Paper 111 http://ssrn.com (accessed 20 June 2016).
33 J Slemrod ‘Tax competition with parasitic tax havens’ NBER Working Paper 12225
(2009) 4 http://www.nber.org/papers/w12225 (accessed 20 June 2016).
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that there is an absence of sufficient empirical evidence supporting the
notion that capital flight is premised on legitimate portfolio choices. In
traditional economic literature, capital flight refers to ‘abnormal capital
outflows … propelled from a country … by any one or more complex list
of fears or suspicion’.34 Ndikumana’s research seeks to determine the
impacts of capital flight (IFFs) and tax havens on economic development.
Pursuant to this, the author employs an econometric model to analyse the
impact of capital flight domestic investment, and then applies a simulation
model in order to determine the gains that would have been derived from
the investment but for the capital flight. The author places significance on
investment as investment is recognised as the most pivotal factor
contributing to long-term economic growth. Capital flight is said to have
an impact on investment because it diminishes the amount of public and
private domestic savings which, in turn, results in a reduction of capital
creation. Furthermore, it creates macro-economic uncertainty due to the
fact that it erodes trust in a specific country’s macro-economic policies.35
Trust in economic policies, particularly those governing the financial
system, is imperative for the attraction of foreign direct investment
(FDI).36
The author makes the finding that capital flight has a negative effect on
domestic investment and that this imposes an opportunity cost on African
economies that has resulted in the forfeiture of an estimated additional 3
per cent growth in the gross domestic product of the African countries in
question.37 A study by Nkurunziza examines the nexus between IFFs and
poverty in Africa. The author defines illicit flows as outflows resulting
from theft, corruption, the mismanagement of public resources and
transfer mispricing.38 In order to determine the effect of IFFs on poverty,
the author applied two simulation models. The first model was constructed
on the basis of the capital-output ratio which establishes the number of
units of investment needed to produce a unit of output. The basis for this
simulation is the presumption that IFFs result in reduced investment, as
illustrated above. The second simulation incorporates capital stock39
instead of investment as a determinant of capital flight. The author makes
the finding that in the absence of IFFs, in the period between 2000 and
34 C Kindleberger International short-term capital movements (1938) 33 Journal of the
American Statistical Association 296.
35 L Ndikumana ‘Capital flight and tax havens: Impact on investment and growth in
Africa’ Conference Paper: European Development Network Conference on Finance
and Development, Berlin 11-13 December 2013 1-12.
36 Yikona et al (n 20 above) 12.
37 The author estimates that the GDP of African countries would have grown by an
additional 3% between the period 2000 and 2010. Ndikumana (n 35 above) 19.
38 JH Nkurunziza ‘Illicit financial flows: A constraint on poverty reduction in Africa’
(2012) 87 Association of Concerned African Scholars Bulletin 15 http://
concernedafricanscholars.org (accessed 17 May 2016).
39 The capital stock is determined on the perpetual inventory method.
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2008, poverty would have been reduced by an additional four to six
percentage points.40 
3.1.2 Social impacts 
Crime 
Money laundering is said to be a catalyst for increased criminal activity. In
addition to this, money laundering is believed to increase the occurrence
of corruption and other illicit crimes. This is because money laundering
allows criminals to mask wealth derived from the performance of illicit
activities. It allows criminals to remain active through the avoidance of
criminal justice sanctions and equips criminals with seemingly legitimate
financial resources required for the further advancement of criminal
activity. It is alleged that a symbiosis relationship exists between money
laundering and corruption. Not only do they occur in tandem, but often
enrich each other.41 It is submitted that a positive correlation is observed
from the existence of perception of corruption and the size of the informal
sector. IFFs are aggravated by smuggling. Smuggling is said to be the result
of the disparity in the manner in which certain goods are treated between
jurisdictions. This disparate legal treatment, whether as a result of
incongruous policies or a lack of enforcement, is believed to incite the
illegal import or exportation of the specific good to which the law
applies.42
Equality and distribution 
The forfeiture of revenue as a result of IFFs leads to the hampering of the
redistribution of wealth; impedes on the curbing of socially-undesirable
conduct (excises); and also causes rent seeking and impedes on the
principles of democracy. Rent seeking refers to the attainment of an undue
benefit, particularly where the law is structured in such a manner that a
group of persons is able to attain a benefit whilst the cost of such benefit is
borne by other fractions of society.43 Rent seeking further exasperates
social inequity or unfairness.44 The term ‘fairness’ is a normative concept.
Aristotle regarded fairness as a component of justice.45 According to
40 In addition to this, the author observes a distinction in the hypothetical poverty
reduction between resource-rich and non-resource-rich countries. Poverty reduction in
oil-rich countries surpasses that in non-resource-rich countries. The author does not
provide a rationale for this distinction. Nkurunziza (n 38 above) 15.
41 D Chaikin & JC Sharman Corruption and money laundering: A symbiotic relationship
(2009).
42 OECD ‘Policy coherence for sustainable development: Thematic module on illicit
outflows’ Workshop Paper (2015) 21.
43 S Ratnapala ‘Economic analysis of law’ in S Ratnapala Jurisprudence (2009) 264.
44 OECD (n 43 above) 5.
45 N Memon ‘Prioritizing principles of a good tax system for small business in informal
economies’ (2010) 25 Australian Tax Forum 79.
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Aristotle, justice exists in three facets, namely, distributive justice;
rectificatory justice; and political justice. Distributive justice manifests in
distributions of honour or resources that fall to be divided amongst those
who have a share in the constitution; rectificatory justice seeks to rectify
the consequences ensuing as a result of voluntary or involuntary
transactions between man and man and political or legal justice which
seeks to treat those who are equal, equally and those who are unequal,
differently. Horizontal equity is closely linked with Aristotle’s notion of
legal justice. Therefore, the construction of legal justice requires that tax
laws be adjusted taking into account the nature of the taxpayers in an effort
to attain horizontal equity.46 Conversely, vertical equity is closely linked
to Aristotle’s summations of distributive justice which concerns itself with
redistribution. It is important to take note of these concepts of justice
because a good legal system is one that conforms to the notions of justice
and morality. In the absence of such conformity, the legal system may be
construed as a fallacious one.47 Rent seeking is undesirable as it bestows a
benefit on a section of society while imposing the burden associated with
this benefit on a different fraction of society, exasperating inequity and
further heightening the poor distribution of resources.
In a study by Baker aimed at determining the effects of capitalism on
society by considering the impact of ‘dirty money’, which Baker considers
a resultant corollary of capitalism, ‘dirty money’ is defined as ‘illegally
earned, illegally transferred or illegally utili[z]ed’ money. The author
deconstructs dirty money into money that crosses borders and money that
does not.48 Additionally, Baker identifies three forms of dirty money that
cross borders. These forms include proceeds of crime, corruption and
commerce. Proceeds of crime are defined as proceeds emanating from
conduct that is criminal in nature, such as racketeering, trafficking,
embezzlement, securities fraud, credit fraud, and so forth. Proceeds of
corruption are afforded separate recognition to proceeds of crime and are
said to include proceeds derived from the bribery of officials or theft by
government officials. Commercial proceeds are defined with reference to
their characteristics. The first characteristic is that the proceeds usually
result in the evasion of tax. This implies that the conduct to which the
proceeds may be attributed is a predicate to tax evasion. The second
characteristic is an absence of records reflecting the proceeds in the country
of origin.49 The varying methods in which the proceeds are derived include
transfer mispricing; fraud; the use of shell companies; transfers to tax
havens; the use of trusts and flee clauses; and the use of other intricate
structures that make use of subterfuge.50 The definition afforded to dirty
46 As above.
47 H Hart The concept of law (1961) 206.
48 This is implicit in the recognition of dirty money that crosses borders.
49 RW Baker ‘Playing the game’ in RW Baker Capitalism’s Achilles heel: Dirty money and
how to renew the free-market system (2005) 23.
50 RW Baker ‘Dirty money at work’ in Baker (n 49 above) 136.
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money is synonymous to the definition of IFFs provided in section 2 of this
article. 
In an effort to determine the impact of dirty money on equality, Baker
reviews statistics from a range of sources to determine income distribution.
Baker refers to World Bank country statistics providing information
concerning gross domestic product (GDP) and quintile shares of gross
domestic product, purchasing power parity and the country rankings of the
United Nations (UN). From an inspection of the statistics, Baker makes
the observation that the gap in income distribution is increasing. Baker
continues to illustrate how poor income distribution results in inequality
by explaining the ‘Gini coefficient’, and goes on to review studies that have
sought to determine income distribution and inequality through the use of
the statistics synopsised. Baker concludes that dirty money leads to poor
income distribution and causes the largest income inequality in developing
countries.51 
A similar observation is made by Yikona et al in a study on behalf of
the World Bank which seeks to determine the effects of regulation aimed
at curbing ‘ill-gotten’ money on Malawi and Namibia’s economy. The
primary objective of Yikona’s study is to determine the effects of anti-
money-laundering regulation on economic development. Pursuant to this,
the study endeavours to determine the relationship between and the effects
of the proceeds of crime on economic development. The study adopts a
qualitative approach which encompasses a literature review, anecdotal
evidence of the perceptions of experts in Malawi and Namibia, and
conclusions derived from an observation of secondary data.52 
The study defines the term ‘ill-gotten money’ with reference to the
sources from which the ill-gotten money is derived. These sources are said
to include corruption; tax evasion (including transfer mispricing);
organised crimes; and illicit resource dealings.53 The authors conclude that
tax evasion and corruption have the most significant impact on
development as they encroach upon the government’s tax base and this
ultimately exacerbates the poverty alleviation plight.54 Inequity in a
country has the potential to instigate the disruption of the social and
political fabric of a country.55
3.1.3 Undermine of democracy
It is imperative that the positive correlation between political stability and
economic productivity be noted. IFFs damage the integrity of society and
51 RW Baker ‘The global divide’ in Baker (n 49 above) 217.
52 Yikona et al (n 20 above) 8.
53 Yikona et al 12.
54 Yikona et al 83.
55 Memon (n 46 above) 80.
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undermine democracy and the rule of law. The rule of law is imperative as
it is used as a measure of institutional quality.56 The term ‘institution’ is
understood as encompassing a wider scope than its original meaning. The
term is often used to describe an organisation formed for a particular social
purpose. The definition we are concerned with in this study is the
understanding of institutions as humanly-devised constraints, such as
law57 and societal norms that influence human interactions. The question
arises as to which specific institutions are of relevance where the address of
the IFFs is concerned. It is often proposed that the institution of relevance
in this instance is the government and its ability to allocate secured
property rights.58 
Well-functioning institutions are believed to be institutions that are
able enforce incepted policies and facilitate the allocation of property
rights.59 Corruption, in particular, predicates the abuse of government
resources by redirecting those resources from the provision of public goods
and services. Furthermore, corruption is implicit in the failure to uphold
the rule of law and, thus, is indicative of weak institutions. It is believed
IFFs are negatively impacted by the perceptions of a transparent electoral
process; a belief in government’s ability to form and implement policies; a
confidence in government’s ability to govern; and the allocation of secured
property rights. IFFs are considered a direct challenge to government’s
authority as they result in the undermining of the enforcement of laws and
the corruption of government.60 A failure to enforce coercive laws, such as
anti-money-laundering legislation and laws targeted at curbing tax
evasion, results in the usurpation of the authority and, thus, the legitimacy
of governments. 
Cognisance must be taken of the Report of the High-Level Panel on
Illicit Financial Flows from Africa.61 Although the primary objective of
the report is to analyse the extent of IFFs from Africa and to determine the
cause of such IFFs, the report takes the opportunity to articulate the
consequences of IFFs observed from case studies and literature reviews.62
The report stipulates that IFFs result in weakened governance,
impediments on domestic and international development, discouraged
56 A Lane Rule of law reform and development (2010) 7.
57 The term ‘law’ includes legislation, common law and regulations. Societal norms
include norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct.
58 B Powell ‘Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: A survey’ 7 January
2009 62, at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324407 (accessed 12 February 2015).
59 Blankenburg & Khan (n 3 above) 23.
60 P Andreas ‘Illicit international political economy: The clandestine side of globalisation
(2004) 11 Review of International Political Economy 646.
61 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ‘Illicit financial flows: Report of the
High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa 51-59 http://www.uneca.org
(accessed 1 February 2016).
62 While the report stipulates that the consequences of IFFs are determined from case
studies and literature review, it does not provide a comprehensive summation of the
nature of the case studies.
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structural transformation and transparency and strained government
resources.
It would be imprudent to restrict an analysis of the impact of IFFs to
the negative effects of such flows. In the interests of establishing a well-
informed policy, consideration must be given to all the impacts of IFFs,
including those that are positive in nature. The positive result of IFFs must
not be confused with ICFs with a positive or negligible effect. As discussed
above, IFFs are those flows with a negative impact on economic
development. However, despite the negative impact in which they result,
it is also possible to observe the indirect positive impact. For example,
while money derived from criminal activities exacerbates crime, the
increase in criminal activity may cause an increase in the demand for legal
services. On the other hand, an example of an ICF with a positive result
may be a flow that violates an ill-considered statute which has undesirable
economic results, such as the protection of monopolies, and which, but for
the violation of the statute, does not have a negative effect. The morality
of observing the positive impact of IFFs is neither here nor there. Such
observation merely seeks to provide a holistic view of the impact of IFFs.
3.2 Positive spill-overs
Some scholars allege that IFFs may have some positive effects. These
effects include the contention that the circulation of IFFs may lead to the
increased demand for financial and legal services. This increased demand
is said to be pro tem.63 Furthermore, a study by Perez et al identifies a
nexus between IFFs and FDI. These authors estimate the role of money
laundering and illegal capital flight in FDI decisions. The authors employ
secondary data depicting FDI outflows from a selection of East European
countries. The authors premise that the use of data illustrating FDI
outflows serves as an indicator for investment decisions.64 In order to
illustrate the effects of illicit capital flight and money laundering on FDI,
the authors adopt a parsimonious model which takes into consideration
the standard factors that influence FDI. The authors’ parsimonious model
is a variation of the knowledge-capital model (KC model) used to analyse
the rationale behind FDI location decisions. The KC model looks at the
movement of FDI between two countries and factors in the impact of
skilled and unskilled labour across two sectors.65 In their model, the
authors assume that FDI will be located in a country where the investment
is profitable because the business undertakings are profitable or because
the conditions in the country enable illegal capital flight or money
laundering. The authors apply the model to six transitional East European
63 Unger (n 15 above) 7.
64 MF Perez et al ‘Illicit money flows as motives for FDI’ (2012) 40 Journal of Comparative
Economics 109.
65 M Petr ‘The knowledge-capital model of FDI: A time varying coefficients approach
(2009) 56 Scottish Journal of Political Economy 197.
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countries (FDI destinations), which are Bulgaria; the Czech Republic;
Estonia; Hungary; Macedonia; and Slovenia, over a four-year period
(2000-2003). This resulted in a total of 449 observations and 83 FDI host
countries. The authors conclude that 29 per cent of FDI is attracted by
countries that may be considered money-laundering centres. In addition to
this, of the 29 per cent that is directed to money-laundering hubs, 20 per
cent is believed to be motivated by the desire to facilitate money
laundering. The authors conclude that 29 per cent of FDI is attracted by
countries that may be considered money-laundering centres. Furthermore,
of the 29 per cent that is directed to money-laundering hubs, 20 per cent is
believed to be motivated by the desire to facilitate money laundering.66
4 Conclusion
The first observation worth noting is the lack of quantitative research that
has sought to determine the effects of IFFs in all its forms (that is, the
effects of specific forms of tax evasion such as trade mispricing).
Furthermore, a significant number of the studies discussed above employ
secondary data which is subject to the authors’ interpretation and validity
of which is often left unchallenged. Thus, a need for further research in this
area is evident. It is also evident that illicit flows present a wide range of
adverse effects. Furthermore, in some instances the effects are
interconnected and often precipitate themselves as a result of this synergy.
While most of the consequences observed are undesirable, there are some
alleged positive effects of IFFs. However, the negative spill-overs resulting
from IFFs have the potential to impede on developmental goals and
human rights.67 This is because the forfeited revenue impedes on
government’s ability to attain the 2030 Sustainable Developmental Goals
and, while income distribution may not amount to a human right, the
inequality exasperated by the poor distribution imposes a limitation on
society’s right to market participation. Furthermore, a failure to
indiscriminately enforce existing laws on private individuals and
government officials brings government’s authority into disrepute and
threatens the rule of law, a principle upon which democracy is premised.
While it is not the intention of this chapter to incite the inception of policy
directed at correcting the negative externalities resulting from IFFs, it is
imperative that cognisance of these externalities be considered in devising
the appropriate panacea aimed at the root cause of IFFs.
66 Perez et al (n 66 above) 125.
67 This is evident from the growing interest in studying the implications of IFFs for
human rights; refer to United Nations (2016) Final Study On Illicit Financial Flows,
Human Rights and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the Independent Expert on
the Effects of Foreign Debt And Other Related International Financial Obligations Of States On
The Full Enjoyment Of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Note by the Secretariat available www.un.org accessed 20 June 2016.
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Abstract
The current international development agenda presents inter-agency
cooperation as one of the relevant tools that may be necessary to achieve
sustainable development. This chapter places inter-agency cooperation in
the context of the concept of good governance and, in particular, tax good
governance. It suggests that inter-agency cooperation is an inherent element
of this. Based on this assumption, the case of the good tax governance
agenda of the European Union is discussed. It is recommended that inter-
agency cooperation should be included as one of the tools on the EU
development agenda addressing third countries. Many developing countries
could benefit from the experience of EU member states in this area.
1 Introduction
In connection with the 2030 Agenda,1 the European Union (EU) has
committed itself to supporting developing countries in strengthening
domestic resource mobilisation in these countries.2 In light of this
commitment, a new strategy (‘Communication’) was issued.3 This strategy
addresses the way in which to fight aggressive tax avoidance. It also looks
at the potential to support developing countries. According to the
European Commission, Communication is a key measure for fighting
aggressive tax avoidance and supporting developing countries.4 The
1 United Nations (2015) Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September
2015, 21 October 2015, A/RES/70/1. 
2 European Commission (2015) ‘Fact sheet, sustainable development goals and the
Agenda 2030’ 25 September 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
5709_en.htm (accessed 20 October 2016).
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, COM/2016/024 final.
4 European Commission (2016) ‘Fact sheet, the anti-tax avoidance package – Questions
and answers (updated)’ 21 June 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
16-2265_en.htm. (accessed 15 September 2016).
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standards of tax good governance as defined by the European Commission
are prominently featured in this Communication. These are the basis of the
strategy applied by the EU with respect to third countries. They have been
suggested as a primary tool for assessing the tax regimes of third countries.
In addition, the European Commission has proposed to introduce them in
bilateral trade agreements that are concluded by the EU and the member
states. Finally, their implementation in third countries is expected to be
supported with assistance from the EU.5 
In an attempt to promote and enhance tax good governance among
third countries, the European Commission has not recognised the role of
inter-agency cooperation. This may be due to the fact that thus far the role
of inter-agency cooperation in enhancing tax good governance also has not
been discussed by academia or international bodies. Inter-agency
cooperation has appeared on the agendas of many international bodies,
including on those of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)6 and the Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (FATF),7 to name but a few. However, none of institutions
mentioned drew a direct link between tax, good governance, inter-agency
cooperation and illicit financial flows (IFFs). This chapter intends to
bridge this gap.
The chapter begins with a brief introduction to the theory of good
governance. It is followed by a brief account of how it occurred that
taxation was recognised as a catalyst of good governance and that, as a
result, tax good governance developed. Against the picture of tax good
governance, the role of inter-agency cooperation is discussed. The
attention then shifts to the role of the EU as promoter of good governance
and tax good governance. The special focus is on Communication as the
latest tax good governance agenda addressing third countries. Based on
this analysis, the recommendations addressing the EU tax good
governance agenda are formulated. 
5 See sec 3 of this article.
6 Eg, in 2011, the OECD launched the ‘Oslo Dialogue’ which is designed to increase
cooperation between authorities in numerous countries when approaching financial
crimes, tax evasion and illicit flows. With this initiative, the whole government
approach was developed. See also the report OECD Effective inter-agency co-operation in
fighting tax crimes and other financial crimes (2013).
7 FATF ‘International standards of combating money laundering and the financing of
terrorism and proliferation: The FATF Recommendation’ February 2012, http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommenda
tions.html (accessed 20 October 2016).
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2 Theory of tax good governance
2.1 Good governance
The concept of tax good governance was built on the theory of good
governance. Thus, in search for the basis of the concept of tax good
governance, it is necessary to first understand the concept of good
governance. 
Regarding the concept of good governance, it is difficult to agree on
one operational definition, namely, its roots, or way of measurement.8 A
review of the literature suggests that the sole term of governance is
employed in a variety of meanings.9 For instance, in a number of studies
by the OECD, 17 definitions of ‘governance’ were identified.10 A baseline
consensus is that governance refers to11 
the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within
public and private sectors have become blurred. The essence of governance is
its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the
authority and sanctions of government. 
As some scholars have indicated, ‘[t]he governance concept points to the
creation of a structure or an order which cannot be externally imposed but
is the result of the interaction of a multiplicity of governing and each other
influencing actors’.12
It is not surprising that the term ‘good governance’ is also ambiguous,
and it is difficult to determine one precise definition. It appears that,
according to different organisations and different actors, it may have
various meanings.13 Some scholars, when searching for the roots of good
governance, analyse the works of Aristotle and his theory of good
governance as defined by the city’s state of happiness achieved through the
entire action of all the institutions that comprised the state mechanism.14
8 M Moore ‘How does taxation affect the quality of governance?’ (2007) 47 Tax Notes
International 79-98.
9 G Stoker ‘Governance as theory: Five propositions’ (1998) 50 International Social
Science Journal 17. 
10 OECD Donor approaches to governance assessments: 2009 Sourcebook (2009).
11 Stoker (n 9 above) 17. 
12 J Kooiman & M van Vliet ‘Governance and public management’ in K Eliassen &
J Kooiman (eds) Managing public organisations (1993) 64.
13 RM Gisselquist ‘Good governance as a concept, and why this matters for development
policy’ WIDER Working Paper 2012/030, Helsinki UNU-WIDER 1.
14 CA Dumitrescu ‘The concept of good governance in Aristotle’s view. Part II: The
practical dimension’ (2010) Cogito – Multidisciplinary Research Journal Issue 2, http://
cogito.ucdc.ro/nr_3_en/1%20-%20THE%20CONCEPT%20OF%20GOOD%20GOV
ERNANCE%20IN%20_eng_.pdf. (accessed 13 September 2016).
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Others refer to Plato for whom good governance is simply a right order.15 
The theoretical basis for this chapter is a definition of good governance
as refined in the development agenda. Taking into account that the aim is
to examine Communication as the latest EU tax agenda with respect to
third countries, for the purpose of this chapter, the meaning of the concept
on the development agenda is relevant. In this context, it was decided to
employ the definition as developed by the United Nations (UN) as this
definition played the most important role in defining good governance. It
also seems to capture the core elements common to most of the various
approaches to the concept of good governance.16 In a publication by the
UN,17 it was defined as being determined by eight characteristics, namely,
being consensus oriented; participatory; following the rule of law; effective
and efficient; accountable; transparent; responsive; and equitable and
inclusive. 
The first of the UN characteristics of good governance relies on being
consensus-oriented, indicating that it should call for mediation of different
interests in society. Good governance should aim at reaching a broad
consensus in society regarding what is in the best interests of all
community members.18 It should also be focused on providing sustainable
development. Second, governance should be participatory. Participation
in the context of good governance should be translated as providing the
opportunity for participation of men and women either directly or through
legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. Third, the rule of
law in this context refers to fair legal frameworks that are impartially
enforced. It requires the full protection of human rights, particularly those
of minorities. Fourth, good governance also requires effectiveness and
efficiency. These features require the best use of the resources at their
disposal. Fifth, good governance does not exist if governmental
institutions as well as the private sector and civil society organisations are
not accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Sixth,
good governance requires transparency which means that the decisions
taken and their enforcement are completed in a manner that is in
15 C-V Raiu ‘An ontology of good governance. A political theory approach’ (2015) 40
Romanian Journal of Economics 154-169, http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:
ine:journl:v:40:y:2015:i:49:p:154-169 (accessed 13 September 2016).
16 There are different definitions of the term ‘good governance’ in the literature. Eg,
Potter pointed that it encompasses a sphere of public sector management;
accountability and legal framework for reforms; information and technology;
legitimacy of government; and competence of governments to formulate appropriate
policies, make timely decisions; execute them effectively and deliver social services to
the people. D Potter ‘Democratisation, good governance and development’ in T Allen
& A Thomas (eds) Poverty and development into the 21st century (2000) 379. 
17 UNESCAP ‘What is good governance?’ http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/
good-governance.pdf (accessed 14 September 2016).
18 This may be achieved through the introduction of mediation among different
stakeholders. See eg K Qudrat‐I Elahi ‘UNDP on good governance’ (2009) 36
International Journal of Social Economics 1167-1180, https://doi.org/10.1108/030
68290910996981 (accessed 14 September 2016). 
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accordance with rules and regulations. It also means that information is
freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such
decisions and their enforcement. It requires that enough information is
provided and that it is provided in easy-to-understand forms and media.
Seventh, good governance should meet the standard of responsiveness
which refers to institutions and processes that attempt to serve all
stakeholders within a reasonable time frame. Finally, it should be based on
the principle of equity and inclusiveness, which indicates that all members
of society should feel included in the mainstream of society.19 
All features collectively address actions primarily undertaken by
government institutions. The important part of public institutions’ agendas
is the administration of the tax system. As was explained in the literature,
‘[t]he state’s capacity to raise taxes is closely linked to its ability to deliver
sound policies and there is much to suggest that tax raising is a good proxy
indicator of overall governance capability’.20 Conversely, a sound tax
system is a pillar and condition of good governance. How the connection
between taxation and good governance was developed will be explained.
2.2 Tax good governance
It took a long time before the association between taxation and governance
was discovered and became the subject of thorough research. The main
reason for this may lie in the evolution of state revenues. The importance
of taxes as the primary source of revenues has in recent centuries steadily
gained significance. Earlier in the seventeenth century, taxation was linked
to war expenditures.21 However, in certain earlier works of philosophers
some recognition of the role of tax systems in developing a strong and
stable country is evident. For instance, both Aristotle and Confucius
identified a fair and effective tax system funding a political leadership and
administration as a requirement for a prosperous and politically stable
society.22 Adam Smith also observed that ‘[l]ittle else is requisite to carry
a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism but
peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest
being brought about by the natural course of things’.23
19 Many scholars later on in the literature referred to those principles. See eg U Karpen
‘Good governance’ (2010) 12 European Journal of Law Reform 16-31; JJ Shananbli
‘Good governance’ (2012) 2 AGORA International Journal of Juridical Sciences 176-181;
V Mallika Vedantham & S Kamruddin ‘Good governance and public policy in India’
(2015) 1 PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences 878-889. 
20 M Everest-Phillips ‘State-building taxation for developing countries: Principles for
reform’ (2010) 28 Development Policy Review 76.
21 M Moore ‘How does taxation affect the quality of governance?’ (2007) 47 Tax Notes
International 19.
22 Everest-Phillips (n 20 above) 76.
23 Stewart reported this as the view of his friend Smith in D Stewart ‘Account of the life
and writing of Adam Smith, LLD’ in Adam Smith's posthumous Essays on
Philosophical Subjects, 1795, lxxx, lxxxi. https://www.adamsmith.org/adam-smith-
quotes/ (accessed 12 December 2017).
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The literature review suggests that since the early twentieth century,
taxation has been perceived as central to state building. At that time, it
began to be associated with revenue creation; the redistribution of income
and assets; the curbing of socially undesirable behaviour, for example, by
means of tobacco and alcohol taxes (repricing); and the realm of
democratic state building (representation). The last dimension –
representation – was presented as the emanation of the need for revenues.
A corollary of this was the creation of representative governments. This
vision of the role of taxation evolved over the course of time, and it became
obvious that there is a close association between taxation and government
services in general.24 The level of taxation is not contested as long as
commensurate government services are provided to citizens. Stated
differently, there is a direct link between taxation and democratisation as
such.25
In general, there now is substantial research material on the correlation
between tax and governance. It is worth noting what Trevor Manuel, then
Finance Minister of South Africa, recognised: ‘Effective revenue
administration contributes to a country more than simply filling its
national coffers; it is an essential component of good governance.’26
To paraphrase these words: There is no good governance without a tax
system that would satisfy all the characteristics of good governance. It is
the condition that addresses the operations of tax administrations and its
organisation as well as the law and all legislative and administrative
processes. All aspects of administering and creating a tax system must
meet the criteria of good governance. What does this mean?
First, tax good governance should be consensus-oriented that could be
translated as a requirement of a tax system that is the result of consensus
reached not only in works of a parliament representing society, but also in
cooperation with a wider society represented by civil society, trade unions,
and so forth. In the context of the administration of a tax system, it may
require openness to taxpayers and providing an opportunity to
communicate. In this respect, it will also meet the requirement of being
participatory and involving all stakeholders in building a tax system.
Second, good governance requires that all stakeholders that can contribute
to building a tax system be invited to do so. Third, a tax system should also
meet the requirements as imposed by the rule of law, both its formal and
substantive elements. This means that it should meet all institutional
24 ML Ross Does taxation lead to representation (2004) 230.
25 D Brautigam Governance and economy: A review (1991) WPS 815, World Bank as
referred to in Moore (n 21 above) 9; W Prichard ‘The politics of taxation and
implications for accountability in Ghana 1981-2008’ IDS Working Paper 330, July
2009 7.
26 Opening speech at the International Conference on Taxation, State-Building and
Capacity Development in Africa, hosted by the South Africa Revenue Service as
referred to in Everest-Phillips (n 20 above) 75.
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requirements (laws made by duly-empowered institutions, access to
independent courts), procedural requirements (fair representation, due
process, rights of appeal), and requirements addressing the content of the
law (generality, certainty, proportionality, equal treatment).27 Fourth, the
feature of effectiveness and efficiency requires that a tax system be
administered by making the best use of the resources at its disposal. It may
be reflected in development of risk management strategies and
implementation of compliance risk management.28 Fifth, a tax system
should be based on accountable institutions. Sixth, a tax system should be
transparent. Transparency currently is often used with respect to increased
pressure on transparency among taxpayers’ data.29 In the context of tax
good governance, the request for transparency requires not only
transparent taxpayers but, first of all, transparency around tax
administrations and their operations.30 Seventh, a tax system should be
responsive, which indicates that tax administrations should be able to
modify their operations and decisions for a specific taxpayer’s situation.31
Finally, it should be based on the principle of equity and inclusiveness
which, building on substantive elements of the rule of law, is again
supported by an invitation to all stakeholders for building a tax system.32  
2.3 Inter-agency cooperation as an effective and efficient 
measure in the promotion of a tax good governance agenda
As has been discussed, one of the pillars of good governance and tax good
governance is effectiveness and efficiency. Whereas effectiveness
addresses the results of tax administrations’ operations, efficiency refers to
the issue of costs that tax administrations must bear. Achieving these goals
may require different measures depending on the types of operations.
Among many functions allocated to a tax administration, one of its core
roles is to enforce tax law. Currently, many tax administrations develop
various risk management strategies that allow for adjusting their
operations to targeted tax behaviour. Thus, they build their operations
based on the enforcement pyramid that differentiates between compliant;
27 J Freigang ‘Is responsive regulation compatible with the rule of law?’ (2002) 8 European
Public Law 463.
28 See eg OECD ‘Compliance risk management: Managing and improving tax
compliance’ (2004) https://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/33818656.pdf
(accessed 16 October 2017).
29 J Grocott ‘Time for tax transparency and clarity’ (2010) 21 International Tax Review
13-15; TA Kaye ‘Tax transparency: Tale of two countries’ (2016) 39 Fordham
International Law Journal 1153-1200; A Pross ‘How tax transparency went global in
2014’ (2015) 26 International Tax Review 10-13.
30 This is also a requirement under the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool.
For more, see http://www.tadat.org (accessed 16 October 2017).
31 For a discussion on responsiveness in the context of tax administration, see L Osofsky
‘Some realism about responsive tax administration’ (2012) 66 Tax Law Review 121.
32 M Everest-Phillips & R Sandall ‘Linking business tax reform with governance’
Investment climate in practice (2009) 48314 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
bitstream/handle/10986/10572/483140BRI0link10Box338894B01PUBLIC1.pdf ?se
quence=1 (accessed 16 October 2017).
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willingness to be compliant; compliant only if they are controlled; and
non-compliant taxpayers.33 Whereas most operations can be undertaken
by tax administrations on their own solely with capacities they already are
equipped with, in some cases they may require support from and expertise
of other agencies. In particular, this is the case when they identify non-
compliant taxpayers who commit tax crimes.34 
Tax crimes commonly are committed along with other crimes such as
money laundering, corruption, drug trafficking, and many others. They
sometimes are referred to as ‘illicit financial flows’ (IFFs).35 It is important
to emphasise that there are substantial similarities between the techniques
exploited to commit these different types of crimes. Money launderers, tax
evaders and bribe takers intend to conceal the illicit origins of funds and
integrate them into apparently legitimate sources. Therefore, they
manipulate prices (over- and under-invoicing), manipulate turnover/sales,
fabricate loans, fabricate a rise in net worth of purchased and sold items,
and use trusts and shell companies. Their ultimate goal is to create
apparent legal origins of illicitly-obtained proceeds to enable them to use
these and benefit from them as if they were legal. All activities undertaken
here thrive on secrecy, inadequate legal frameworks, tax regulation, poor
enforcement, and weak inter-agency cooperation.36 Moreover, conduct
involving money laundering, corruption or other economic crimes usually
is also a tax crime. In this context, it should be recalled that international
standards37 recognise a tax crime as a predicate offence to money
laundering.38 
Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that a large number of agencies
may be involved in countering IFFs. They detect, investigate and
prosecute crimes resulting in IFFs. They also carry out preventive
activities. Finally, they are in charge of the recovery of proceeds.39
Considering the criminal character of most IFFs, police forces and
prosecution authorities play an important role here. Tax and customs
administrations as well as financial regulators also are relevant. In the
course of their normal activities, tax and customs administrations and
financial regulators collect and retain information which might be
33 OECD (n 29 above) 41.
34 OECD Tax administration 2017: Comparative information on OECD and other advanced and
emerging economies (2017) 103 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/tax_admin-2017-en
(accessed 16 October 2017).
35 OECD (n 6 above).
36 A Fontana & K Hansen-Shino ‘Implementing the illicit financial flows agenda:
Perspectives from developing countries’ (2012) Chr Michelsen Institute (U4 Brief
2012:8) 4.
37 FATF (n 7 above).
38 See, inter alia, R Tavares ‘Relationship between money laundering, tax evasion and tax
heavens’ (2013) EU Special Committee on Organized Crime, Corruption and Money
Laundering (CRIM) 2012-2013, thematic paper on money laundering; A Storm
‘Establishing the link between money laundering and tax evasion’ The Clute Institute
Academic Conference, Munich, 2014.
39 OECD (n 6 above).
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necessary in the detection and investigation of IFFs. With respect to tax
administrations, it should be emphasised that a tax crime is perceived as
one of the major sources of IFFs. Some studies even indicate that the
majority of all IFFs are related to cross-border tax-related transactions
which would require cross-border cooperation.40 That is why, in order to
be effective and efficient, as is required by good governance criteria, a tax
administration should establish cooperation with law enforcement
agencies, a so-called inter-agency cooperation which builds on a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach.
Entering into inter-agency cooperation may substantially enhance
efforts of a tax administration and also other agencies in stemming illicit
financial flows. Among many benefits of the concept of inter-agency
cooperation are increased effectiveness of agencies participating in this
cooperation; improved chances of stemming IFFs; operational efficiency;
and an improvement in agencies’ skills due to collaboration. It is also a
way in which a tax system may become better integrated with other
agencies. From a good governance perspective, it may contribute to
promoting inclusiveness by replacing separate actions of different agencies
with a collaborative effort. Inclusiveness is being repeated by many fora as
a key element in building capacities, ensuring sustainable sources of
government revenue and, finally, supporting good governance.41
Inter-agency cooperation may be framed in different ways. This may
range from tools as simple as joint training that supports an exchange of
expertise and discussing obstacles faced, to more enhanced forms such as
joint investigations or even special task forces.42 
The value of inter-agency cooperation has been recognised by the
international community. Many developed countries have initiated special
programmes based on inter-agency cooperation as an effective and
efficient way of preventing, detecting, tracking and prosecuting illicit
financial flows. Joint investigation teams, inter-agency centres of
intelligence and secondments, and co-location of personnel are but some
40 United Nations Final study on illicit financial flows, human rights and the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other
related international financial obligations of states on the full enjoyment of all human rights,
particularly economic, social and cultural rights (2016) 15 January 2016, A/HRC/31/61 3.
41 It is worth referring to the Agenda 2030 that states: ‘We envisage a world in which
every country enjoys sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and decent
work for all. A world in which consumption and production patterns and use of all
natural resources – from air to land, from rivers, lakes and aquifers to oceans and seas
– are sustainable. One in which democracy, good governance and the rule of law, as
well as an enabling environment at the national and international levels, are essential
for sustainable development, including sustained and inclusive economic growth,
social development, environmental protection and the eradication of poverty and
hunger. One in which development and the application of technology are climate-
sensitive, respect biodiversity and are resilient. One in which humanity lives in
harmony with nature and in which wildlife and other living species are protected.’
42 OECD (n 6 above) 14-18.
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examples of existing strategies of inter-agency enhanced cooperation. A
number of interesting initiatives were developed in The Netherlands,43 the
USA,44 Australia and Finland.45
International organisations have also recognised the value of inter-
agency cooperation. It began with the Communiqué by the G20 Leaders
who, at the 2011 Cannes Summit, called for the adoption of and
compliance with the international standards in the tax, prudential, and
AML/CFT areas, and requested international organisations to ‘work
closely together to enhance transparency and facilitate cooperation
between tax and law enforcement agencies in the implementation of these
standards’. The initiative was adopted by the OECD, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the FATF and the UN. However,
thus far there has been no involvement of the EU. This may be surprising
considering the fact that the EU promotes the concept of good governance
and tax good governance. 
3 European Union tax agenda as a case study
3.1 Rationale for the new tax good governance agenda within 
the European Union framework
The EU introduces itself as a leader in promoting good governance in tax
matters and the principles of transparency, the exchange of information,
and fair tax competition that are now worldwide gaining traction. It is
noteworthy to recall the OECD discussion paper on ‘A Contribution to the
Third Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa’. Here the
EU stated:46 
… put the EU at the forefront in improving tax governance within its own
borders and given the EU a leading role in pushing for an ambitious global
agenda. Major improvements have been made in tax governance in the EU
internal market while taking into account implications for third countries.
43 In 2013 the criminal investigations leg of the Netherlands Tax and Customs
Administration established a Centre for Intelligence and Operational Excellence. The
Centre consists of authorities that are involved in any actions against money
laundering.
44 The United States established the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
Fusion Center (OCDETF-FC) in 2006 under the auspices of the Department of
Justice, Homeland Security and the Department of Treasury.
45 Eg, in Finland the Grey Economy Information Unit (GEIU) was established. It aims
at promoting the fight against the shadow economy. The GEIU collects information
from different authorities, regardless of existing confidentiality provisions.
46 European Commission ‘Collect more – Spend better. A contribution to the third
financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa’, Discussion paper (2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/com_collectmore-
spendbetter_20150713_en.pdf (accessed 19 October 2016).
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Tax good governance was developed by the EU primarily with respect
to a policy that addresses third countries. The first proposal of minimum
standards of tax good governance was issued in the Commission
Recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage third
countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax matters
in 2012,47 although the concept of pure good governance had even earlier
been present on the EU agenda.48 The recommendation included the set
of rules addressing third countries. The rules were aimed at incentivising
third countries to meet the standards of tax good governance. Three of
these standards, namely, transparency, exchange of information and fair
tax competition, were regarded as the core of the recommendation. Thus,
they were seen as criteria in the assessment of third countries' tax regimes.
In case of non-compliance with these core rules, common counter-
measures could be applied. The criteria were approved by the Economic
and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN). Next, they were used in the
course of work of the Platform for Tax and Good Governance.49 Very
soon it was recognised that the rules needed to be updated. 
First of all, over the course of time it was recognised that the criteria
were used in an inconsistent manner, and sometimes not at all50 in regard
to both their application by the Platform for Tax and Good Governance as
well as by member states. This lack of a coherent approach resulted in the
need for more clarity.
In addition, the EU Tax Good Governance criteria had become
obsolete. Since 2012, when the recommendation was issued, there have
been many advancements on the tax agenda. The automatic exchange of
information has become widespread across many countries around the
world and gathered the support of the largest economies.51 However, it
was the BEPS project,52 led by the OECD under the auspices of the G20
Leaders, who significantly reshaped the international tax agenda and
47 Brussels, 6.12.2012 C(2012) 8805 final.
48 As early as 1991 the European Council in Luxembourg (European Council 1991) and
the Council of Development Ministers each adopted a declaration (Resolution of the
European Council, 28 November 1991, OJ EEC 11-1991: 122ff) responding to the
international debate on good governance. For more, see TA Börzel et al ‘Good
governance in the European Union’ Berlin Working Paper on European Integration,
No 7, 2008, http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/international/europa
/arbeitspapiere/2008-7-Boerzel_et_al_GoodGovernance.pdf (accessed 21 October
2016).
49 The Platform for Tax and Good Governance brings together representatives from
business, civil society, trade unions and national tax administrations. It was established
in 2013 in the context of an Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and
tax evasion presented by the Commission in 2012. In 2015 it was decided to prolong
its mandate. For more, see https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/com
pany-tax/tax-good-governance/platform-tax-good-governance_en (accessed 16 Octo-
ber 2017).
50 The Communication, point 2.
51 For more details, see: https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/ (accessed
21 June 2016).
52 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project. For more details, see http://www.
oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm (accessed 16 October 2017).
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influenced the understanding of good governance criteria. Following the
creation of new standards created by the OECD under the BEPS project,
the EU faced the necessity to update its agenda and apply a common
approach across all member states in order to answer the current tax
challenges in a consistent matter. As a result, the Action Plan for Fair and
Efficient Corporate Taxation in the EU (Action Plan)’ was developed. The
Action Plan proposed five key areas for action: re-launching the Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB); ensuring fair taxation where
profits are generated; creating a better business environment; increasing
transparency; and improving EU co-ordination. From the perspective of
the EU Single Market, it aims at ensuring that all member states adopt a
coordinated approach against the phenomenon of profit shifting and base
erosion. 
As a follow-up to the Action Plan, on 28 January 2016 the European
Commission released the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package (ATA Package).53
The new set of measures was suggested with the intention of ensuring that
a minimum standard against the phenomenon of base erosion be
established across all member states. As was explained by the European
Commission, the ATA Package offered immediate solutions to tackle tax
avoidance, boost tax transparency, and ensure a fairer and more stable
business environment. As a next step, the Commission proposed the
relaunch of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)
project.54 The relaunch was announced in October 2016.55 It was
suggested that the project would be implemented through a two-step
process and that it would be compulsory for the largest groups of taxpayers
in the European Union.56
The integral part of the ATA Package is Communication. The
Communication does not have a binding form, constituting only soft law.
Thus, as a soft law instrument, it only requires endorsement by the Council
53 See press release http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-159_en.htm (accessed
16 October 2017).
54 On 20 June 2016 tax commissioner Pierre Moscovici stated that the EU Commission
would relaunch proposals for a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) in
the EU in the autumn of that year. He confirmed that ‘[b]usinesses and investors need
simplicity, certainty, and a level playing field. They also need a swift and efficient
system to solve double tax disputes and the Commission will make proposals to
improve the current situation by the end of this year. This will come together with the
real prize for businesses: the CCCTB, which the Commission will re-launch in the
autumn.’
55 European Commission ‘Commission proposes major corporate tax reform for the EU’
Press release, 25 October 2016, Strasbourg, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
16-3471_en.htm (accessed 23 November 2016).
56 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate
Tax Base, COM (2016) 685 final, 2016/0337 (CNS), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/sites/taxation/files/com_2016_685_en.pdf. (accessed 23 November 2016).
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and Parliament. Communication on an External Strategy already has been
endorsed by the ECOFIN.57 
3.2 New approach to promoting tax good governance
Within Communication, the EU Commission suggested several tools that
should internationally promote tax good governance. These are
implementing tax good governance clauses and state aid provisions in
agreements with third countries; assisting developing countries in
improving their tax systems and increasing their domestic resources;
developing a common approach to listing third countries; and
strengthening the relationship between EU funds and tax good
governance. To understand how these tools fit the definition of good
governance and tax good governance, it is essential to comment on each of
the suggested tools.
The first items proposed in Communication suggests inserting a good
governance clause to treaties concluded with third countries. The idea as
such is not novel. Since 1995 it has been the official policy of the EU to
include references to democratic principles and human rights in
agreements between the EU and third countries. The most prominent of
this practice is the clause agreed to in the Cotonou Agreement.58 In 2008,
the uniformed wording of such a clause was agreed upon. It was seen as a
basis for future tax good governance clauses in international agreements.
The Commission was given a mandate to negotiate this type of clause. In
the meantime, the international tax environment dramatically changed,
whereas the suggested good governance clause quite often was the subject
of discussion during the negotiations around the treaties, and caused
delays in reaching final consensus. In a direct response to these issues, the
EU Commission set out core elements in the Communication of good
governance which should be included in a negotiated treaty. The
Communication included transparency and exchange of information upon
request; Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) of financial account
information; fair tax competition; G20/OECD BEPS Standards; and
FATF Recommendations.59
The EU Commission acknowledged that in some cases, countries may
not be prepared to meet all the criteria. It was suggested that in these cases
member states should adopt a different approach. The EU Commission
57 Council conclusions on an external taxation strategy and measures against tax treaty
abuse, 25 May 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/
2016/05/25-conclusions-tax-treaty-abuse/ (accessed 15 June 2016). 
58 Art 9 of the Cotonou Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 includes
reference to good governance standards that should underpin the domestic and
international policies of parties to the agreement and constitute a fundamental element
of the agreement.
59 FATF (n 7 above).
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referred to two potential solutions. Member states can try to offer a so-
called ‘simplified approach’. Another option would be to support these
countries in the implementation of the clause. It remains to be seen
whether member states will abuse this gateway to create a myriad of
differentiating good governance clauses. Considering that there are 28
member states, it is easy to conceive that each of these may compose
dissimilar good governance clauses. Whereas diversity should be
welcomed, it should not be equal to diminishing standards.
A new interesting measure that was suggested in Communication is
the monitoring of whether a third country is compliant with the good
governance clause inserted in the agreement. In the event of its violation,
the agreement’s consultation mechanism should be initiated. The
implementation of this proposal would be a long-anticipated change on the
EU good governance agenda. One of most important weaknesses of
previous good governance clauses was the lack of a proper operational
mechanism for the implementation, the monitoring of compliance with the
clause, and an evaluation of the effectiveness of sanctions. As was
sometimes pointed out, the EU policy in respect of enforcing good
governance was ‘aspirational’ and aimed at fostering dialogue.60 The EU
Communication provides no additional details of how this mechanism will
function.
Along with the good governance clause, state aid provisions would
have a dissuasive influence on any type of harmful subsidies when
included in agreements with third countries, and would ensure that
government interventions do not distort competition. Therefore, it was
also suggested that they be included. Taking into account the active
position over previous years of the European Commission in enforcing
state aid provisions, it could be accepted that the new clause may play an
important role in shaping the relationship with companies from third
countries that are active in the EU. 
Communication also discusses a suggestion to assist third countries in
mobilising domestic resources. In particular, this can be done by
strengthening their tax systems. It is an important position on the EU tax
good governance agenda since it is an indication of preference for an active
approach towards promoting good governance in third countries. Good
governance should be not only a clause in a treaty, but should also demand
implementing a certain policy agenda, and the EU should provide the
required support in its implementation. In this respect, the EU intends to
follow its strategy regarding developing countries that was presented in the
‘Collect More – Spend Better’.61 Within this initiative, the EU intends to
60 N Hachez ‘Essential elements clauses in EU trade agreements making trade work in a
way that helps human rights?’ Working Paper 158, April 2015 21, https://ghum.
kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/wp158hachez.pdf (accessed 17 July 2016). 
61 European Commission (n 48 above).
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address tax policy and tax compliance gaps. This can be achieved by
adopting various measures addressing both the substantive laws of
taxation as well as law of tax administration and procedure. The aim of the
EU is to address aggressive tax avoidance and tax evasion. In this respect,
the EU Commission also alludes to the issue of illicit financial flows.
However, it does not articulate what should be initiated to address the
issue. Only in a number of earlier documents was there a proposal of
strengthening monitoring capacities in the fight against illicit financial
flows.62 This suggests a rather limited scope of operations that target these
flows, whereas nothing has been suggested with respect to inter-agency
cooperation. It appears that the EU agenda is focusing only on pure tax or
public finance issues. The EU Commission is silent on a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach. 
The next suggested measures resurrect the antiquated concept of
blacklisting.63 In Communication, the Commission suggests a system
consisting of three steps. These are assessing; screening; and listing third
countries. The first ‘go’ of the EU blacklist was in 2015, but it was heavily
criticised internationally. The wider society commented that it lacked
objectivity and logic concerning which jurisdictions were on the list.64 The
new EU blacklist is based on a screening and listing process. The process
addresses countries that do not ‘play fairly’. 
In order to identify these countries, a common EU list of third
countries will be developed within a three-step process (a scoreboard
phase, a screening phase and a listing phase).65 The first step is the
identification of the jurisdictions to be prioritised for screening at the EU
level. The basis for prioritisation would be a scoreboard of indicators
described in Communication.66 The second step consists of a selection of
jurisdictions for the assessment and the actual assessment. The selection
would be done based on the outcome from the first step. This would be
followed by the assessment, done by the EU Commission. In the
assessment, the EU Commission would take into consideration the Code
62 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and
the European Economic and Social Committee – Tax and Development Co-operating
with Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters COM
(2010) 426. 
63 In a report issued in 2000, the OECD identified a number of jurisdictions as tax havens
according to criteria it had established. However, in 2009, the last three countries were
removed from the list and, since then, the initiative has not been relaunched. For more,
see http://www.oecd.org/countries/monaco/listofunco-operativetaxhavens.htm
(accessed 17 July 2016).
64 For more comments, see V Houlder ‘Tax blacklist provokes offshore fury’ Financial
Times 22 June 2015.
65 For a detailed description, see ‘Common EU list of third country jurisdictions for tax
purposes’, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tax-common-eu-list_de (accessed
17 October 2017).
66 On 14 September 2016, the Commission completed a scoreboard of all third countries
and jurisdictions for tax purposes. For the results, see https://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/2016-09-15_scoreboard-indicators.pdf
(accessed 17 October 2017). 
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of Conduct for Business Taxation. Finally, the third step is an agreement
on a list. Based on a recommendation by the Commission, member states
will agree on the countries that need to be on the list. Communication did
not address the counteraction67 against listed countries.68
The developed procedure promotes good governance and enhances its
implementation. It attempts to avoid the previous massive criticism of
being arbitrary.69 According to the EU Commission, the procedure should
be more transparent. The format of the information should also be easier
to access. This proves that high standards of good governance mirrored in
a transparent policy are relevant to the EU. 
Nonetheless, it may be doubtful how effective the mechanism of the
listing will be. The entire process of listing third countries seems to be quite
complex and long. It is not surprising that the Commission stated that it
will be applied only in exceptional cases. According to the Commission,
‘[l]isting a jurisdiction should always be considered as a last resort option.
It should be reserved for those jurisdictions that refuse to engage on tax
good governance matters or fail to constructively acknowledge EU
concerns with their tax systems.’70 This may undermine the idea of listing
and make it an even weaker mechanism. The process already has been
criticised by some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as being
‘doomed to fail’ because it will not include some countries where
international financial secrecy thrives.71 
Finally, Communication also recognised the role of international
financial institutions in promoting good governance. The EU Commission
referred to the EU Financial Regulation72 (article 140(4)). In particular, it
discussed the ban on investing and channelling EU funds through entities
in third countries if these do not comply with international tax
transparency standards. 
67 The options that have so far been considered are a possibility to review and even
suspend free trade agreements and prohibiting access to EU funds.
68 A detailed description of the process of deciding on the EU list of non-cooperative
jurisdictions is described in the Communication.
69 Although the new list will be the result of certain proceedings and will be based on
clear criteria, it was welcomed with some criticism, particularly by NGOs. They claim
that it is ‘a highly political exercise, where rich and powerful countries such as the US
and Switzerland are protected from blacklisting’. See https://financialtrans
parency.org/false-eu-promise-listing-tax-havens/ (accessed 17 July 2016).
70 Communication, 5.3.
71 Tax Justice Network ‘The false promise of tax haven blacklists’ http://
www.taxjustice.net/2016/05/31/the-false-promise-of-tax-haven-blacklists/ (accessed
21 October 2016).
72 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of
the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (Official
Journal L 298 of 26 October 2012).
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4 Call for promotion of inter-agency cooperation as 
a way of enhancing tax good governance in third 
countries
The new EU agenda promoting good governance in relationship to third
countries is an important increment in promoting and enhancing good tax
governance. Many developing countries experience weak governance and,
as a result, widespread corruption, tax evasion and money laundering.
With the suggested set of policy instruments, the EU, given its
unquestionable political impact and important role on the international
agenda, may have a unique opportunity to improve the situation whereby
none of the competing parties has an advantage at the initiation of a
competitive activity in many third countries. However, a thorough
analysis reveals certain weaknesses of the updated EU agenda. 
In the context of the conducted analysis, it appears that the EU thus far
has not recognised the value of inter-agency cooperation as a tool that not
only tackles illicit financial flows, but also increases the effectiveness and
efficiency of tax administrations and promotes inclusiveness within a
frame of a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. This is quite surprising
considering the wide array of actions suggested in Communication. 
It may even be more surprising considering current initiatives
undertaken over the last few years by many member states of the EU. On
such an initiative, the Croatian State Prosecutor's Office for the
Suppression of Organized Crime and Corruption (USKOK) is a Croatian
agency supervised by the state attorney’s office but which also cooperates
with the tax administration73 or Tax Cobra, a cooperation of police,
custom and finance administration in the Czech Republic.74 The concept
of inter-agency cooperation seems to be widespread in Europe, and many
countries have well-grounded experience in this field. 
Considering the experience of developed countries experienced in this
area, they could assist those that are still developing to increase their
knowledge on how the effective and efficient inter-agency cooperation
should be constructed. Existing studies suggest that there still are many
legal and practical challenges that will need to be overcome.75 The role of
developed countries is to share their experiences of how the issues of
confidentiality, sharing information and responsibilities could be
addressed. It seems that thus far not much has been done. Various
73 S Hodžić ‘National report: Croatia’ paper presented at the conference ‘Improving tax
compliance in a globalised world’, Rust, Austria, 30 June-2 July 2016.
74 D Nerudová & J Tepperová ‘National report: Czech Republic’ paper presented at the
conference ‘Improving tax compliance in a globalised world’ (n 74 above).
75 A Majdanska et al ‘Inter-agency co-operation and illicit financial flows in Africa’
Working Draft.
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international stakeholders are focusing on tax cooperation whereas, to face
the challenges of many modern threats (eg IFFs) and to ensure sustainable
sources for development, cooperations should include more agencies than
tax administrations.
At the same time, when examining the experience of some developing
countries, it appears that many of these countries continue to struggle with
constructing efficient channels for inter-agency cooperation.76 A good case
study may be sub-Saharan African countries. Capacity in sub-Saharan
African countries is limited and further complicated by the need to
significantly improve cooperation between existing institutions. Even
where appropriate architectures of government agencies are in place, the
effectiveness of their work is diminished by the lack of cooperation.
Responsibilities are duplicated, and information is very limited.77 
Nigeria is an example of an African country where many regulatory
agencies already exist, for instance, the Special Control Unit Against
Money Laundering or the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit.
Nevertheless, the country ranks in the top five African countries by
cumulative IFFs in the period 1970 to 2008. The situation may be the result
not only of inadequate capacities of existing institutions, but also the lack
of coherence between them. Again, some responsibilities between agencies
are duplicated.78 
On the other hand, a slow move in the direction of inter-agency
cooperation can be observed. Kenya is an example of a less-developed
country that implemented inter-agency strategy. In 2015 Kenya
established the Multi-Agency Team (MAT) on Corruption and other
Economic Crimes that ensures the cooperation of a number of agencies on
a regular basis.79 There is evidence that the MAT has been used
successfully to share information between the various agencies, and a
number of cases are currently before court as a result of information
sharing.80
76 Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa commissioned
by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development 36 (UNECA Report) http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/
publications/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf (accessed 10 September 2016).
77 S Chrispin, ‘Pressure grows to tighten global tax rules’ 31 October 2014, http://
www.bbc.com/news/business-29850055 (accessed 15 September 2015).
78 UNECA Report (n 77 above) 36.
79 Country Statement by Ambassador Michael AO Oyugi, Ambassador/Permanent
Representative of the Republic of Kenya to the UN and the International
Organisations in Vienna, Austria and Leader of Delegation, 15 November 2016, 7th
session of the Meeting of the Implementation Review Group of the UN Convention
Against Corruption, Vienna, Austria, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/14-16November2016/
Statements/Kenya.pdf (accessed 17 October 2017).
80 A Majdanska et al ‘Inter-agency co-operation and illicit financial flows in Africa’,
paper presented at the 2nd annual congress on Financing Sustainable Development in
Africa: Identifying Untapped and Underutilised Sources of Revenue, Seychelles,
5-7 September 2016.
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It cannot be ignored that inter-agency cooperation not only is a tool
that affords an opportunity to effectively address certain types of crimes. It
may also address issues of scarce capacities which, when coupled with
complex law systems and opaque administration, become unable to
effectively utilise law enforcement and ultimately enables IFFs to flourish.
Efficient inter-agency cooperation could mitigate some of these problems.
The benefits of implementing this strategy that may be most important
from the perspective of the least developed countries could be providing a
sustainable source of revenues; promoting good governance; capacity
building; and, finally, improving effectivity and efficiency of law
enforcement.
The effective fight against illicit financial flows demands the
participation of different sets of actors. Among them, tax authorities,
customs administrations, the police, financial intelligence units and anti-
corruption agencies play the most significant role. Therefore, the slow
move to inter-agency cooperation in some developing countries must be
welcomed and support from international fora must be demanded. 
5 Conclusions
In terms of enhancing good governance, the inclusiveness and
participation of main stakeholders are of great value. An important
dimension is cooperation. Cooperation should stand as an invitation to all
stakeholders. It also refers to good governance in taxation. This statement
implies a twofold collaboration. It not only is about collaboration between
tax administration and taxpayers. Cooperation between tax
administration and other types of law enforcement agencies, both at the
international and domestic levels, plays an equally significant role in
countering different types of illicit financial flows. The shift to a
cooperative approach among different governmental bodies could be a
long-term project that may result in preventions that are more effective and
efficient in detecting, investigating and prosecuting different types of illicit
financial flows. From the perspective of developing countries, creating this
type of cooperation is of the greatest importance. It also equals access to
data, experience and knowledge of other agencies required by the tax
administration. Their limited capacity could gain in cooperation with
financial intelligence units and different law enforcement agencies. 
Taking into account the rich experience of member states, the EU has
a unique opportunity to promote the concept of inter-agency among
developing countries. It may help design appropriate modes of information
exchange and subsequent communication channels. By improving
cooperation between tax administrations and other law enforcement
agencies, the efficiency and effectiveness of tax administrations could be
improved. In this manner, it may fulfil its commitment to strengthen
domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries. Tax
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administrations as well as other law enforcement agencies would be better
informed and equipped to conduct investigations. Finally, by supporting
cooperation at the inter-institutional level, the EU could contribute to
building enforcement agendas of third countries that are more coherent. In
the same way, the EU would also fulfil its obligation of supporting the
achievement of Sustainable Development Goals.
In examining the operations of other international bodies, inter-agency
cooperation already is present on the agendas of the OECD, the World
Bank Group and the IMF. Perhaps it is the right time for the EU to join
these institutions and support developing countries in building their good
governance agenda by implementing inter-agency cooperation. 
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Bernd Schlenther
Abstract
The level of cooperation between tax administrations and other domestic
law enforcement agencies is critical in addressing illicit financial flows
(IFFs). Recent international strategies addressing financial crimes and illicit
flows have primarily focused on achieving greater synergies in information
exchange. However, traditional concerns about taxpayer confidentiality and
society’s best interests have impeded cooperation in many jurisdictions,
whereas others have found innovative solutions to resolve this conflict.
Although there are several limitations on the scope of domestic inter-agency
cooperation, opportunities do exist for countries to improve existing
cooperation models by means of task forces, fusion centres and by applying
international best practice. For African countries to meet the
recommendations for inter-agency cooperation, as set out in the Report of
the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, this requires
that appropriate legal gateways are in place, that strategies and objectives to
combat IFFs are aligned and that appropriate co-ordination mechanisms are
identified and implemented.
1 Introduction
A key challenge posed to African countries by the recommendations of the
Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa is
that African states should ‘strengthen the independent institutions and
agencies of government responsible for preventing IFFs’ and ‘create
methods and mechanisms for information sharing and co-ordination
among the various institutions and agencies of government responsible for
preventing IFFs’.1 The main role players identified in the Report are tax
and customs agencies; financial intelligence units; anti-fraud agencies;
anti-corruption agencies; and financial crime agencies. Considering the
complexities, mandates and objectives of different spheres of government,
the question is how these different agencies should work together. 
1 UNECA Illicit financial flows: Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from
Africa (2014) 81-82.
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The relationship between different spheres of government is
characterised by layers of inter-dependencies as it is not possible to have a
complete separation of policy responsibilities and outcomes amongst
different levels of government.2 Producing deliverables and achieving
government objectives requires co-ordination between government
agencies. Charbit and Michalun define this as a complex relationship
because at the same time it is vertical (across different levels of
government), horizontal (among the same level of government) and
networked, as the lines of communication and co-ordination for an agreed
policy objective may traverse as it involves a multitude of actors and
stakeholders in the public and private sectors.3 
In addressing the above problem, Charbit and Michalun identify five
dominant challenges to multi-level governance. These are described as
information gaps; capacity gaps; fiscal gaps; as well as administrative and
policy gaps. The information gap refers to ‘information asymmetries
between levels of government when designing, implementing and
delivering public policy’.4 The capacity gap refers to a lack of human
resources, knowledge and skills and supporting infrastructural resources.
The fiscal gap represents ‘the difference between sub-national revenues and
the required expenditures for sub-national authorities to meet their
responsibilities.5 An administrative gap refers to a disjoint when
administrative boundaries do not correspond to functional economic areas
at sub-national levels, whilst a policy gap arises when strictly vertical
approaches to cross-sectoral policy are taken by ministries.6 It can be
argued that an administrative and policy gap arises when there is no nexus
between the heads of administrations and policy setters (that is, a
horizontal approach is taken without considering the vertical
relationships).
The level of cooperation between tax administrations and other
domestic law enforcement agencies is critical in countering financial
crimes. Recent international strategies to address financial crimes and
illicit flows primarily have focused on achieving greater synergies in
information exchange. However, traditional concerns on taxpayer
confidentiality and society’s best interests have impeded cooperation in
many jurisdictions, whereas others have found innovative solutions to
resolve this conflict. The current state of affairs in domestic cooperation
reveals that, whilst there are several limitations on the scope of
cooperation, opportunities do exist in the form of existing cooperation
2 C Charbit & M Michalun ‘Mind the gaps: Managing mutual dependence in relations
among levels of government’ OECD Working Papers on Public Governance 14 (2009)
8.
3 As above.
4 As above.
5 As above.
6 As above.
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models, the use of task forces and fusion centres and in applying
international best practice.
Tax administrations have a key role to play in addressing serious
crime, and this role often is expressed in specific terms in country
legislation.7 This obligation of sharing taxpayer information with other
departments, however, should be measured against the potential impact on
the integrity of the tax system. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
points out that in most countries there are regulatory restrictions in place
that govern the collection and use of information (whether from the public
or from other government agencies).8 Such restrictions can limit an
agency’s ability to share information with other government agencies and
countries. It is, therefore, necessary to find a balance between data
protection rights and in government departments to share information and
may lead to a situation where no sharing whatsoever will take place.
Moore points out that revenue administrations are highly networked
and dependent on active cooperation from a variety of stakeholders that
may include ministries of finance; commerce and trade; justice; as well as
functionaries responsible for registering property; new businesses; motor
vehicles; public utilities; and public procurement agencies.9 In addition to
these stakeholders, there are the police; the judiciary; public prosecutors;
security agencies; tax administrations of other countries’ financial services
industries; business associations; and professional associations of
accountants and auditors.10
The ability of government institutions to share relevant information is
often a key indicator of the effectiveness of a department to pro-actively
identify risks pertinent to its mandate. The failure to relate its core
functions and mandate to that of similar departments will not allow for a
common line of sight desperately needed in countering financial crime.
In 2011 the first International Forum on Tax and Crimes was held in
Oslo, Norway, with the aim of finding more effective ways of using a
‘whole-of-government’ approach in countering financial crimes. In
response, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)11 produced an in-depth analysis of inter-agency cooperation in
fighting financial crimes in 32 countries wherein four different models of
cooperation are mapped.12 These are discussed in the next section.
7 Eg, in South Africa through sec 3 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) that
singles out the tax authority next to law enforcement agencies.
8 FATF ‘Best practices paper: Sharing among domestic competent authorities
information related to the financing of proliferation’ (2012) 6.
9 M Moore ‘Obstacles to increasing tax revenues in low income countries’ (2013) 8.
10 As above.
11 Through the Rome Report of 2012.
12 OECD ‘Effective inter-agency co-operation in fighting tax crime and other financial
crimes’ (2013) 8.
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2 Models for cooperation
Strategies for combating financial crimes are dependent on the ability to
share information and that becomes a necessary pre-condition for inter-
agency cooperation. Such cooperation is required over various stages,
including prevention; detection; investigation; prosecution; and recovery
of the proceeds of crime. From the perspective of combating financial
crimes, a number of government agencies need to be involved in part or
throughout an investigation, depending on the circumstances. 
The OECD identifies the key agencies13 involved in the different
stages of combating financial crimes, and identifies frameworks that
support arrangements for inter-agency cooperation.14 It further identifies
information flows of importance that enable different agencies to
effectively combat financial crime, whilst describing the ‘legal gateways’ in
countries that make or need to make information flows possible.
In assessing the ways in which countries have allocated responsibilities
for countering tax crimes, four models were identified:
• In the first model, the tax administration has the responsibility of directing
and conduction investigations (Model 1).15
• In the second scenario, tax administrations conduct investigations under
the auspices of the public prosecutor (Model 2).16
• A third way identified is where a specialist tax agency is constituted
outside the tax administration but under the auspices of the finance
ministry to conduct investigations (Model 3).17
• The fourth model is one where the police or the public prosecutor has the
responsibility for conducting investigations (Model 4).18
All countries assessed by the OECD have ‘legal gateways’ in place to allow
tax administrations to share information collected for the purpose of a civil
tax audit or law enforcement agencies that conduct tax crime
13 These agencies can include the tax and customs administration(s); anti-money-
laundering authorities; the police; specialised law enforcement units; the public
prosecutor’s office; and financial regulators.
14 OECD (n 13 above) 8.
15 Applied in a number of Commonwealth countries (including the United Kingdom;
Australia; Malaysia; South Africa; New Zealand; Uganda; and India), Japan; South
Korea; Switzerland; and the United States.
16 Eg applied in Austria, Spain, Portugal and the US. The US is included in both models
1 and 2 as two types of criminal investigations are conducted: (i) administrative –
conducted by the tax administration and handed over to the prosecutor’s office;
(ii) grand jury investigation initiated and conducted under the direction of a
prosecutor.
17 Ghana, Greece, Iceland and Turkey.
18 Eg Belgium, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Norway,
Slovenia and Spain. Spain is included under models 2 and 4 as it can conduct
investigations under the direction of an examining judge or, because a case was
initiated outside the tax administration, it may fall under the direction of the police. 
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investigations.19 However, there are shortcomings regarding the sharing of
non-tax information by tax administrations with the police or public
prosecutor.20 Some countries explicitly prohibit tax administrations from
sharing information relevant to non-tax crimes. Four countries assessed
have prohibitions on the financial intelligence units (FIUs) from obtaining
tax information from the tax authority.21 Wider information sharing is
possible as far as customs information is concerned for tax and non-tax
crimes. In the case of the latter, the customs mandate includes facilitation
of trade and the collection of duties and security that puts it in a position
where it will always collect both tax and non-tax information. 
Cooperation between customs and tax can create financial and
efficiency gains in the collection of duties and taxes, the exchange of
information and a coordinated approach in pursuing common objectives
such as improving compliance, fostering cross-border trade and supporting
economic development.22 Effective cooperation can bring about better
deterrence of tax and customs fraud through the holistic application of risk
management methodologies. In this regard, import and export data and
purchase and sales data can be matched to improve risk identification of
under-declaration practices. When verifying the customs value for related
party transactions involving multinational enterprises, customs
administrations can benefit from information derived from the transfer-
pricing studies that have been developed for profit tax purposes, and which
are generally based on the application of the OECD transfer-pricing
guidelines.23
The World Customs Organization (WCO)24 identifies the following
underpinning enablers for effective and sustained cooperation and
information exchange between tax and customs administrations:
(a) Political will and executive commitment is required because once a
policy decision is taken, it is the commitment and involvement of heads
of both authorities that provides credibility and the necessary drive to
ensure that officers in both administrations understand the importance of
co-operation and information exchange and that they can actively pursue
that agenda through a sustained process.
(b) A legal framework is required for the effective exchange of information
and the protection of data.
19 OECD (n 13 above) 14.
20 As above.
21 OECD (n 13 above) 14-15.
22 WCO ‘Guidelines on customs-tax co-operation’ (2016) 5.
23 As above. Both the OECD transfer pricing guidelines and the WTO customs valuation
methodology are designed to ensure that related party prices are comparable to those
between unrelated parties. The WCO notes that there are opposing risks, namely, the
risk to customs generally is the undervaluation of imported goods to reduce customs
duties, whereas the tax risk is the overvaluation of goods and services to reduce the
taxable profit.
24 WCO (n 23 above) 7-8.
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(c) Governance processes and resources: An adequately-resourced
governance process laying down detailed co-operation mechanisms and
designated contact points should be put in place.
(d) Cross-sectoral understanding: Both administrations should develop and
enhance their capability to identify information of use that may be held
by the other administration.
(e) Data confidentiality and protection: Proper legal safeguards governing
data privacy and protection are required and both administrations need
to promote an organisational culture of data confidentiality.
(f) The standardisation of communication protocols (inclusive of
information technology systems) is required.
(g) Data analytics: Large data requires robust data analytics capability and
analytical techniques including predictive analytics which will assist in
identifying patterns/trends, compliance and/or non-compliance history,
gaps, risks and modi operandi.
(h) Information and system security management.
Legal gateways are available in most countries (although a request-based
limit may be imposed in some countries) whereby the police or prosecuting
authority can provide relevant information to agencies that are
investigating tax crimes.
In as far as information sharing between tax administrations and FIUs
is concerned, several variations were identified. In some countries, tax
authorities may have direct access to FIU information while, in others, the
FIU may not share information with the tax authority for purposes of
doing tax assessments. In the six countries assessed, FIUs are prohibited
from sharing information with the customs authorities.25 In most
countries, legal gateways are in place for FIUs to provide information on
possible tax offences to the responsible authority, although in many
instances, the FIU is able to exercise a discretion as to what information is
made available. 
From an African perspective (of the countries assessed by the OECD),
only Uganda allows tax crime investigators to have direct access to
information obtained by the tax administration for purposes of
administering and assessing taxes. Ghana operates on a request based only
premise, and South Africa is able to share information spontaneously (it is
under no obligation to do so and may exercise its discretion in opting
whether to do so).26 
The four models for cooperation reveal that various options are
available to countries for structuring inter-agency cooperation. Whichever
agency is chosen to lead inter-agency efforts preferably should have both
25 OECD (n 13 above) 16.
26 OECD (n 13 above) 49 51.
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strong governance procedures and institutional capacity in place to lead. It
is also imperative that the underpinning enablers to cooperation, as
identified by the WCO,27 are in place. 
3 Strategies for cooperation
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff hold the view that ‘commitment to
interorganisational cooperation can facilitate cooperation in areas of
common interest, promote a common operational picture, and enable the
sharing of critical information and resources’.28 Where such commitment
is present and actioned, inter-agency cooperation will enable:
(a) unity of effort whereby national objectives are translated into unified
action;29
(b) the pursuit of commonly-shared objectives by integrating joint and
multinational operations at the strategic level and through co-ordination
at the operational and tactical level;
(c) achieving a common understanding that will allow for the identification of
opportunities for co-operation and that can assist in mitigating
unnecessary conflict or unintended consequences; and
(d) a ‘whole-of- government approach’.30
In 2009 the OECD described the rationale for ‘whole-of-government’ work
as the recognition of the interdependence among levels of government.31
The term ‘whole-of-government approach’ is described as a resurgent form
of co-ordination between government agencies, and the spectrum can
range from improvements in horizontal co-ordination between different
policy areas in the central administrative apparatus to improved inter-
governmental vertical co-ordination between ministries and agencies.32
The intent behind this greater recognition of the existence of inter-
dependencies generally is aimed at achieving better regulation and
enhancing performance, effectiveness and efficiency.
The whole of government approach requires a particular way of
working, which involves various managerial inputs. First, joining up
policy making at the centre is required to achieve ‘a shared vision in
support of implementation’. This means that all stakeholders should have
27 WCO (n 23 above) 5-6.
28 US Army Joint Publication 3-08 ‘Interorganizational Co-operation’ (2016) I-1.
29 Four attributes are associated with a framework that can improve unity of effort,
namely, common vision or goals; common understanding of the operational
environment; co-ordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency; and compatible
measures of progress and ability to change course, if necessary (US Army JP 3-08:
2016: I-5/6).
30 US Army Joint Publication 3-08 (n 29 above) I-12.
31 US Army Joint Publication 3-08.
32 T Christensen & P Laegreid ‘The whole-of-government approach – Regulation,
performance and public-sector reform’ (2006) 6.
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the same understanding of the problem and the ‘same vision and buy-in to
the same strategic priorities’ where they are part of the consultation process
from the agenda-setting stage right through to policy development.33
Colgan, Kennedy and Doherty make the point that whenever complex
policy and policy implementation decisions are taken, there needs to be
recognition of inter-dependencies between government agencies which is
followed up by effective management between different government
departments and the different levels of government to make the
implementation work.34 Fundamental to successful cooperation is the
ability of heads of agencies to personally work together. In this regard,
interpersonal communication skills that emphasize consultation,
persuasion, compromise and consensus building are necessary
contributors to achieving unified objectives and to build personal
relationships that inspire trust and confidence.35 
Agencies have found various ways of working together in addressing
financial crimes, such as joint investigation teams; joint training
interventions (for example, Iceland and Latvia);36 inter-agency centres of
intelligence/fusion centres; secondments of personnel (for example, Italy,
Ghana, Korea and Japan);37 the use of shared data bases; joint committees
to coordinate policies in areas of shared responsibility; and inter-agency
meetings and training interventions.
3.1 Aligning objectives and developing a common 
understanding
By comparing the goals and objectives of two different agencies that are
responsible for addressing IFFs, an indication of the feasibility of inter-
agency cooperation can be obtained. To illustrate this point, the objectives
of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the South African
Financial Intelligence Centres (FICs) are compared to determine levels of
alignment. The FICs’ mission and objectives are clear and are summarised
in legislation: Section 3 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act states that
the principal objective of the Centre is to assist in the identification of the
proceeds of unlawful activities, the combating of money-laundering
activities and the financing of terrorist and related activities. The other
objectives of the Centre are (a) to make information collected by it
available to investigating authorities, the intelligence services and the
South African Revenue Service to facilitate the administration and
enforcement of the laws of the Republic; and (b) to exchange information
33 A Colgan et al A Primer on implementing whole of government approaches (2014) 4.
34 As above.
35 US Army Joint Publication 3-08 (n 29 above) I-12.
36 OECD (n 13 above) 232 265.
37 OECD (n 13 above) 251 218 258 254.
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with similar bodies in other countries regarding money-laundering
activities and similar offences.38
One of the five-year priority initiatives of SARS is to ‘achieve
increased customs compliance.’39 To achieve this outcome, it proposes,
amongst others, to ‘continue to adopt a whole of government view in
managing the customs border environment; continue to strengthen risk
management capabilities and to continue to strengthen international
agreements and links with other jurisdictions’.40 Its strategic plan further
states that SARS will adopt a whole-of-government view in managing the
customs border environment through collaboration with other government
agencies. Collaboration with other government agencies is done in such a
way as ‘to improve government’s overall value chain.’41 These sentiments
capture the essential need for co-ordination and how the administration
tends to go about in achieving this. 
SARS also indicates that it will continue to strengthen international
agreements and links with other jurisdictions and, given the level of
interconnectivity in global trade, it acknowledges the importance of
building and maintaining good relations with other tax and customs
jurisdictions. SARS states that it
will collaborate with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to support its
mandate in implementing global safeguards to protect the integrity of the
financial system, in order to meet the objectives of tackling money
laundering. This is particularly relevant to SARS as tax crime is considered as
a base to money laundering and smuggling. Customs and excise duties
offences are also included in this exercise.42 
Furthermore, SARS indicates that it will seek to strengthen and leverage
South Africa’s international treaty networks to cooperate and exchange
information with other tax and customs jurisdictions.43 Thus, the
collaborating agencies and objectives are clearly defined.
In its latest strategic plan,44 the inclusive language has dissipated to the
extent that reference to FATF is limited to the participation of SARS in
both domestic and global anti-terrorism bodies to assist SARS in the
identification, mitigation and sharing of information regarding potential
terrorist threats through the trade supply chain networks. Also, in dealing
with the threat of the illicit economy and illicit financial flows, 
38 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001.
39 SARS ‘Strategic Plan 2014/15-2018/19’ (2014) 25.
40 As above.
41 SARS (n 40 above) 25-27. 
42 As above.
43 As above.
44 SARS ‘Strategic Plan 2016/17-2020/21’ (2016). 
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it is proposed that (i) engagement with other state enforcement agencies such
as state security agency and police takes place to agree on memoranda of
understanding (MOUs) for establishment of dedicated resources for fighting
illicit trade; and (ii) enhancing the inter-agency co-operation in fighting tax
and other financial crimes.45 
Notably absent from the language is specific reference to the term ‘money
laundering’ and the FIC. It can be inferred from the language that an
obstacle to co-ordination may have arisen as a result of changes in
constituents. Another inference is possible in that the co-ordination levels
are so well developed that they do not need mentioning. Be that as it may,
it would have been preferable that specific reference to money-laundering
activities be maintained because of the overlaps that exist between tax
evasion and laundering.46
The excerpts from the SARS strategic plans demonstrate sufficiently
that its objectives overlap with other agencies and that it sees the need to
coordinate actions at different levels to achieve its goals. As pointed out
earlier, the FIC mandate and objectives are clear, and the Act leaves little
room for different interpretations. Turning to the tax legislation analysed
below, it is shown that high levels of discretion in determining what may
or may not be shared may become problematic in advancing cooperation
and co-ordination mechanisms.
Under section 70(3)(c) of the Tax Administration Act of 2011,
provision is made for the disclosure of information to the Financial
Intelligence Centre where such information is required for the purpose of
carrying out the Centre’s duties and functions under the Financial
Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001.47 According to section 70(7), SARS
may not disclose information if it is satisfied that the disclosure would
seriously impair a civil or criminal tax investigation. Section 71 allows
SARS to make an ex parte application to a judge in chambers for an order
authorising SARS to disclose the information under certain
circumstances.48 
45 SARS (n 45 above) 27 28. 
46 Eg, both crimes entail some form of concealment or hiding of assets through shell
companies or by means of deliberate steps to break the audit trail. Risk indicators also
overlap, such as transactions that lack reasonable explanation; the use of offshore
accounts, trusts or companies not supported by economic rationale for doing so;
schemes involving suspect territories; over-complicated tax schemes; unrealistic wealth
compared to client profile; short-life businesses involved in imports/exports; and the
use of cash transactions.
47 Under sec 70(5). The information disclosed may only be disclosed to the extent that it
is (a) necessary for the purpose of exercising a power or performing a regulatory
function or duty under the legislation; and (b) relevant and proportionate to what the
disclosure is intended to achieve as determined under the legislation.
48 Where it may reveal evidence that (a) an offence (other than a tax offence) was or may
be committed in respect of which a court may impose a sentence of imprisonment
exceeding five years; (b) that may be relevant to the investigation or prosecution of the
offence; or (c) of an imminent and serious public safety or environmental risk.
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A serious impediment to information sharing may be caused if section
70(7) is applied with a wide discretion or without some fixed criteria for
determining what would cause or be a serious impairment of a civil or
criminal tax investigation. Conversely, some criteria could be set for
instances where information sharing should be compulsory because there
are indicators within the scope of tax administrations which are relevant to
anti-money-laundering initiatives.
The South African example shows that clear language should be used
to describe the objectives of an agency and, also, in which areas it has inter-
dependencies with another agency and how those inter-dependencies will
be addressed. It is also evident that clarity in legislation and/or regulations
is necessary where ‘discretion’ is left too wide for interpretation.
3.2. Joint investigation teams
A working example of an integrated task team is Project Wickenby which
is run under the auspices of the Australian Tax Office (ATO).49 The ATO
is included in the Commonwealth's Organised Crime Strategic Framework
as ‘an agency with shared responsibility for addressing the impact on
Australia of serious and organised crime’.50 The ATO has direct access to
information collected by the Australian FIU (AUSTRAC) which accords
with the relevant provisions of the Financial Transactions Reports Act
(FTR) and a memorandum of understanding between AUSTRAC and the
ATO. There are no specific restrictions on the use of information by the tax
authorities as the principle object of the FTR is to facilitate the
administration and enforcement of tax laws. Under AML/CFT
legislation, the tax authorities are entitled to access AUSTRAC
information for any purpose that relates to facilitating the administration
or enforcement of a tax law.51
The ATO’s role is explained by ‘the profit driven nature of organised
crime’ and the fact that the necessary skills are available to the ATO to help
with the identification of unexplained wealth that is generated through the
proceeds of crime.52 The basis of this framework is the understanding that
law enforcement agencies have differing powers and responsibilities, and
that cooperation will result in these responsibilities and powers being used
to maximum effect. The purpose of the framework is to initiate and sustain
49 ATO (no longer available).
50 As above. The introduction, in 1985, of sec 3D of the Taxation Administration Act
1953 (allowing disclosure of ATO information to the National Crimes Authority
(NCA), a precursor to the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the introduction,
in 1989, of sec 3E of the TAA 1953 (which allowed the ATO to share information on
serious offences with law enforcement bodies) formally inducted the ATO into the
armoury of state and Commonwealth law enforcement.
51 E Mathias & G Esposito ‘Using anti-money laundering measures to improve tax
compliance’ in M Geerten et al (eds) Tax design issues worldwide (2015) 284.
52 ATO (no longer available).
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a collaborative and integrated Commonwealth approach to address
organised criminal activity in order to reduce the social and economic
impacts of organised crime on the Australian community by targeting the
most significant threats.53 Whilst taxation secrecy and disclosure
provisions are designed to keep protected tax information confidential,
limited circumstances allow the disclosure of protected information by the
tax authorities to other agencies. Such circumstances include investigating
a serious offence or when disclosure is in connection with a prescribed task
force and one of the main purposes of the task force is protecting the fiscus.
3.3 Task force and the fusion centre concept 
Information sharing by ATO officers for purposes of law enforcement is
enabled under legislation. Information sharing through a task force allows
the ATO to chase after assets of criminals by means of tax remedies. The
task force's law enforcement impact is the result of having an integrated
approach to confiscation of assets and by combining inter-agency
resources. In July 2010, the National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Centre
was launched, which is described as an important component of the
Commonwealth Organised Crime Strategic Framework. The Fusion
Centre concept is designed to bring together information, skills and
knowledge, data and technology across government departments. The
Fusion Centre integrates information and intelligence at a central or
national level in order that ‘real time’ intelligence is generated on risk areas
such as organised crime. It also draws together a variety of skills in a single
environment that allows for better collaboration and for an improved view
of factors associated with organised crime, such as risks, threats and
vulnerabilities. From these factors, targets common to all participants can
be identified.54
The United States (US) in 2006 established the Organised Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force Fusion Centre (OCDETF-FC) under the
auspices of the Department of Justice, Homeland Security and the
Department of Treasury. The task force/fusion centre serves a central
point for developing and utilising technologies that provide an analysis of
law enforcement and intelligence data to support inter-agency
cooperation.55 Through the Fusion Centre, law enforcement data is shared
and different agencies derive different benefits from the Centre. For
example, the involvement of the Internal Revenue Service Criminal
Investigation’s (IRS-CI) at the OCDEFT-FC is focused on money
laundering activities, and it does not make tax information available.56
The design of the OCDEFT-FC is aimed at generating cross-agency
53 As above.
54 ACIC ‘National criminal intelligence fusion capability’ (2016).
55 OECD (n 13 above) 117.
56 As above.
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integration and the analysis of drug and drug-related financial data to
derive comprehensive intelligence pictures of targeted entities. The IRS-CI
contributes resources and information for the purpose of generating
analytical products, investigative leads, target profiles, strategic reports
and field query reports.57 This contribution is important as it is an
acknowledgment that the pursuit of national objectives relies on
collaboration. As such, it provides a basis for addressing risks such IFFs
through a whole-of-government approach in the form of fusion centres or
task teams. 
3.4 International developments in domestic cooperation
In 2013 criminal investigations leg of The Netherlands Tax and Customs
Administration established a Centre for Intelligence and Operational
Excellence which includes all national agencies involved in countering
money laundering.58 The main goals of the Centre are to
• enhance ongoing work on anti-money-laundering activities;
• improve seizure and confiscation procedures;
• centralise the management and preparation of money-laundering cases;
• optimise resources; and
• continuously identify ways of strengthening the process of combating
money laundering though improved inter-agency and international co-
operation.
In achieving these goals, the Centre acts as nodal point for case
management and the evaluation of completed cases; for developing a
network of cooperation; and establishing and maintaining partnerships
and the sharing of information. The Centre is also responsible for the
exploration of new strategies and techniques for addressing money
laundering, including the use of digital technology and social media.59
In 2011 the Grey Economy Information Unit (GEIU) was established
in Finland as a means of addressing the grey economy.60 The Unit’s
mandate to collect information is described as ‘the right to receive, on
request, necessary information held by other authorities, even where that
information would not normally be available to the tax administration due
to secrecy provisions.’61 A key role of the Unit is to produce compliance
reports requested for purposes of levying taxes, the enforcement of tax
57 As above.
58 OECD (n 13 above) 20.
59 OECD (n 13 above) 115-116.
60 The grey economy is defined as ‘any activities that result in the failure to meet legal
obligations for payment of taxes, customs fees or to obtain unjust repayment’.
61 OECD (n 13 above) 203.
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controls and the prevention or investigation of money laundering or
terrorism.62
France regards cooperation between the tax authority and customs as
a critical aspect in the fight against tax evasion. This is recognised through
a national agreement between the agencies. Cooperation is based on a
legislative framework which allows for the receipt of information on
request by the tax authority and also for spontaneous reporting by customs
to the tax authority of information collected in the course of conducting
customs activities.63 Under Ghana’s anti-money-laundering legislation,
the Ghana Revenue Authority must spontaneously provide all information
concerning suspicious transactions to the FIU. The framework for
enhanced cooperation is contained through the governing body of the FIU
which includes representatives of the various agencies combating financial
and tax crimes.64
India in 2011 constituted a High-Level Committee under the
Chairmanship of the Secretary (Revenue) with representatives of the
reserve bank, intelligence agency, enforcement directorate and other
relevant agencies, following the recognition that a multi-disciplinary
approach was required for the co-ordination of investigations into
incidences where funds are generated illicitly in the country or where these
are illicitly moved to foreign jurisdictions.65 
In October 2012 Mexico published the law (which came into effect in
2013) on the Federal Prevention and Identification of Operations from
Illicit Resources that contains provisions to improve cooperation in
information sharing and in the prevention, detection and combating
money laundering between government agencies.66 New Zealand’s
information exchange is largely case-specific and the means of transferring
information is dependent on the type of data.67 In 2011 Switzerland placed
a duty on every federal civil servant (including tax officials) to report to the
police or public prosecutor ‘suspicions of all misdemeanours or felonies
which they come across in the course of their professional activity’.68
From the random country selection above, it is evident that many
jurisdictions have recognised the need that an effective response to
financial crime is best achieved through a ‘whole-of-government’ approach
which is premised on the better gathering and sharing of information to
allow for quicker responses through the pooling of resources.
62 As above.
63 OECD (n 13 above) 209.
64 OECD (n 13 above) 218.
65 OECD (n 13 above) 249.
66 OECD (n 13 above) 288.
67 OECD (n 13 above) 299.
68 OECD (n 13 above) 22.
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3.5 FATF best practice – Principles for sharing information 
and joint operations
The FATF best practice on addressing proliferation finance provides
useful guidance as far as principles for the sharing of information and joint
operations are concerned. These best practices can be applied to a variety
of target areas, including financial crimes, as it allows for joint analysis,
coordinated and complementary operations, and more developed policy
positions. The FATF points out that some of the benefits of joint initiatives
are relationship and confidence-building measures that bring together
representatives of various government agencies.69 Some common issues
that can be addressed through joint initiatives include
• the monitoring and analysis of risks, threats, new trends and
vulnerabilities;
• policy development on combating financial crime and illicit financial
flows;
• recommendations of appropriate responses for competent agencies to take
action;
• identification of key intelligence gaps related to financial crimes and illicit
flows and the development of possible solutions to close those gaps;
• consideration of potential interdiction opportunities to impede financial
crimes and co-ordination of such actions;
• co-ordination and ‘de-conflicting’ the activities of competent agencies
(including financial, intelligence and law enforcement agencies) in terms of
combating the problem;
• co-ordination and de-conflicting of financial, intelligence and law
enforcement agencies in terms of potential plans to identify individuals
and entities who may be involved in or supporting financial crimes; and
• a review of mechanisms to ensure effective scrutiny of suspicious activity
reporting.70
Underlying these principles is the question whether the necessary
information management systems are in place and whether risk
management practices are followed. Similarly, the WCO71 points out that
joint tax and customs activities may potentially include activities such as 
• joint risk profiling/analysis for the identification of potential risk areas;
• joint investigations or audits; joint identification of measures and their
application in the fight against customs duty, tax offences and
transnational crime (for instance, money laundering);
• co-ordination of control and compliance activities within free trade zones;
69 FATF (n 8 above) 9-10.
70 As above.
71 WCO (n 23 above) 5.
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• co-ordination on transfer pricing and customs valuation matters;
• integrated programmes on approved economic operators (AEO) and co-
operative compliance; 
• joint research and analysis on tax and customs topics; joint training
initiatives to enhance the understanding of each other’s roles and
responsibilities and to educate officers on cross-sectoral risks and
challenges;
• joint approach on legislative/policy matters and taxpayer education; and
• secondment programmes involving officers being interchanged between
agencies to enhance cross-sectoral capacity.
Such initiatives should be backed by a proper risk management framework
that provides for clear terms of reference for the setting up of risk
committees and periodic meetings that will have the responsibility of
assessing the performance of such programmes and to make operational
decisions to address high-risk operators or tax entities identified.
4 Limitations to the scope of cooperation
The obligation of sharing taxpayer information with other departments in
addressing serious crimes should be measured against the potential impact
on the integrity of the tax system. A 2012 New Zealand study found that a
tax administration’s partaking in information sharing to address serious
crime is acceptable as long as it is ‘fit for purpose’.72 Aspects considered in
the sharing of information include
• balancing the individual’s right to privacy and the benefits to society; 
• the nature of the serious crime in question and the scope of the
information required; 
• the authority of the information and the ability of the tax administration to
provide it,
• the intended and potential use of the information, 
• the risk and error of misuse.73
When the above is considered in context of Recommendation 2, a twofold
question may be posed, namely, to what extent information is available
and to what extent it is shared. For example, the FATF shows that, while
South Africa has ‘most of the necessary legal tools and funding to combat
money laundering, there is a very low number of ML investigations and
prosecutions, despite an acknowledged level of organised crime and
predicate offences’.74 A key constraint identified is the insufficient
recording of statistics to allow for a pro-active pursuit of money-laundering
72 OECD (n 13 above) 20.
73 As above.
74 FATF ‘Mutual evaluation of South Africa’ (2009) 67.
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offences.75 Recommendation 2 requires countries to have national AML/
CFT policies in place that are informed by (a) the risks identified (requiring
accurate information to be available) and (b) mechanisms in place to
enable policy makers, FIUs and law enforcement authorities to cooperate.
In addition, mechanisms should be in place on a domestic level for co-
ordination in developing and implementing AML/CFT policies and
activities, both on policy-making and operational levels.76
Recommendation 2 also should be viewed in the context the prevalence of
corruption and a country’s structural deficiencies.77 The FATF
methodology provides as follows:
An effective AML/CFT system normally requires certain structural elements
to be in place, for example political stability; a high-level commitment to
address AML/CFT issues; stable institutions with accountability, integrity,
and transparency; the rule of law; and a capable, independent and efficient
judicial system. The lack of such structural elements, or significant
weaknesses and shortcomings in the general framework, may significantly
hinder the implementation of an effective AML/CFT framework; and …
other contextual factors that might significantly influence the effectiveness of
a country’s AML/CFT measures include the maturity and sophistication of
the regulatory and supervisory regime in the country; the level of corruption
and the impact of measures to combat corruption …78 
In taking a ‘whole-of-government approach’ to addressing financial
crimes, Recommendation 29 clearly sets the requirements for effectiveness
in respect of information sharing:
The FIU should (a) in addition to the information that entities report to the
FIU, be able to obtain and use additional information from reporting entities,
as needed to perform its analysis properly; and (b) have access to the widest
possible range of financial, administrative and law enforcement information
that it requires to properly undertake its functions.
The OECD79 advances that if the ongoing objective of a whole-of-
government approach is to identify ways in which agencies can work
together in combating crime in order for better results to be attained over
shorter time frames and with less costs, it may be opportune to consider
extending the application of FATF Recommendations to include the
public-sector institutions, especially in relation to the following:
75 FATF (n 75 above) 67-69.
76 FATF ‘Methodology for assessing technical compliance with the FATF
Recommendations and the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems’ (2013) 6.
77 The importance of structural reforms and good governance may be ignored at a
country’s own peril. Eg, by implementing OECD governance principles, Mauritius
overtook South Africa in 2013 to become the most competitive economy in sub-
Saharan Africa.
78 FATF (n 77 above) 6.
79 n 77 above.
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• Secrecy laws should not inhibit the implementation of FATF
Recommendations.80
• Suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a
criminal activity should be a mandatory reporting requirement. 
The underlying rationale is that institutions of government daily come
across information that may be relevant in addressing financial crimes.
Without such information being channelled to a central repository for
analysis and interpretation, a vast knowledge base is foregone. For
example, suspicious activity that may come to the attention of any agency
or department official which requires further scrutiny could be any of the
following:
• transactions requested outside the normal service;
• transactions outside the company’s relationship with the client;
• a person entered into a business relationship for a single transaction;
• extensive and unnecessary foreign travel; and
• loans to government employees.
Indicators within the scope of tax administrations:
• transactions that have no reasonable explanation;
• a person’s use of offshore accounts, trusts or companies that does not
support such economic requirements;
• tax schemes involving suspect territories;
• over-complicated tax schemes;
• unrealistic wealth compared to client profile;
• short-life businesses involved in imports/exports;
• cash transactions instead of appropriate financial instruments.81
The inclusion of tax crimes as predicate offences to money laundering has
put the exchange of information high on the agenda of many countries. It
is therefore important that agencies develop cross functional indicators in
order to improve data quality that allow for meaningful exchange.
Most countries make provision for the protection of taxpayer
information. For example, in South Africa, section 71 of the Tax
Administration Act82 provides for the disclosure in criminal, public safety
or environmental matters if so ordered by a judge, while section 70 makes
provision for disclosure to other (specified) entities. Section 69 contains the
80 FATF Recommendation 9.
81 S Young & D Cafferty Money laundering reporting officer’s handbook’ (2005) 107.
82 Act 28 of 2011.
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prohibitions on information sharing.83 Similarly, in terms of the Customs
Control Act84 
no SARS official, customs officer or person referred to in section 12(3)(a), and
no person who was such an official, officer or person, may disclose any
information acquired by him or her in the exercise of powers or duties in
terms of this Act or the Customs Duty Act concerning the private or
confidential matters of any person,85 except to the extent that such disclosure
is made in the exercise of those powers or duties, including for the purpose of
any proceedings referred to in Chapter 36.
Section 22(1) provides that any disclosure in terms of section 21(e) ‘to …
(i) an organ of state referred to in section 20(j) must be confined to
information necessary for enforcing the legislation administered by that
organ of state regulating the movement of goods or persons into or out of
the Republic’; and section 22(2) provides that ‘an authorised recipient may
use the information disclosed in terms of subsection (1) only for the
purpose for which the information was disclosed’. ‘Authorised recipient’
under section 20 includes ‘the police, public prosecutor, FIU and any
organ of state administering legislation applicable to the crossing of goods
or persons into or out of the Republic’.86
The importance of cooperation between customs and other law
enforcement agencies is acknowledged in section 12(2) that provides for a
customs officer to perform an enforcement function87 at any time and
without a warrant or previous notice. Importantly, section 12(3) allows for
a customs officer to ‘be accompanied and assisted by any interpreters,
technicians, workers, police officers or any other persons whose assistance
83 Sec 69 provides: ‘(1) A person who is a current or former SARS official must preserve
the secrecy of taxpayer information and may not disclose taxpayer information to a
person who is not a SARS official. (2) Subsection (1) does not prohibit the disclosure
of taxpayer information by a person who is a current or former SARS official (a) in the
course of performance of duties under a tax Act, including (i) to the South African
Police Service or the National Prosecuting Authority, if the information relates to, and
constitutes material information for the proving of a tax offence; (ii) as a witness in
civil or criminal proceedings under a tax Act; or (iii) the taxpayer information is
necessary to enable a person to provide such information as may be required by SARS
from that person; (b) under any other Act which expressly provides for the disclosure
of the information despite the provisions in this chapter; (c) by order of a High Court;
or (d) if the information is public information.’
84 Act 31 of 2014.
85 ‘Such official, customs officer or person may be obliged to disclose such information in
terms of other legislation, eg the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001.’
86 Act 31 of 2014, sec 20.
87 ‘Enforcement function’, in relation to the customs authority or a customs officer,
means a power or duty assigned to the customs authority in terms of this Act or
assigned or delegated to a customs officer in terms of this Act to (a) implement and
enforce this Act or a tax levying Act; or (b) to assist in the implementation or
enforcement of other legislation referred to in ch 34 or 35. 
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may reasonably be required for the performance of that [enforcement]
function’.88 
It is worth noting that the OECD Report also acknowledges that
customs administrations are key in addressing financial crimes because of
the records customs holds regarding individuals, companies, transactions
and indirect taxes.89 In addition, its control and security function should
also entail a vast repository of information on crimes such as smuggling,
money laundering and false declaration. 
5 Conclusion
In meeting the challenge of strengthening their independent institutions
and agencies of government responsible for preventing IFFs, countries are
required to identify frameworks and mechanisms for information sharing
and co-ordination. This chapter highlights some fundamental aspects that
are necessary for inter-agency cooperation. It is shown that various models
and gateways for cooperation are available in most countries and that
strategies for cooperation should be founded on a shared commitment to
inter-organisational cooperation. This commitment should be reflected in
a common understanding of the goals and objectives as well as a unified
effort through a whole-of-government approach. Countries, therefore,
should recognise that the foundation for cooperation first and foremost lies
in information sharing through appropriate legal gateways and, thereafter,
in collaboration which is premised on a common line of sight.90 
Because the relationship between different spheres of government is
characterised by layers of inter-dependencies, an optimal effort toward
reducing illicit financial flows should be premised on common areas of
interest and knowledge. Collaboration between different agencies,
therefore, requires
• a common understanding of the problem;
• the identification and inclusion of all relevant stakeholders;
• policy co-ordination that supports the nexus between administrations and
policy setters;
• horizontal and vertical alignment between the goals and objectives of
different agencies;
88 Sec 12(4) provides that ‘[a] person assisting a customs officer in terms of subsection
(3)(a) must, whilst and for the purpose of assisting, be regarded to be a customs officer
under the supervision of the customs officer that person is assisting’.
89 OECD (n 13 above) 8.
90 I use the term ‘common line sight’ as cooperation goes further than having shared
objectives – there should also be a shared view on how those objectives are to be
achieved, in other words, an inter-departmental alignment of both goals and objectives
in furtherance of a commonly-understood strategic imperative, is required. 
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• defining and implementing the strategies for cooperation; and
• implementing or revising existing legal gateways to streamline
cooperation.
Fundamental to successful cooperation is the ability of heads of agencies
and ministries to personally work together in a manner that seeks
consensus, where such consensus leads to the implementation of strategies
and actions that allow agencies to work together to address IFFs. 
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Abstract
Corruption is a major impediment to sustainable development in African
countries. Corrupt acts result in revenue losses to the fiscus at the expense of
society, and the proceeds of corruption then are hidden through money
laundering and tax evasion. The purpose of acts of corruption, money
laundering and tax evasion generally are aimed at achieving a financial gain
in a manner which aims to hide that gain – this often manifests in capital
outflows. The obstacles to different government agencies in addressing this
objective are the same, namely, a lack of transparency, excessive secrecy and
a lack in institutional responsiveness through coordinated action. Because of
the impact of acts of corruption, laundering and evasion on sustainable
development, measures to address such acts necessarily are intertwined. It is
shown that an institutional response which recognises this inter-relationship
is more successful in harnessing a cross-selection of preventative measures
available to government agencies in dealing with these diverse crimes – thus
placing institutions in a better position to address illicit financial flows.
1 Introduction
Corruption is described as ‘a major impediment to sustainable
development for mineral, oil and gas producing countries’ in Africa.1 In
the extractive sector, revenue losses at the expense of society most often are
due to corrupt acts in all parts of the extractive value chain. The proceeds
of corruption then are hidden through money laundering and tax evasion.
The purpose of acts of corruption, money laundering and tax evasion
generally are aimed at achieving a financial gain in a manner which aims
to hide this gain. The obstacles to different government agencies in
addressing this objective are the same, namely, a lack of transparency,
excessive secrecy and a lack in institutional responsiveness through co-
ordinated action. Due to the impact of corruption, money laundering and
1 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (2002) 4; OECD Corruption in
the extractive value chain’ (2016) 10.
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evasion on sustainable development, measures to address such acts
necessarily are intertwined. From the perspective of illicit financial flows
(IFFs), many bribes result in capital outflows to tax havens, which are
useful for hiding embezzled payments or to syphon off revenue intended
for the fiscus. 
It is shown that an institutional response which recognises this inter-
relationship is more successful in harnessing a cross-selection of
preventative measures available to government agencies in dealing with
these diverse crimes – thus placing institutions in a better position to
address IFFs. In this regard, it should be pointed out that anti-money
laundering (AML), for example, is a major element in the standard list of
interventions available to countries with the potential to reduce IFFs, both
into and out of developing countries. AML interventions are also powerful
tools to address other elements of IFFs, such as corruption and tax evasion.
However, this potential is largely dependent on the implementation of the
relevant Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, the
level of reporting in administrations and the level of inter-agency
cooperation and international cooperation.
Corruption, estimated at USD40 billion dollar per year,2 is given as a
primary reason for the weak economic performance of resource-rich
countries, because it manifests in rent seeking and patronage.3 According
to Kolstad and Søreide, 
resource rents induce rent seeking, as individuals compete for a share of the
rents rather than use their time and skills more productively, whilst resource
revenues induce patronage as governments pay off supporters to stay in
power, resulting in reduced accountability and an inferior allocation of public
funds.4 
The possibility for both tax avoidance and tax evasion is created with the
negotiation of contracts with companies seeking a favourable investment
climate, and where contractual arrangements are the consequence of
corruption (such as payments by companies to public officials to secure
better terms). Tax havens become useful for hiding embezzled payments or
to syphon off revenue intended for the fiscus. 
The FATF is of the view that 
[t]he fight against corruption is inextricably intertwined with that against
money laundering in that the stolen assets of a corrupt public official are
2 World Bank A call for action: No safe havens: A global forum on stolen asset recovery and
development (2010) 3.
3 I Kolstad & T Søreide ‘Corruption in natural resource management: Implications for
policy makers’ (2009) 34 Resources Policy 214.
4 As above.
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useless unless they are placed, layered and integrated into the global financial
network in a manner which does not raise suspicion.5 
The FATF also highlights the role of politically-exposed persons (PEPs) in
money-laundering schemes. PEPs are deemed a high risk due to the
positions they occupy in government, where they have access to public
funds and contractual information.6 PEPs can also influence the way in
which contracts are awarded and, therefore, can award contracts for
personal financial reward.7 
The level of governance, the strength of legal controls and cultural
aspects can influence the degree to which corruption is present in a
country.8 The FATF identifies the most prevalent forms of proceeds in the
grand corruption context as those resulting from accepting bribes; various
forms of extortion; self-dealing and conflict of interest; and embezzlement
from the treasury through fraud.9 From a tax perspective, two important
concerns arise: first, tax revenue due to the fiscus is diverted, which affects
public spending; and, second, the proceeds of corruption in the hands of
corrupt officials escape taxation should they remain undetected.
The focus of this chapter, therefore, is on the inter-relationship
between corruption, tax crimes and money laundering. The first part
examines the dynamics of corruption, money laundering and tax evasion
and how these impact on society. The second part of the chapter examines
regulatory issues, barriers thereto and different preventative measures
available to address different aspects of these crimes.
2 Dynamics of corruption
The World Bank describes corruption as a ‘complex phenomenon’10
because its roots may lie deep in government institutions. How corruption
affects development is influenced by country conditions and the
interventions governments make on policy and contractual levels. For
example, in pursuit of financial gain, government officials may intervene
in areas where no intervention is required, or they may fail to enact or
implement policies.11 The term ‘corruption’12 covers a broad range of
5 FATF Laundering the proceeds of corruption (2011) 5.
6 As above.
7 FATF (n 5 above) 9.
8 As above.
9 FATF (n 5 above) 16.
10 UNODC ‘New UNODC campaign highlights transnational organised crime as a
USD 870 billion a year business’ (not dated); World Bank ‘Helping countries combat
corruption: The role of the World Bank (not dated).
11 World Bank ‘Measuring regulatory quality and efficiency’ (2016) Doing Business 5.
12 According to the Online etymology dictionary ‘corrupt (adj)’ takes its meaning from old
French corropt which means ‘unhealthy; corrupt; uncouth’ and directly from Latin
corruptus, meaning ‘to destroy; spoil’ or figuratively ‘corrupt, seduce, bribe’.
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human actions.13 The World Bank defines it as the ‘abuse of public office
for private gain’14 and primarily included in this definition are bribery and
theft.15 Bribes can be intended for the bribe taker himself or for a third
party – the relationship of the public official to the beneficiary and the
reasons why the official might want to benefit the third party is of no
relevance.16 The link between the bribe and the action or omission on the
part of an official is inherent in the definition of bribery. However, the
requirement of a causal link between the bribe and the specific action or
omission by the official could be extremely difficult to prove. Furthermore,
an act or omission by an official does not have to be illegal per se or in
breach of the official’s duties – if the bribe is aimed at inducing a breach in
an official’s duty, it implies that there is a duty on public officials to
exercise their judgment or discretion impartially.17 For a corrupt act to
constitute active bribery of a foreign public official, the goal of the bribe
‘must have been to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in
relation to the conduct of international business’.18 Undue advantage
(meaning that the company or person has no legitimate right to it) in the
context of business includes the relaxation of regulatory standards or
granting undue tax breaks.19 
It is interesting to note that acts of bribery of foreign public officials for
non-business purposes are not covered by the definition of transnational
bribery and, therefore, are not criminalised in international law. An
example of non-business purposes includes the bribery of an official so that
an unqualified person is hired and appointed in a position where that
person could advance the agenda of the briber. This can be in the form of
allowing the briber to evade taxes in return for some personal or political
favour, often with the tacit approval of the tax administration or finance
ministry.20 According to article 4 of the African Union (AU)
Convention,21 the scope of application explicitly covers such instances
where there is
13 There is no internationally agreed definition on corruption; furthermore, a different
meaning is attached to the term depending on the discipline (eg political science,
economics, legal or sociological) with which it is approached. Corruption also occurs
in business and corporate relationships which exist between private businesses and
suppliers. It may also involve illegal behaviour by corporate officials for private
monetary gain. 
14 World Bank (n 11 above).
15 The World Bank (n 11 above) states that ‘bribery occurs in the private sector, but
bribery in the public sector, offered or extracted, is the Bank's main concern, since the
Bank lends primarily to governments and supports government policies, programmes,
and projects’. 
16 JB Terracino The international legal framework against corruption. States’ obligations to
prevent and repress corruption (2012) 103.
17 Terracino (n 16 above) 104 107.
18 Terracino (n 16 above) 108.
19 Terracino (n 16 above) 108 109.
20 M Everest-Phillips ‘The political economy of controlling tax evasion and illicit flows’
in P Reuter (ed) Draining development? Controlling flows of illicit funds from developing
countries (2012) 74.
21 African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 7. 
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the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a public official or any other
person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour,
promise or advantage for himself or herself, or for another person or entity, in
exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public
functions.
Illicit enrichment22 is a criminal act that is only indirectly related to an
illegal act by a public official, but which manifests through a variety of
criminal acts such as accepting a bribe or embezzlement. In the case of
illicit enrichment, it is not the act as such, but the use of the proceeds from
the illegal acts. The reason for the existence of the criminal act of illicit
enrichment lies in the difficulty of proving corruption in a court of law and,
by focusing on the unexplained wealth accrued through the illicit
enrichment, the burden of proof can be discharged with lesser difficulty.23
The government benefits purchased with bribes can vary from large
contractual awards to petty corruption such as that found in the issuing of
licences or fast-tracking services.24 Grand corruption typically is
associated with international business transactions which involve
government officials, and these are usually concluded outside the official’s
home country.25 While instances of grand corruption capture the world’s
attention, the World Bank cautions that ‘the aggregate costs of petty
corruption, in terms of both money and economic distortions, may be as
great if not greater’.26 
Corruption flourishes in environments that are characterised by abuse
of office.27 Some 2 000 years ago, Caesar Augustus recognised that the
efficient and honest collection of taxes is of no lesser importance than the
tax structure for the fairness of a financial system. Consequently, Augustus
attempted a rationalisation of tax collection techniques by making the
provincial governors salaried imperial employees, thereby lessening their
exposure to the temptation of diverting tax income of their provinces for
their personal benefit.28 
22 According to art 20 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC),
it is provided that ‘[s]ubject to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its
legal system, each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed
intentionally, illicit enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public
official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful
income’.
23 Most acts of corruption are consensual and there are no ‘direct’ victims – it is society
that is affected, but because society is not aware of the corruption, it can be said that it
is a victimless crime. The absence of direct victims defies traditional procedures of
starting with a complaint by a victim, and in many instances there are no witnesses,
documents or other means of evidence available. 
24 World Bank (n 10 above).
25 As above.
26 As above.
27 FATF Corruption: A reference guide and information note on the use of the FATF
Recommendations to support the fight against corruption (2012) 3.
28 K Loewenstein The governance of Rome (1973) 304.
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From a governance perspective, the absence of knowledge of
economic causation saw to it that the ancient Roman Empire
overextended its state activities to a degree that was never matched by
public income. In many instances, public income was recklessly used for
the maintenance of a sumptuous establishment of the imperial court; more
and better equipped and paid armed forces; and an immensely wasteful
bureaucracy which depleted general resources. The conspicuous
consumption of the upper classes contrasted with the desperate plight of
the masses. The never-mastered economic imbalance grew into a chronic
crisis of society at large, while a relentless tightening of the tax screw
exacerbated the plight of the common people.29
Whilst the latter contributed to the fall of the Roman Empire, Roman
state practice provided the intangibles for good governance: patriotism;
civic virtues of dedication to the community; honesty; probity; and
disinterested service for the nation.30 Today it is accepted that ‘tax systems
in developing countries perform poorly due to weak capacity, corruption
and the lack of any reciprocal link between tax and public and social
expenditures’.31 Moore32 proposes that 
political regimes are the outcome of tension and conflict between (a) elites
who control the state, and wish to remain in power and to exercise that power
as freely as possible; and (b) societal actors who want to place restraints on the
power of a potentially overweening state. 
In this ‘conflict’, revenue is central for two reasons: First, it represents a
‘key strategic resource for state elites’ and ‘if non-state actors can limit and
control elites’ access to revenue, they enjoy countervailing power in
relation to the state’.33 Secondly, 
if state elites need to depend on general taxation because they lack alternative,
easier revenue sources, they generally have to put considerable organisational
and political effort into obtaining the revenue, and face strong incentives to
bargain and negotiate, directly or indirectly, with at least some taxpayers,
rather than simply to extract revenue forcibly.34 
Moore concludes that ‘dependence on general taxation provides incentives
for state elites and taxpayers to resolve their differences through
bargaining’.35
29 Loewenstein (n 28 above) 473.
30 Loewenstein 488.
31 OECD ‘Illicit financial flows from developing countries: Measuring OECD responses’
(2014) 59.
32 M Moore ‘How does taxation affect the quality of governance’ (2007) 14.
33 As above.
34 Moore (n 32 above) 15.
35 As above.
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Encouraging constructive state-society engagement around taxes is
one of four channels by which tax reform contributes to state building.36
This implies the prominence of taxation issues on the public political
agenda, and the levying of taxes as ‘consensually and as transparently as
possible’.37 This means that assessments should be raised objectively and
there should be equal and fair treatment of taxpayers in the recovery of
debt.
According to the World Bank, the causes of corruption are ‘always
contextual, rooted in a country's policies, bureaucratic traditions, political
development and social history’.38 Corruption tends to flourish in the
presence of weak institutions and where policies are designed to generate
economic rents. According to the World Bank, the dynamics of corruption
in the public sector may be depicted in a simple model where ‘the
opportunity for corruption is a function of the size of the rents under a public
official’s39 control, the discretion that official has in allocating those rents,
and the accountability that official faces for his or her decisions’.40 The level
of discretion of public officials may be too wide (due to a lack of explicit
regulations), which in turn can be ‘exacerbated by poorly-defined, ever-
changing, and inadequately disseminated rules and regulations’.41 The
World Bank identifies several characteristics associated with a lack of
institutional integrity:
• weak accountability with ethical values eroded or never having been
established;
• rules regulating the conduct of officials and management of conflict of
interest are not enforced and financial monitoring systems (for instance,
mechanisms for recording revenues collected and budgeted expenditures)
are dysfunctional;
• formal mechanisms for holding public officials to account for achieving
specific results, are not in place or not applied;
• oversight institutions (for instance, press, external auditors or ombudsmen)
responsible for scrutinising government performance are ineffective;
36 O Fjeldstad & M Moore ‘Taxation and state-building: Poor countries in a globalised
world’ (2008) 242 255.
37 Fjeldstad & Moore (n 36 above) 255.
38 World Bank (n 11 above).
39 According to sec 2(a) of UNCAC, ‘[p]ublic official’ shall mean ‘(i) any person holding
a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State Party, whether
appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid,
irrespective of that person’s seniority; (ii) any other person who performs a public
function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a public
service, as defined in the domestic law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent
area of law of that State Party; (iii) any other person defined as a ‘public official’ in the
domestic law of a State Party. However, for the purpose of some specific measures
contained in Chapter II of this Convention, “public official” may mean any person
who performs a public function or provides a public service as defined in the domestic
law of the State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party.’
40 World Bank (n 11 above).
41 As above.
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• divergence between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ rules in the public sector;42
and
• special anti-corruption bodies are used as partisan instruments whereby
those in government are protected, opposition members are harassed and
fraud detection is not prioritised.43 
In South Africa, such actions are described as ‘state capture’, and these
actions are evidenced in the appointment of public officials for the sole
purpose of promoting the interests of those who appointed them.44 
The presence of these characteristics requires the recognition by
governments that a strong legal framework to control corruption is
required, and that institutional strength is returned to departments by
placing renewed emphasis on the ‘formal’ rules.45 
Reuter states that ‘it is fanciful to imagine that Marcos, Mobutu or
Suharto would have allowed the operation of an effective domestic AML,
whatever laws they might have permitted to be placed on the books’. This
predicament repeats itself continuously, as is reflected by recent reports
from South Africa relating to delays by the President’s office in passing the
Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Bill, which is aimed at bringing
greater transparency to the financial system, and complementing
government’s objective to fight corruption. It gives banks powers to
perform due diligence on politically-exposed persons or, as termed in the
Bill, ‘prominent influential persons’. The Bill was unanimously adopted by
parliament in May 2016.46 In November of the same year, the Bill was
referred back to parliament due to the wide formulation of searches
without a warrant.47 Although the amendments are in line with legislation
42 The World Bank (n 11 above) describes situations where corruption is systemic as one
where the ‘formal rules remain in place, but they are superseded by informal rules:
Thus it may be a crime to bribe a public official, but in practice the law is not enforced
or is applied in a partisan way, and informal rules prevail.’
43 World Bank (n 11 above).
44 Daily Maverick ‘gupta-leaks.com: Everything you ever need to know about
#GuptaLeaks in one place’ (2017).
45 World Bank (n 11 above).
46 S Mkhwanazi ‘FICA Bill in line with Global Standards’ (2016).
47 Amendment of sec 45B of Act 38 of 2001, as inserted by sec 16 of Act 11 of 2008
proposes under (1C) that ‘an inspector otherwise required to obtain a warrant under
subsection (1B) may enter any premises without a warrant (a) with the consent of the
owner or person apparently in physical control of the premises after that owner or
person was informed that he or she is under no obligation to admit the inspector in the
absence of a warrant; or (b) if the inspector on reasonable grounds believes that (i) a
warrant will be issued under subsection (1B) if the inspector applied for it; and (ii) the
delay in obtaining the warrant is likely to defeat the purpose for which the inspector
seeks to enter the premises. (1D) Where an inspector enters the premises without a
warrant, he or she must do so (a) at a reasonable time; (b) on reasonable notice, where
appropriate; and (c) with strict regard to decency and good order, including to a
person’s right to (i) respect for and the protection of dignity; (ii) freedom and security;
and (iii) personal privacy.’
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in other jurisdictions it was restricted by the courts.48 In the context of
political events49 in South Africa, the referral would have been of serious
concern, had the President found the provision relating to, for example,
‘politically-exposed’ persons (or ‘persons in prominent positions’, as
referred to in South African legislation) to be unconstitutional.50 
3 Dynamics of money laundering
IFFs are said to ‘often leave developing countries via the commercial
financial system’ through which ‘funds are laundered to disguise their
origin’.51 Anti-money-laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist-financing
(CFT) regimes are potentially effective tools to identify and prevent illicit
funds from being ‘held, received, transferred and managed by major banks
and financial centres’.52 The latter actions, whereby IFFs are facilitated,
can be damaging not only to the financial sector, as far the reputational risk
of financial institutions is concerned, but also to entire economies which
are dependent on a well-functioning financial sector.53
In many countries, money laundering is rarely successfully
prosecuted, due to the difficulties in proving the offence, capacity
constraints and the like.54 Money laundering refers to any act that that
aims to disguise the illicit nature or the existence, location or use of the
48 Federation of Law Societies of Canada v Canada (Attorney-General) [2013] BCJ No 632.
The issue revolved around whether Canada’s anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorist-
financing legislation, as it applies to the legal profession, infringes on the right to be
free of unreasonable searches and seizures; and whether legislation infringes on the
right not to be deprived of liberty otherwise than in accordance with principles of
fundamental justice and, if so, whether the infringements are justifiable. The court
argued that these provisions had a predominantly criminal law character, rather than
an administrative law character. They facilitate detecting and deterring criminal
offences, and investigating and prosecuting criminal offences. There are penal
sanctions for non-compliance. These provisions authorise sweeping searches of law
offices which inherently risk breaching solicitor-client privilege. The provisions in
question were unconstitutional insofar as they applied to lawyers and law firms only.
49 At the time, various allegations of bribery and accepting kickbacks were made against
the president resulting from the so-called Gupta leaks. The leaks consist of a few
hundred gigabytes of information containing between 100 000 and 200 000 unique e-
mails and a host of other documents. The e-mails portray members of government, a
substantial number of ministers and senior state employees illegally sharing
confidential state information with members and associates of the Gupta family. Daily
Maverick (n 44 above).
50 The Bill has since been passed and it is now known as the Financial Intelligence
Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017.
51 OECD (n 31 above) 15.
52 As above. 
53 As above.
54 B Schlenther ‘The taxing business of money laundering: South Africa’ (2013) 16
Journal of Money Laundering Control 23 reveals that 927 confiscation orders under ch 5
and 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act were made in South Africa amounting
to ZAR 577 million from 1 April 2003 to 1 April 2008. The confiscation data
reportedly does not show whether the confiscations were related to money laundering
per se. It is, therefore, not known whether these figures are representative of the
pervasiveness of money laundering in South Africa. Based on reports for later years, it
can be assumed that a small number of confiscations related to money laundering took
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proceeds of crime.55 Money-laundering legislation typically provides for
three substantive offences in respect of the crime of money laundering.
These offences are the concealment of criminal property; arrangements
made with regard to criminal property; and the acquisition, use and
possession of criminal property.56 For money-laundering schemes to
achieve their objective, De Koker57 identifies criteria which they must
meet, namely, that ‘they must appear to make commercial sense, be
structured in a tax efficient way,58 have the appearance of legitimacy and
be transnational in nature’. The aid of professional advisors (also referred
to as gatekeepers) in accounting, banking, law and financial services is
integral to the success of sophisticated laundering schemes. The socio-
economic and political environment also plays a role, and a greater
incidence of money laundering will be present in countries with high levels
of corruption59 and with a high prevalence of organised crime, specifically
through the production or distribution of prohibited goods.60
Experience across the globe shows six general money-laundering
techniques used: (i) the investment of proceeds of crime in a legal business
54 place in the years 2009-2010 and 2010-2011. The National Prosecuting Authority
(NPA) reported success in 192 trial cases for the latter year, which included five
racketeering convictions and 25 counts of money laundering. The year 2009 only
delivered six finalised money-laundering cases. In addition, the FIC Annual Report for
2014-2015 makes no mention of successful money-laundering prosecution in South
Africa for the year under review. However, the NPA’s report for the same period
indicates that 11 cases involving racketeering and/or money-laundering charges were
finalised with verdicts (eight of these cases were finalised with guilty verdicts, and the
remaining three were acquittals). Five cases involving money laundering were finalised
with verdicts (all were finalised with guilty verdicts). In its 2015/16 Annual Report,
the FIC makes mention of the number of investigations they assisted in with no
reference to successful prosecutions. For the same period, the NPA reported only three
money-laundering convictions, namely, S v Hinzelman; S v Norman and Hendricks and
S v Letsie & Others. 
55 L De Koker South African money laundering and terrorism financing law (2007) 1-4.
56 According to De Koker (n55 above) 4, ‘three stages are generally distinguished in the
money laundering process, namely placement, layering and integration. During the
placement stage, money enters the financial system. The aim of the layering process is
aimed at separating the illicit proceeds from their criminal source, which may entail a
complex series of transactions which are solely aimed at blurring the money trail. The
last stage involves the integration of all the funds – the original amount minus the costs
of the laundering process, is amassed and controlled as apparent legitimate business
funds.’
57 De Koker (n 55 above) 7.
58 Schlenther (n 54 above) argues that ‘tax efficiency may not necessarily be a
requirement, as paying taxes timeously creates the perception of a compliant taxpayer
and with that, brings legitimacy to the criminal enterprise’.
59 The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranking provides a
breakdown of the country perception of that country which is likely to be most/least
corrupt.
60 The CIA world factbook (not dated) classifies countries’ attractiveness to criminal
activity. Eg, Ghana is identified as a ‘major transit hub for Southwest and Southeast
Asian heroin and, to a lesser extent, South American cocaine, destined for Europe and
the US; widespread crime and money-laundering problems, but the lack of a well-
developed financial infrastructure limits the country's utility as a money-laundering
centre’. South Africa is described as ‘an attractive venue for money launderers, given
the increasing level of organised criminal and narcotics activity in the region and the
size of the South African economy’.
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venture, either through shell or fictitious companies or in genuine
companies under a false identity; (ii) the acquisition of assets accompanied
by payment of the requisite taxes; (iii) the deposit of money in tax havens
or in banks in non-cooperative countries, and remittances back to the host
country through normal banking channels; (iv) the use of underground
banking channels for the transfer of funds; (v) the over-invoicing of goods
in import or export transactions; and (vi) the routing of funds through safe
tax haven countries.61 These forms of financial systems and corporate
vehicle abuse can cause extensive reputational damage to institutions,
damage the investment climate and ultimately can weaken the financial
system.62
Money laundering has numerous underlying predicate offences, which
need to be established before a charge of money laundering can be pursued
– thus the removal of the predicate offence (for example, tax evasion or
corruption) may provide a better long-term solution. The FATF recognises
the ‘link between corruption and money laundering’ and takes into
account compliance by countries with the FATF Recommendations.63
Some compliance measures include:
• the degree to which the FATF Recommendations are implemented;
• implementation measured against the number of money-laundering
investigations, prosecutions and convictions, as well as the value of assets
confiscated as a result of money laundering or a predicate offence;
• measures to prevent and combat corruption.64
Several indicators are used to measure the strength of the anti-corruption
framework. These are the level of transparency; the presence of good
governance principles and ethical codes of conduct for officials; as well as
the efficiency of the courts and the degree to which court decisions are
enforced.65 These indicators are regarded as significant because, where
they are absent or weak, the effective implementation of the FATF
Recommendations may be jeopardised.66 
4 Dynamics of tax evasion
Considerable evidence is available that tax evasion depends on
opportunities for successful evasion and these differ widely, depending on
61 UNAFEI ‘Resource Material Series No 59’ (2000). 
62 As above.
63 FATF/OECD (n 27 above) 2.
64 As above.
65 As above.
66 As above. The FATF views the presence of ‘a proper culture of compliance with
AML/CFT standards’ as a key component to detect and mitigate corruption.
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the circumstances of the taxpayer.67 Tax compliance, therefore, is not
solely reliant on the taxpayer’s analysis of the benefits and costs of evasion,
but also on the presence of a belief that the state lacks legitimacy.68
International initiatives to limit tax evasion and address the proceeds
of crime are ongoing and are led by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Global Forum on Taxation, the
FATF and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
However, these efforts in curbing IFFs are still being evaluated, but it is
clear that any approach will require greater co-ordination and cooperation
around key issues and stakeholders, such as the private sector,
government, international organisations and civil society.69
The predicament posed by tax evasion is well phrased by Everest-
Phillips, who states that
effective states require effective, efficient, and equitable tax systems. Creating
the commitment of citizens not to evade taxation is a political process central
to state building; cajoling elites to pay taxes has always been an essential step
to any state becoming effective. Bad governance manifests itself through an
unjust tax system and rampant tax evasion.70 
The latter then becomes or remains a trigger for or indicator of political
instability. Tax evasion, corruption and criminality as the main drivers of
illicit capital flows at the same time are ‘both causes and effects of the
fragility of state institutions, and in this sense, are challenges to state
legitimacy’.71 Everest-Phillips draws an important correlation between tax
evasion and corruption. He states that tax evasion undermines the funding
of the state and, therefore, the legitimacy associated with the state through
the delivery of public services. Corruption, in turn, affects the moral
legitimacy of the government, and criminality becomes a challenger to the
legitimacy of the government.72 It is evident that good governance is an
essential element to addressing IFFs and, therefore, remedies should be
more than ‘technocratic solutions’.73 This requires that the correlations or
inter-relationships between tax evasion and corruption are recognised, but
also those that include money laundering, and other financial crimes over
and above evasion and corruption must be recognised.
67 J Slemrod & J Bakija Taxing ourselves: A citizen’s guide to the great debate over tax reform
(1998) 149.
68 Everest-Phillips (n 20 above) 73.
69 World Bank (n 11 above).
70 Everest-Phillips (n 20 above) 70.
71 Everest-Phillips (n 20 above) 71.
72 As above.
73 Everest-Phillips (n 20 above) 72.
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5 Inter-relationship between corruption, money 
laundering and tax evasion
Examples of the inter-relationship between corruption, money laundering
and tax evasion may be drawn from the extractive industries. To illustrate,
the risk of corruption in the extractive sector already appears in the tender
process, where bidding companies in which public officials or their
affiliates have a stake may receive preferential treatment, or where the
potential for bribes for bid exclusion exists. In some instances, the
awarding of a bid may require a joint venture between a foreign entity and
a local company or a state-owned enterprise. This obligation, however, can
be diverted from the initial objective of empowering the local entity to one
where companies owned by or connected to public officials are favoured.74
The OECD identifies forms of corruption risks in contract negotiation as
trading in influence, political capture and interference. Trading in
influence is described as ‘the process or act by which a person who has real
or apparent influence on the decision making of a public official,
exchanges this influence for an undue advantage’.75 Political/state capture
or interference refers to situations where private interests significantly
influence decision-making processes of public officials for private gain.76 
In contract negotiations, the typology of corruption risks includes
exercising undue influence to obtain favourable contractual terms, to get
access to otherwise restricted or commercially-sensitive information, or to
obtain permit approvals. Often ‘influencing’ can be in breach of legislation
in that a royalty rate is agreed to, which it is not provided for in law, or a
permit is granted in a protected area.77 In exercising undue influence,
companies may 
offer or be solicited to provide improper advantages in the form of anything of
value, such as illegal commissions, gifts and entertainment (ie, first class
flights, expensive hotels, dining, school fees), job or business opportunities to
public officials and politicians or their family members, with a view to unduly
influencing the negotiation process.78
During contract negotiations, funds intended for public use can be diverted
to benefit private individuals. Such misappropriation of public funds or
embezzlement often is exacerbated by a lack of transparency in the
contract negotiation phase. This then creates an environment conducive to
corrupt activities, which are intended to circumvent or violate existing
legal provisions for the payment of taxes and royalties.79 
74 OECD Corruption in the extractive value chain (2016) 43.
75 OECD (n 74 above) 37.
76 As above.
77 As above.
78 As above.
79 OECD (n 74 above) 39.
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With regard to the latter, provisions negotiated in a non-transparent
way may set inappropriately low corporate tax rates in comparison to the
standard national rates.80 
Kick-backs and bribes received during the negotiation phases can
easily be routed to foreign jurisdictions through corporate vehicles. The
use of corporate vehicles and trusts are established means of money
laundering and are addressed in FATF Recommendations 33 and 34.
Because shell corporations provide advantages in concealing the identity
of the beneficial owner, they often are used by politically-exposed persons
(PEPs) to hide wealth, since their careers and reputations may be at stake
if they are found to be in possession of unexplained wealth.81 In this sense,
‘shell companies ensure that specific criminal assets cannot be identified
with or traced back to them’.82 The Panama Papers again confirmed the
trend.83 Corporate vehicles, therefore, are a preferred and effective means
of separating the origin of the illegal funds from the PEP who controls it.84
Those wishing to hide proceeds from corruption or other crimes make
use of gatekeepers or skilled professionals to establish corporate structures
in offshore jurisdictions, with the sole purpose of disguising the source and
ownership of the funds. With the focus on foreign PEPs and the
requirements of enhanced due diligence regarding the source of funds
deposited into financial institutions, corporate vehicles are in high
demand.85 
6 Overview: Regulatory measures to address 
corruption, tax evasion and money laundering
Corruption today is classified as a category of transnational crime (other
crimes in this category include drug trafficking, human trafficking and the
80 As above. Examples of such practice are cited in the UNECA Report, where one
company negotiated a corporate rate of 1,43% and another whereby the royalty rate on
mining was set at only 20% of the rate prescribed in legislation.
81 Due to the high visibility of their office, both in and outside their country, PEPs
frequently make use of nominees (middlemen or other intermediaries such as close
associates, friends and family) to conduct financial business on their behalf. According
to the FATF (n 5 above) 19, the use of middlemen is aimed at sheltering or insulating
the PEP from unwanted attention. The use of intermediaries can also serve as an
obstacle to customer due diligence where the individual acting on behalf of the PEP
has special status such as diplomatic immunity.
82 FATF (n 5 above) 19.
83 International Consortium for International Journalists (ICIJ). The ICIJ describes the
Panama Papers as ‘a global investigation into the sprawling, secretive industry of
offshore jurisdictions that the world’s rich and powerful use to hide assets and skirt
rules, by setting up front companies in far-flung jurisdictions. Based on a trove of more
than 11 million leaked files, the investigation exposes the use of offshore companies to
facilitate bribery, arms deals, tax evasion, financial fraud and drug trafficking.’
84 FATF (n 5 above) 19.
85 FATF Recommendation 6.
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financing of terrorism).86 The emergence of the international framework
against corruption is the result of the convergence of a combination of
values (moral and religious) and interests (economic and development).
Terracino describes the highly-political processes of the negotiation of
international anti-corruption instruments as a response of traditional
normative values and the interests of global players to corruption. On the
African continent, this is reflected by two anti-corruption treaties adopted
in 2003: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol
against Corruption; and the Economic Community of West-African States
(ECOWAS) Protocol on the Fight against Corruption. Later, in 2003, the
AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption was adopted,
while in the same year the UN adopted the United Nations Convention
against Corruption, which is the most recent and significant international
law instrument against corruption.87 The latter includes provisions on the
recovery of stolen assets, and establishes various measures for
international cooperation for the purpose of detecting the transfer of
proceeds of crime, determining the ownership of assets, as well as their
confiscation, return and disposal.88
While current international instruments against corruption require
state parties89 to establish a number of offences as crimes of corruption in
their domestic laws, the same instruments have taken different approaches
to the criminalisation of corrupt acts. Some call for the criminalisation of
the act of bribery, and some are broader in scope, requiring the
criminalisation of embezzlement; the trading in influence; the abuse of
functions, and illicit enrichment. Under the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption (UNCAC), it is mandatory to criminalise bribery and
embezzlement in domestic law, while the criminalisation of the second
group of acts is not mandatory, but preferred.90 The SADC Protocol deals
with both the primary and secondary acts, while the ECOWAS Protocol
covers the same, but without the inclusion of ‘abuse of function’. The
immediate concern flowing from the above is that where acts other than
the prescribed ones are not accepted by countries party to the UNCAC,
their acceptance as corrupt acts at the international level is not clear and
can complicate judicial processes. An additional feature to the AU
Convention is a monitoring role constituted as the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM), which is a mutually-agreed upon instrument to
which member states can voluntarily accede as a means of self-monitoring
to ascertain whether they are in conformity with the agreed political,
economic and corporate governance values.91
86 Terracino (n 16 above) 3.
87 Terracino (n 16 above) 19 51.
88 Terracino (n 16 above) 52.
89 A ‘state party’ to a treaty is a country that has ratified or acceded to that particular
treaty, and therefore is legally bound by the provisions of the instrument.
90 Terracino (n 16 above) 82.
91 As above.
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Other international instruments, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, establish legally-binding standards to criminalise the bribery
of foreign public officials in international business transactions, and are
focused on the supply side of bribery transactions. The US Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) targets the non-compliance by
US taxpayers using foreign accounts. The FATCA requires foreign
financial institutions (FFIs) to report to the Inland Revenue Service (IRS)
information about financial accounts held by US taxpayers, or by foreign
entities in which US taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest.92 
The criminalisation of corrupt offences in domestic legislation is the
first step towards ensuring the ability of states to prosecute and sanction
offenders. Part of this obligation is the obligation to criminalise money
laundering that has its origins in corrupt acts.93 Countries accordingly
have to apply the money-laundering offences to the proceeds of corrupt
acts. Therefore, there are two distinct crimes, namely, (a) the corrupt act,
which is the predicate offence by which the proceeds are generated; and
(b) the laundering of such proceeds. As most money-laundering cases
involve an international element, countries are required to establish the
extraterritoriality of predicate offences.
In keeping with the inter-relationships between corruption and money
laundering, both the regulatory measures aimed at the proceeds of
corruption and the AML measures applicable to the diamond value chain
are highlighted below. 
The following FATF Recommendations are applicable to diamond
dealers: Recommendation 22 mandates that customer due diligence and
record-keeping requirements set out in Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15
and 17 apply to dealers in precious stones when they engage in any cash
transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable designated
threshold (US dollars/EUR 15 000). Recommendation 28 requires that
dealers in precious stones be subject to effective systems for monitoring
and ensuring compliance with AML/CFT requirements, which should be
92 IRS ‘Summary of FACTA reporting’ (not dated).
93 This obligation is covered in specific terms in the UNCAC. Art 23(1)(a) provides for
‘(i) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds
of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or
of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to
evade the legal consequences of his or her action; (ii) the concealment or disguise of
the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of, or rights with
respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime; (b) subject to
the basic concepts of its legal system (i) the acquisition, possession or use of property,
knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime;
(ii) participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and
aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences
established in accordance with this article’. 
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performed on a risk-sensitive basis by a supervisor or by an appropriate
self-regulatory body.94
In some instances, countries without national AML/CFT regulations
regarding diamond dealers may have national legislation in place for sector
regulation. South Africa, for example, does not have industry-specific
AML/CFT regulations directed at diamond traders, and diamonds are
only covered under the Diamond Act, which deals with the regulation of
the diamond industry in its entirety.95
The inherent involvement of public officials in corrupt activities in
many instances entails jurisdictional privileges and immunities, which can
impede efforts to combat corruption. Where immunities are abused by
those in public office, immunity becomes impunity and the international
legal framework does not adequately address the issue of immunities.96
According to article 30 of the UNCAC, jurisdictions 
shall consider establishing procedures through which a public official accused
of an offence established in accordance with this convention may, where
appropriate, be removed, suspended or reassigned by the appropriate
authority, bearing in mind respect for the principle of the presumption of
innocence. 
In short, countries are only required to apply an appropriate balance
between immunities and adjudication.97
Bank secrecy typically is aimed at protecting the financial privacy of
citizens from unauthorised access, and its foundation lies in the right to
privacy. A different meaning is attached to the protection afforded by bank
secrecy laws. On the one hand, it is regarded as a private law issue (breach
of contract or delict98 where false reporting of corruption is made) and, on
the other, it is seen as a public interest matter, and a breach of secrecy
constitutes a criminal offence. From a transnational investigative
perspective, jurisdictions cannot deny mutual legal assistance to another
jurisdiction on the grounds of bank secrecy.
After the financial crisis of 2008/2009, the G20 countries compelled
tax havens to sign bilateral treaties providing for the exchange of bank
information. Policy makers reportedly celebrated this as the momentum
required to end bank secrecy. Johannesen and Zucman assessed the impact
of tax treaties on bank deposits in tax havens, and found that rather than
94 FATF ‘Money laundering and terrorist financing through the trade in diamonds’
(2013) 36-37.
95 FATF (n 94 above) 38.
96 Terracino (n 6 above) 195.
97 Terracino (n 16 above) 212.
98 According to art 5(7) of the AU Convention, provision is made for the adoption of
national legislative measures in order to punish those who make false and malicious
reports against innocent persons in corruption and related offences.
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repatriating funds, tax evaders merely moved deposits to tax havens which
are not covered under a treaty with their home countries. What is
celebrated as a crackdown, thus, is merely a relocation of deposits to the
benefit of the least compliant havens.99
The liability of legal persons is highly relevant to corruption cases,
since these are frequently committed through or under cover of legal
entities. With corporate structures becoming increasingly complicated,
holding individuals to account for a particular decision has become
progressively more difficult. Legal persons have elaborate financial
structures (especially in the case of corporates) and accounting practices,
making it easier to conceal corrupt acts and the identity of decision
makers.100 The attribution of responsibility to legal persons is possible
through three major approaches. The first is the identification theory,
which assigns liability to the individual who is in a leading position; the
second approach is based on the agency principle which attaches vicarious
liability (that is, an employee acting within the scope of his or her duties
and for the benefit of the company). The third approach relates to
corporate culture, where ‘the legal person fails to create or maintain a
corporate culture that requires compliance with the relevant laws’.101
A legal person is only held responsible for corrupt acts committed by
its employees when there is a connection between the act and the legal
person – the act must have been committed ‘for the benefit of the legal
person and not in the interest of the employee’.102 When assessing the
liability of the legal person, a key test is whether the legal person has
exercised due diligence in supervising and controlling its employees.103
From a tax perspective, the greatest weapon in the arsenal of the tax
authority no doubt is its ability to tax all income – including that generated
through illegal means, for example, section 1 read with section 23 of the
South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, which respectively deal with
gross income and non-allowable deductions. ‘Trade’ is widely defined to
include ‘every profession, trade, business, employment, calling,
occupation or venture’, while section 23(o) does not allow for deductions
‘where the payment of that expenditure or the agreement or offer to make
that payment constitutes an activity contemplated in Chapter 2 of the
99 N Johannesen & G Zucman ‘The end of bank secrecy? An evaluation of the G20 tax
haven crackdown’ (2014) 6 American Economic Journal 65.
100 Terracino (n 16 above) 255.
101 Terracino (n 16 above) 258.
102 As above.
103 Due diligence requires steps such as the implementation and application of a code of
conduct, an efficient internal audit control system, compliance programmes as well as
effective training and enforcement. In some jurisdictions, effective due diligence
constitutes a defence (eg in Italy and Korea), while in others it is only a mitigating
factor in sentencing (eg the US).
  Inter-relationships between common factors to illicit financial flows    125
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004’. Similar
provisions are contained in the new Ghana Income Tax Act,104 which
defines income in section 2(1) as ‘the assessable income from employment,
business or investment’.105 Excluded deductions specifically include bribes
and expenses incurred in corrupt practices, as well as interest, penalties
and fines paid or payable to a government or a political division of a
government of any country for breach of any legislation.
Preventive measures have the potential to make corruption riskier
where these are targeted at systemic weaknesses that facilitate corrupt
practices. Their successful implementation could significantly reinforce
institutions necessary to prevent corruption. Such measures can include,
for example, (a) increased transparency (through initiatives such as the
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI); (b) approaching
treaties as mechanisms that can police interactions between countries;106
(c) establishing effective anti-corruption and anti-money laundering
bodies; (d) implementing sound risk management policies; (e) imple-
menting beneficial ownership requirements; and (f) implementing a
legislative and regulatory environment that is conducive to revenue
collection. 
7 Conclusion
The underlying conditions that create incentives for corrupt activities are
diverse and can manifest in rent seeking through payoffs and kickbacks. In
order for bribery to be worthwhile to public officials, they must be in a
position to create or distribute rents. The economics approach predicts that
the higher the rent, the higher the incentive for corruption, and the more
managers will be prone to corrupt behaviour.107 Good governance
requires the implementation of measures that improve the external
environment in which enterprises operate, and that improve the
effectiveness of institutions which regulate, facilitate and enforce
regulations. As acts of corruption, money laundering and tax evasion
generally are aimed at achieving a financial gain108 in a manner which
aims to hide that gain, they are necessarily intertwined. An institutional
104 Act 896 of 2015.
105 Business income includes income from a trade, profession, vocation or isolated
arrangement with a business character; gains from the realisation of capital assets and
gifts received in respect of the business.
106 A Campbell ‘Riding a friendly elephant’? How African nations can make the best of
economic partnership with China’ (2016) 49 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
540.
107 Y Jeong & RJ Weiner ‘Conflict and corruption in international trade: WHO helped
Iraq circumvent United Nations sanctions?’ in S Rose-Ackerman & T Søreide (eds)
International handbook on the economics of corruption (2011) 381.
108 The gain could be legal or illegal. Where the gain is legal but the entity attempts to
hide the gain from the tax authorities, it becomes tax evasion and, therefore, is illegal. 
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response should recognise this aspect, in order to successfully deal with
these diverse crimes.
Taxation is a key shaper of accountability relationships between
citizens and government,109 and the anti-money-laundering framework
can further delineate this relationship by highlighting agreements which
are opaque and where beneficial ownership is not transparent. For a tax
administration, this may mean better revenue collection, and for tax policy
greater transparency in the design of, inter alia, incentive and/or exemption
regimes.
In addressing money laundering and tax evasion, cognisance should
be taken of the fact that anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-
financing regimes support economic development though three primary
roles:
(a) by serving as an additional tool in combating and preventing crime and
tax evasion; 
(b) by protecting the financial system from criminal influences and by
preventing tainted money from being injected into the economies of
countries; and 
(c) by contributing to good governance and by promoting the rule of law to
the benefit of society as a whole.110
The different regulatory frameworks aimed at fighting corruption, evasion
and money laundering are complementary and provide diverse options to
enforcement agencies. For instance, instead of pursuing embezzlement
under anti-corruption laws, it may be better for tax authorities to pursue
tax evasion charges, as unexplained wealth forms the basis of the
embezzlement crime and life style audits are the bread and butter of
revenue agencies. Strong sanctions of the AML Framework, coupled with
a wealth of financial information, puts it in a formidable position to assist
tax administrations with up-to-date information, where the tax authority is
hampered by a lack of updated, comprehensive and comparable data.
109 S Knack Sovereign rents and the quality of tax policy and administration (2008).
110 S Yikona et al ‘Ill-gotten money and the economy: Experiences from Malawi and
Namibia’ World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (2011) 5.
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Abstract
Illicit financial flows (IFFs) strip essential resources from developing
countries, which could be used to foster development. International tax
evasion constitutes one major source of IFFs out of developing countries.
This problem, being global by nature, resulted in an unprecedented peak in
global tax cooperation with a creation of global infrastructure to jointly fight
IFFs resulting from tax aversion. Although this global cooperation covers
various aspects, one main element is the consensus that transparency is an
important antidote. Vast amounts of resources are allocated to global
exchange of information for tax purposes between countries. There are
additional efforts to broaden the scope for which the information exchanged
can be used so that not only tax authorities can benefit from the information
received (so-called inter-agency cooperation). Additionally, one can see an
increase in the cross-border assistance in the collection of taxes. However,
for various reasons many developing countries are benefiting from the
increased global tax cooperation in a limited way. Accordingly, this chapter
focuses on the global tax cooperation mechanisms implemented by Ghana,
Nigeria and South Africa with regards to (i) global transparency; (ii) inter-
agency cooperation; and (iii) the cross-border assistance in the collection of
taxes. It provides a gap analysis with regard to the embeddedness of the
respective countries into bi- or multilateral frameworks. Based on the results
of the gap analysis, recommendations are given on how to improve the
benefits of the increased global tax cooperation in respect of Ghana, Nigeria
and South Africa. 
1 Introduction
Governments around the globe are joining forces to combat illicit financial
flows (IFFs) with special attention being given to the position of
developing countries. While IFFs occur and are damaging in all countries,
their impact are more severe in developing countries due to their limited
resource base and smaller, less stable markets. Estimates on the exact
volume of IFFs are heavily debated and vary greatly. However, in these
debates there is general consensus that each year large amounts of money
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are transferred illegally out of developing countries, likely exceeding
inbound aid and investment flows in volume. 
There is further consensus that the IFFs strip essential resources from
developing countries, which could otherwise be utilised to finance public
infrastructure and services in education, health, security and justice, with
a decelerating effect on development. Various definitions are used for
IFFs, which in essence can be summarised as ‘methods, practices and
crimes aiming to transfer financial capital out of a country in contravention
of national or international laws’.1 International tax evasion constitutes a
major source of illicit financial flows from developing countries. As capital
– be it from individuals or companies – has become more mobile, all
countries on equal footing are dealing with new international challenges,
such as the tracing of offshore assets; how to tax multinational enterprises
adequately; building effective transfer pricing regimes; establishing and
using information sharing arrangements to obtain tax information about
taxpayers from other countries; and how to use this information most
effectively. These challenges, being global by nature, resulted in an
unprecedented peak in global tax cooperation with a creation of global
infrastructure to jointly fight IFFs resulting from tax aversion. Although
this global cooperation covers various aspects, one major element is the
agreement that transparency is the antidote. Since the primary goal of IFFs
is to hide funds from governments, vast amounts of resources are allocated
to the global exchange of information for tax purposes between countries.
There are additional efforts to broaden the scope for which the information
exchanged can be used so that not only tax authorities can benefit from the
information received (so-called inter-agency cooperation). Additionally,
one can see an increase in the cross-border assistance in the collection of
taxes. 
Developing countries are included in the discussions and can benefit
from this global momentum in cooperation. Strikingly, however, many
developing countries are only utilising and benefiting from the increased
global tax cooperation in a limited way. They rarely use the global
infrastructure that now exists to request information on companies and
wealthy individuals, to share the information exchanged with other
government agencies or request assistance in the cross-border collection of
taxes.2 The reasons are diverse, for instance, the lack of a legal basis; the
lack of awareness of tax administrations of the potential benefits of global
cooperation; or simply a lack of knowledge about the implementation of
1 OECD Illicit financial flows from developing countries: Measuring OECD responses (2014),
https://www.oecd.org/corruption/
Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries.pdf (accessed 10 November
2016).
2 Global Financial Integrity Illicit financial flows: The most damaging economic condition
facing the developing world (2015) 132, http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/09/Ford-Book-Final.pdf (accessed 10 November).
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required means to enable tax cooperation.3 However, the argument
commonly brought forward about the lack of capacity and bargaining
power to include instruments in relevant treaty negotiations no longer is a
valid excuse, since multilateral instruments for the exchange of
information are now readily available, which developing countries can
adhere to without the need to negotiate individually with other states.
However, it still is not being utilised sufficiently. 
1.1 Aim of the research
All these limitations seem abstract without placing them into an actual
country’s framework. Hence, this chapter focuses on the global tax
cooperation mechanisms implemented by Ghana, Nigeria and South
Africa with regard to (i) global transparency; (ii) inter-agency cooperation;
and (iii) the cross-border assistance in the collection of taxes. It provides a
gap analysis with regard to the embeddedness of the respective countries
into bi- or multi-lateral frameworks. However, this chapter does not cover
national law mechanisms. Based on the results of the gap analysis, the aim
is to develop recommendations on how to improve the benefits of the
increased global tax cooperation for Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. The
first part provides a general overview of the range of the bi- and multi-
lateral frameworks of each country. Thereafter, the second part conducts
the gap analysis on the three aspects, namely, global transparency,
interagency cooperation and the cross-border assistance in the collection of
taxes. Based on the conclusions of the gap analysis, the last part provides
some recommendations. 
2 Network of global tax cooperation partners
In order to utilise the new global infrastructure in international
cooperation in tax matters, developing countries need to have in place an
adequate framework. First, a legal basis is required for doing so, which can
be included in a bilateral or a multilateral framework. Second, it is
important that the framework covers all relevant countries that constitute
trading partners and wealth management centres. 
2.1 Bilateral framework
A bilateral framework would require tax treaty partners to incorporate
administrative assistance provisions, such as an exchange of information
article in their relevant double tax treaty (DTT). The disadvantage of solely
relying on such a provision in a bilateral tax treaty is that they might not
3 Tax and Development Practical guide on exchange of information for developing countries,
ATAF and OECD (2012), http://www.g20dwg.org/documents/pdf/view/306/
(accessed 10 November 2016).
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represent international standards due to pressure in the process of
negotiations. Additionally, as international standards on global
cooperation are over time steadily refined and changed, a bilateral
provision needs to be renegotiated in order to reflect the ‘state of the art’. 
Since developing countries may not have the capacity, negotiation
skills or bargaining power, the clauses might be outdated and restrictive,
not exhausting the whole potential of the global cooperation. Another
bilateral instrument is the conclusion of tax information exchange
agreements (TIEA), which have a material scope of only covering the
provision of information exchange. However, since these instruments are
bilateral, again they require resources and the willingness of third countries
to conclude such agreements with developing countries. Hence,
multilateral instruments in this regard are far more beneficial, since
harmonised wording applies to a wide network of treaty partners with no
need for individual negotiations by the developing country. 
2.2 Multilateral framework
The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters constitutes such multilateral framework. It´s ‘birth’ resulted from
the work carried out jointly by the Council of Europe and by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It
constitutes one of the most ambitious and comprehensive endeavours for
cross-border tax cooperation and originally was opened for signature only
to members of the Council of Europe and the OECD as of 25 January
1988.4
The Convention was amended according to the call of the G20 at its
2009 London Summit to harmonise it to the international standard on
exchange of information on request included in article 26 of the 2008
OECD Model Tax Convention. It is understood that the EoI provisions of
the Convention, as amended by the 2010 Protocol (amended Convention),
are generally given the same interpretation as that expressed in the OECD
Commentary thereon.5 Furthermore and, more importantly, the
amending protocol opened the Convention to all interested countries, with
the rationale to ensure in particular that developing countries could benefit
from the new more transparent and cooperative environment. On 1 June
2011 the amended Convention was ready for signature.6 A non-OECD or
4 See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Explanatory_Report_
ENG_%2015_04_ 2010.pdf (accessed 10 October 2016).
5 See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Explanatory_Report_
ENG_%2015_04_ 2010.pdf (accessed 10 November 2016); OECD ‘Preface’ in The
multilateral convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters: Amended by the
2010 Protocol (2011) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115606-1-en (accessed
10 November 2016).
6 See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/convention-on-mutual-
administrative-assistance-in-tax-matters.htm (accessed 10 November 2016).
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non-Council of Europe member wishing to join the amended Convention
must address the Secretary-General of the OECD or of the Council of
Europe. The decision to invite a requesting country to become a party to
the Convention will be taken by consensus by the parties through the co-
ordinating body. The decision will be based on several factors, taking into
account, inter alia, the confidentiality rules and practices of the country
concerned and whether the country is a member of the Global Forum on
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes.7 As of
26 September 2016, 104 jurisdictions participate in the amended
Convention. This covers a wide range of different countries, including all
G20 countries, all BRIICS, all OECD countries, major financial centres
and an increasing number of developing countries.8
2.3 Outreach to trading partners and wealth management 
centres
A treaty network – be it bi- or multi-lateral – that facilitates cross-border
cooperation in tax matters with all relevant trading partners of a country is
very valuable, since it can help in circumstances of tax audits on cross-
border activities; transfer pricing issues; the transfer of knowledge with
regard to special industry practices; or to share strategic information on
VAT evasion schemes. Additionally, since high net worth private
individuals often use offshore global wealth management centres for the
management of their funds, a treaty network covering the classical wealth
management hubs is also important. The biggest global wealth
management centres currently comprise of Switzerland, the United
Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), Panama and the Caribbean, Hong
Kong and Singapore.9 Although Switzerland still constitutes the biggest
wealth management hub, Hong Kong has achieved a growth of 146 per
cent (±US $0.4 trillion) in cross-border client assets during the period
between 2008 to 2014 and, hence, has the biggest amount of inflows of new
assets – more inflows than any other centre.10 Below, one can find an
overview of the outreach of the global tax cooperation partners of Ghana,
Nigeria and South Africa.
7 See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Process_to_Become_a_
Party_to_the_Amended_Convention.pdf (accessed 10 November 2016).
8 See http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention
.pdf (accessed 10 November 2016).
9 Descending order with regard to volume of assets under management based on the
Deloitte Wealth Management Centre Ranking 2015, https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/financial-services/ch-en-financial-services-the
-deloitte-wealth-management-centre-ranking-2015.pdf (accessed 8 November 2016).
10 Deloitte Wealth Management Centre Ranking (n 9 above) 2
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2.3.1 Ghana
Ghana has a market-based economy with relatively few policy obstacles to
trade and investment in comparison with other countries in the region.
Ghana is a commodity-exporting country as it is equipped with natural
resources and has a strong agricultural sector. Agriculture accounts for
nearly one-quarter of gross domestic product (GDP), and the services
sector accounts for about half of the GDP. Gold and cocoa exports, as well
as individual remittances, are major sources of foreign exchange. The
expansion of Ghana’s nascent oil industry has boosted economic growth,
but the recent crash in the oil price reduced by half Ghana’s 2015 oil
revenue.11 Ghana´s main export and import commodities and partners are
summarised in Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1: Ghana’s Import and Export Commodities and Partners
Source: World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency (2016).
With regard to its global tax cooperation partners, Ghana only has a
limited treaty network in place. Currently, with only nine DTTs in force,
the treaty network covers Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and South Africa. Ghana
further has concluded one tax information exchange agreement (TIEA)
with Liberia.12 As a major step forward, on 10 July 2011 Ghana signed the
amended Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters with entry into force on 1 September 2013. Participation in the
Convention significantly broadened Ghana´s framework of global tax
cooperation partners, since the Convention currently covers the
participating countries listed in Box 6.1.13
11 For more information on Ghana´s economy, see https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html (accessed 7 November
2016).
Imported
commodities
Capital equipment; refined petroleum; foodstuffs
Import partners China 32.6%; Nigeria 14%; Netherlands 5.5%; US 5.4%
(2015)
Exported
commodities
Oil; gold; cocoa; timber; tuna; bauxite; aluminium;
manganese ore; diamonds; horticultural products
Export partners India 25.2%; Switzerland 12.2%; China 10.6%; France
5.7% (2015)
12 See List of recent exchange of information agreements http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
harmful/43775845.pdf (accessed 10 October 2016).
13 See http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention
.pdf (accessed 10 October 2016).
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Source: http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax information/Status_of_convention.pdf
(accessed 10 October 2016).
Accordingly, Ghana’s bi- and multi-lateral framework of global tax
cooperation partners generally covers its main import and export
partners.14 With regard to global wealth management centres, Ghana’s
global tax cooperation network covers Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
some of the Caribbean islands and Singapore. However, since the United
States and Panama have not ratified the amended Convention yet and
Hong Kong is not participating so far, Ghana’s treaty network does not
cover these countries/regions.
2.3.2 Nigeria
Nigeria constitutes Africa's largest economy, with 2015 GDP estimated at
USD1.1 trillion. Nigeria is a commodity-exporting country with a strong
14 With the exception of the United States, since it signed the Convention but ratification
is still open. 
Box 6.1: Participating countries in the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters
Albania; Andorra**; Anguilla; Argentina; Aruba; Australia; Austria;
Azerbaijan; Barbados; Belgium; Belize; Bermuda; Brazil; British Virgin Islands;
Bulgaria; Burkina Faso*; Cameroon; Canada; Cayman Islands5; Chile; China
(People’s Republic Of); Colombia; Costa Rica; Croatia; Curaçao; Cyprus;
Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic*; El Salvador*; Estonia;
Faroe Islands; Finland; France; Gabon*; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Gibraltar;
Greece; Greenland; Guatemala*; Guernsey; Hungary; Iceland; India;
Indonesia; Ireland; Isle Of Man; Israel*; Italy; Jamaica*; Japan; Jersey;
Kazakhstan; Kenya*; Korea; Latvia; Liechtenstein**; Lithuania; Luxembourg;
Malaysia*; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Monaco*; Montserrat;
Morocco*; Nauru; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Niue; Norway;
Pakistan*; Panama*; Philippines*; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russia; Saint
Kitts And Nevis**; Saint Vincent And The Grenadines**; Samoa**; San
Marino; Saudi Arabia; Senegal**; Seychelles; Singapore; Sint Maarten; Slovak
Republic; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland**; Tunisia;
Turkey*; Turks & Caicos Islands; Uganda; Ukraine; United Kingdom; United
States*; Uruguay**
Notes:
*)    signed but not in force;
**)  signed and entry into force latest by 1 January 2017.
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agricultural sector. Oil has been a dominant source of income and has
constituted approximately 70 per cent of government revenues since the
1970s. Over the last five years, Nigeria’s economic growth has been driven
in the sectors of agriculture, telecommunications and services. Due to
regulatory constraints and security risks, only limited new investment in
oil and natural gas has taken place and Nigeria's oil production has
contracted every year since 2012. Because of lower oil prices, GDP growth
in 2015 fell to around 3 per cent, and government revenues declined, while
the non-oil sector also contracted due to economic policy uncertainty.15 In
Table 6.2 Nigeria’s main export and import commodities and partners are
summarised.
Table 6.2: Nigeria’s Import and Export Commodities and Partners
Source: World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency (2016).
With regard to its global tax cooperation partners, Nigeria only has a
limited treaty network in place. Currently, with only 14 DTTs in force, the
treaty network covers Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, France,
Netherlands, Romania, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. As a major step forward, on 29 May 2013
Nigeria signed the amended Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax matters with entry into force on 1 September 2015.
Participation in the Convention significantly broadened Nigeria’s
framework of global tax cooperation partners, since the Convention covers
multiple countries. Nigeria’s bi- and multi-lateral framework of global tax
cooperation partners generally covers its main import and export partners.
With regard to global wealth management centres, Nigeria’s global tax
cooperation network covers Switzerland, the United Kingdom, some of
the Caribbean Island States and Singapore. However, since the United
States and Panama have not yet ratified the amended Convention and
15 For more information on Nigeria’s economy, see https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html (accessed 14 November
2016).
Imported
commodities
Machinery; chemicals; transport equipment; manufactured
goods; food and live animals
Import partners China 25.7%; US 6.4%; Netherlands 6.1%; India 4.3%
(2015)
Exported
commodities
Petroleum and petroleum products 95%; cocoa; rubber
(2012 est)
Export partners India 18.2%; Netherlands 8.5%; Spain 8.2%; Brazil 8.2%;
South Africa 7.8%; France 5.2%; Japan 4.5%; Côte d’Ivoire
4.2%; Ghana 4% (2015)
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Hong Kong is not participating so far, Nigeria’s treaty network does not
cover these countries/regions.
2.3.3 South Africa
South Africa is a middle-income emerging market well equipped with
natural resources, well-developed financial, legal, communications,
energy and transport sectors, and a stock exchange that is Africa’s largest
and among the top 20 in the world. However, unemployment, poverty and
inequality – among the highest in the world – remain a challenge. The
current government faces growing pressure from urban constituencies to
improve the delivery of basic services to low-income areas and to increase
job growth.16 South Africa’s main export and import commodities and
partners may be summarised as follows:
Table 6.3: South Africa’s Import and Export Commodities and 
Partners
Source: World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency (2016).
With regard to its global tax cooperation partners, South Africa has in
place an extensive treaty network. Currently, with 76 DTTs in force, the
treaty network covers the countries listed in Box 6.2. 
16 For more information on South Africa’s economy, see https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html (accessed 14 November
2016).
Imported
commodities
Machinery and equipment; chemicals, petroleum products;
scientific instruments; foodstuffs
Import partners China 17.6%; Germany 11.2%; US 6.7%; Nigeria 5%; India
4.7%; Saudi Arabia 4.1% (2015)
Exported
commodities
Gold; diamonds; platinum; other metals and minerals;
machinery and equipment
Export partners China 11.3%; US 7.3%; Germany 6%; Namibia 5.2%;
Botswana 5.2%; Japan 4.7%; UK 4.3%; India 4.2% (2015)
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South Africa has further concluded three TIEAs with Cayman Islands,
Guernsey and San Marino.17 Additionally, on 3 November 2011, South
Africa signed the amended Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax matters with entry into force on 1 March 2014.
Participation in the Convention further broadened South Africa’s
framework of global tax cooperation partners, since the Convention covers
multiple countries. South Africa´s bi- and multi-lateral framework of
global tax cooperation partners generally covers its main import and
export partners. With regard to global wealth management centres, South
Africa’s global tax cooperation network covers Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, the United States, some of the Caribbean island states,
Singapore and Hong Kong. Only Panama is not included, since Panama
has not yet ratified the amended Convention.
3 The Gap Analysis on Global Tax cooperation 
Framework
3.1 Global transparency
The late US Justice Louis Brandeis famously stated that ‘sunlight is the
best disinfectant’. Correspondingly, an important mechanism for the
elimination of tax avoidance and aversion is transparency. Transparency
through the exchange of information on a global scale helps to avoid
information asymmetries though enhancing a more transparent global tax
footprint. Particularly for developing countries, it constitutes an important
tool to inhibit the loss of revenues from assets held offshore or
misrepresented cross-border activities. The G20 and the OECD’s Global
17 See List of Recent Exchange of Information Agreements (n 12 above).
Box 6.2: South Africa’s Treaty Network
Algeria; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Canada; China; Democratic Republic of
the Congo; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Egypt; Ethiopia;
Finland; France; Germany; Ghana; Grenada; Greece; Hong Kong; Hungary;
India; Indonesia; Iran; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Kenya; Korea (South);
Kuwait; Lesotho; Luxembourg; Malawi; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico;
Mozambique; Namibia; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Norway; Oman;
Pakistan; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russian Federation; Rwanda;
Saudi Arabia; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Spain;
Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; Tanzania; Thailand; Tunisia;
Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; United Kingdom; United States; Zambia; and
Zimbabwe.
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Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes
(Global Forum) were the driving forces to improve transparency through
setting global standards for information-sharing around the world. As a
result, the number of agreements on exchange of information between tax
authorities and the scope of the exchange have steadily increased,
incorporating also the agreements between OECD countries and
developing countries.18 The Global Forum became the venue for a peer
review programme aimed at assessing the effective practical
implementation of OECD transparency standards.19 Action was taken
against jurisdictions that fail to comply with the international standards of
fiscal transparency, and the era of bank secrecy was declared extinct
because of the new information exchange obligations. The international
standard for the exchange of information upon request over time was
gradually refined and now envisages information exchange to the widest
extent possible, namely, that the information can relate to persons who are
not resident in either contracting state, and it can cover information
regarding taxes that are not covered by the tax treaty, such as VAT.20
However, speculative requests for information with no apparent nexus to
an open inquiry or investigation – so-called ‘fishing expeditions’ – are not
permitted. This fine balance between broadness and the limit on ‘fishing
expeditions’ was created by introducing the standard of ‘foreseeable
relevance’ into article 26(1)21 of the OECD and UN Model Tax
Convention.22
3.2 Automatic exchange of information
Invited by the G20 countries, the OECD has recently developed what it
refers to as the new single global standard for the automatic exchange of
information (AEOI) between tax authorities globally. The OECD defines
the AEOI as the systematic and periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ taxpayer
information by the source country to the residence country in a common
18 OECD (n 1 above).
19 Statement of G8 Finance Ministers, Lecce, Italy,13 June 2009: ‘We welcome progress
in negotiations of agreements on the exchange of information for tax purposes. We
urge further progress in the implementation of the OECD standards and the
involvement of the widest possible number of jurisdictions, including developing
countries. It is also essential to develop an effective peer-review mechanism to assess
compliance with the same standards. This could be delivered by an expanded Global
Forum. We also look forward to an update on progress on the G20 agreement to tackle
tax havens at the next OECD Ministerial meeting.’ https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg171.aspx (accessed 15 November 2016).
20 Para 7.2 UN Model: Commentary on Article 26 (2011) and para 5 OECD Model:
Commentary on Article 26 (2014).
21 See Appendix A for the wording of art 26 of the UN Model (2011) and the OECD
Model (2014).
22 The commentaries to art 26 OECD and UN Model Tax Convention additionally
stipulate that the term ‘foreseeably relevant’ can be substituted with ‘necessary’,
‘relevant’ or ‘may be relevant’. These terms are equivalent to the international standard
of the term ‘foreseeably relevant’, if those terms are understood to require an effective
exchange of information and are understood to mean ‘appropriate and helpful’ but not
‘essential’; paras 7.1-7.2, UN Model: Commentary on Article 26 (2011).
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reporting format or standard.23 Local banks and financial institutions of
participating countries would be required to obtain information on
financial accounts, which they would make available to the local tax
authorities. In turn, they would provide that information on an automatic
basis to other countries in a standardised format (without the need for
sending a specific request). As at 10 April 2017, 52 jurisdictions have
committed to undertaking their first exchange by 2017, with another 48
indicating that they would start their exchange by 2018.24
Generally, the principal purpose of exchanging information is to
provide countries with information to detect tax evasion, thereby allowing
them to protect their tax base and limit their exposure to revenue loss.
Especially for developing countries, the detection of tax evasion is
considered critical, due to the estimation by the OECD that approximately
US $8,5 trillion of household assets are held abroad in developing
countries.25 For instance, in 2012 more than 25 per cent of all Latin
American and almost 33 per cent of all Middle Eastern and African
household wealth was held abroad compared to the worldwide average of
6 per cent.26 The successful implementation of the AEOI can alert tax
administrations to tax evasion that was previously unknown and, hence,
limit the tax revenue and illicit financial flows lost by developing countries.
However, the practical adoption of the AEOI standard presupposes an
onerous administrative burden on countries, and this burden arguably is
bigger on developing countries. Developing countries usually – albeit on
different degrees – do not have the same level of administrative resources
and intellectual capital as developed countries. Additionally, developing
countries also are not at the same level regarding the system already in
place for the exchange of information as developed countries are.27
The special needs and position of developing countries in their AEOI
implementation was acknowledged by the OECD and G20, in particular,
at the St Petersburg Summit in 2013.28 G20 leaders called on the
Development Working Group (DWG) in conjunction with the Finance
23 OECD (n 1 above) 76.
24 See https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf (accessed
1 May 2017).
25 G20 OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes:
Automatic exchange of information: A roadmap for developing country participation (2014) 9. 
26 Boston Consulting Group (BCG) ‘Global wealth 2013: Maintaining momentum in a
complex world’ 2013 http://www.bcg.de/documents/file135355.pdf (accessed
10 November 2016).
27 K Sadiq & A Sawyer ‘Developing countries and the automatic exchange of
information standard - A ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution? (2016) 31 Australian Tax Forum
102.
28 G‐20 ‘Leaders’ declaration with regard to AEOI and BEPS’ www.g20.org/sites/
default/les/g20_resources/library/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_ENG_0.pdf
(accessed 10 November 2016).
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Track, to work with the OECD, the Global Forum and other international
organisations to develop a roadmap to assist developing countries.29 
The mentioned roadmap for developing countries to participate in the
AEOI was delivered by the Global Forum to the G20 DWG on 5 August
2015.30 It is described as a high-level implementation policy by the OECD
to broadly address the concern of developing countries.31 However, next
to the identification of high-level hurdles32 and the drafting of principles
and steps, the roadmap does not provide concrete solutions or tangible
assistance suggestions. Thus, it does recommend to all developing
countries to volunteer to participate in a pilot project, which should assist
with effective implementation.
The pilot projects are conducted by the Global Forum, together with
the World Bank Group and other Global Forum members. These projects
are undertaken as a collective effort by the pilot country (the developing
country participant) and a developed country that has agreed to partner
with the pilot country, the Global Forum Secretariat, the World Bank
Group and other organisations depending on the particular case.33
According to the Global Forum, six pilot projects are already underway:
Albania supported by Italy; Colombia by Spain; Ghana by the United
Kingdom; Morocco by France; the Philippines by Australia; and Pakistan
by the United Kingdom. The pilot projects are conducted through a step-
by-step approach to implementation. Thereby it is assumed that gradually
each developing country participant (‘pilot country’) would reach full
implementation in accordance with the standard.
Next to the pilot projects, dedicated further technical assistance is
being offered by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes, including training seminars (with more
than 400 government officials attending training in 2015 alone) and one-
one-one advisory services, particularly focusing on legislation and other
areas highlighted through an ongoing monitoring process.34
29 G-20 (n 29 above) para 52.
30 As above.
31 Sadiq & Sawyer (n 28 above) 114.
32 As above.
33 More information on the outline of a pilot project can be found in Global Forum on
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Automatic Exchange of
Information: Pilot Project Outline (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/
technical-assistance/aeoi/AEOI-pilot-project-briefing.pdf (accessed 10 November
2016).
34 More information on the technical assistance provided can be found at http://
www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/technical-assistance/aeoi/#d.en.352223 (accessed
10 November 2016).
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Nevertheless, the participation of developing countries in the AEOI
remains an exception due to their lack of capacity, and its wide-scale
accessibility will still require some time.35 
3.3 Interim period before AEOI
Until AEOI becomes viable for developing countries, the exchange of
information upon request will be instrumental to attaining cross-border
information. Likewise, its workability includes difficult hurdles to pass.
The tax authorities need to link a tax evader to a specific different
jurisdiction in order to pass the ‘foreseeably relevant’ hurdle. In order to do
so, someone must have spilled evidence and this information needs to be
adequate. Hence, the use of exchange of information upon request in
practice might be of limited use, due to the difficulties to attain this
evidence, when one only has limited resources available. However, what
one should not forget is that the exchange of information is not restricted
to taxpayer-specific information. More generic industry knowledge can
also be subject to exchange. Industry knowledge is particularly helpful for
tax administrations in developing countries that may lack valuable
industry-specific knowledge necessary for adequate transfer pricing
outcomes. An industry-wide exchange of information is the exchange of
tax information, especially concerning a whole economic sector (for
instance, the oil or pharmaceutical industry, the banking sector, and so
forth) and not taxpayers in particular.36
Irrespective of the mode of exchange – be it upon request, spontaneous
or automatic – as stated above, countries need to have an adequate legal
basis for doing so. The following part will be devoted to a gap analysis of
the frameworks available for Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, with
regard to the exchange of tax-specific information.
3.3.1 Gap analysis on Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa
Bilateral framework
As already discussed above, Ghana and Nigeria have in place only a
limited bilateral treaty network while South Africa has an extensive
bilateral treaty network. All three countries underwent the peer-review
process of the Global Forum, implying an in-depth monitoring and peer
review of the implementation of the international standards of
35 The OECD’s new landmark model agreement on automatic exchange of financial
information currently is likely to exclude many less-developed countries from its
benefits on the grounds that they lack the resources to set up the data collection
arrangements required to qualify as a reciprocating partner. However, resources are
allocated in order to help developing countries to build their capacity.
36 Para 6.1 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 26 (2014).
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transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes. Accordingly,
for purposes of this chapter, there is no need to go into details with regard
to the quality of the jurisdictions’ legal and regulatory framework for the
exchange of information. This issue is covered extensively in the respective
peer-review reports.37 
In summary, the exchange of information provisions in DTT of
Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa vary strongly in their wording and scope.
They are generally based on article 26 of the OECD or UN Model Treaty.
However, depending on the point in time the DTT was concluded and the
tax policy considerations of the two contracting parties, there are
significant treaty variations. The majority of the EoI provisions of Ghana,
slightly less than half of those of South Africa, and only two of those of
Nigeria contained in bilateral treaties include a broad personal as well as
material scope and, hence, could facilitate information exchange to the
widest extent possible with regard to taxes and persons covered.
Accordingly, these provisions potentially facilitate a broad exchange,
which can relate to persons who are not resident in either contracting state
and they can cover information regarding taxes that are not covered by the
Convention, for instance, VAT. However, the rest of their EoI provisions
are either restricted to information requests limited to ‘taxes covered by the
Convention’, generally taxes on income and capital gains. A minority of
EoI provisions even are very restrictive, since they are firstly restricted in
their taxes covered and the persons covered. Additionally, they can include
wording that can significantly limit the information to be exchanged.38
37 OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes Peer Reviews: Ghana 2014: Phase 2: Implementation of the Standard in
Practice (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264222878-en (accessed 10
November 2016); OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews: Nigeria 2016: Phase 2: Implementation
of the Standard in Practice (2016) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264250857-en
(accessed 10 November 2016).; OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange
of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews: South Africa 2013: Combined: Phase 1
+ Phase 2, incorporating Phase 2 ratings (2013) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264205901-en (accessed 10 November 2016).
38 Eg, the exchange of information provision in the treaty between Ghana and
Switzerland limits the scope of exchange to the residents of the contracting states and
does not cover taxes of every kind and description, but is limited to ‘the taxes which
are the subject of the Convention’, ie taxes on income, capital and on capital gains. A
further restricting factor is the treaty provides for the exchange of ‘such information
(being information which is at their disposal under their respective taxation laws in the
normal course of administration)’. If interpreted restrictively, this wording can
significantly limit the information to be exchanged to information that is already
available to the tax authorities. However, on 22 May in Accra, Switzerland and Ghana
signed a protocol amending the agreement for the avoidance of double taxation (DTA)
with respect to taxes on income, capital and capital gains. This protocol broadens the
exchange of information provision and brings the administrative assistance clause into
line with the applicable international standard for the exchange of information upon
request. It still needs to be approved by parliament in both countries before it can enter
into force. A further example of a very restrictive clause is South Africa`s DTT with
Switzerland. It is drafted in a distinct way and constitutes a good example of a
restrictive clause with various elements. First, the EoI provision provides for the
exchange of information ‘as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this
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Chart 6.1 below provides an overview of the scope of the bilateral EoI
provisions of the three countries. ‘Broad’ means neither restricted by article
1 (persons covered) nor by article 2 (taxes covered); ‘restrictive’ means
either restricted by article 1 (persons covered) or by article 2 (taxes
covered); and ‘very restrictive’ means restricted by article 1 (persons
covered) and by article 2 (taxes covered) and, in some cases, with
additional restrictive wording.
Chart 6.1: Scope of the Bilateral Exchange of Information Provisions
Source: Author’s own analysis of treaties.
Looking at the bilateral treaty landscape of the three countries, Ghana and
Nigeria generally have a very limited network of DTTs in place. Although
South Africa’s bilateral network is more extensive, the level of the EoI
38 Convention and, upon request, of the provisions of domestic law concerning tax fraud
in relation to the taxes which are subject of this Convention’. This wording provides
that other than for carrying out the provisions of the Convention, the exchange of
information is only granted in case of tax fraud. The protocol further defines the term
‘tax fraud’ as fraudulent conduct which constitutes a tax offence which, in both
contracting states, can be punished with imprisonment. Hence, in order for
information to be exchanged, the act needs to constitute a crime under the laws of both
contracting states. To put it in different words, this so-called principle of dual
criminality requires the act under investigation to constitute a crime also under the
laws of the requested state. This requirement limits the scope of the EoI provision
extensively, because of an idiosyncratic feature in Swiss law. Under Swiss law, there is a
distinction between tax fraud and mere tax evasion. Tax evasion is given when a
taxpayer fails to submit a tax return or submits incomplete information. This tax
evasion is seen as a regulatory offence, which is subject to a fine rather than
constituting a criminal offence. Tax fraud, on the other hand, occurs when falsified or
non-genuine records, such as accounts, balance sheets or income statements are used
for the purpose to avoid taxes. The concept of tax fraud was further broadened by the
Swiss Supreme Court, stipulating that tax fraud does not necessarily imply the use of
false documents; there may also be tax fraud in situations of tax evasion, which have
been provoked by a particularly cunning act (astuce) on the part of the taxpayer. The
mere omission to declare something, however, constitutes only tax evasion.
Accordingly, the threshold under Swiss law to constitute tax fraud is much higher than
in other jurisdictions and even further limits the EoI.
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mechanisms leaves sufficient room for improvement for all three countries.
Since renegotiation or – in the case of Ghana and Nigeria – the conclusion
of new DTTs with more countries, is time and resource-consuming, it is
positive to note that bilateral EoI provisions do not limit, nor are they
limited by, those contained in existing international agreements or other
arrangements between the contracting states which relate to cooperation in
tax matters.39 Hence, it is worthwhile exploring the scope of EoI under the
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters. 
3.3.2 Multilateral framework
The amended Convention is the most comprehensive multilateral
instrument available for all forms of tax cooperation to tackle tax evasion
and avoidance and provides for a single legal basis for bilateral and multi-
country cooperation. As stated above (sec II.1-3), Ghana, South Africa
and Nigeria have already signed the Convention, and it has gone through
the required ratification processes and entered into force.40 Accordingly,
by being members of the Convention, all three countries have expanded
their network of mutual administrative assistance partners extensively
through one single legal basis. 
Generally speaking, the amended Convention provides for wide-
ranging cooperation between tax authorities. First, the personal scope is
broad, since it is stipulated that the parties shall provide administrative
assistance to each other in tax matters, irrespective of whether the person
affected is a resident or national of a party or of any other state (article 1).
Second, the material scope is even broader. Different forms of
administrative assistance are contemplated, including the exchange of
information that is foreseeably relevant for the administration or
enforcement of domestic laws concerning taxes covered by the Convention
– explicitly mentioning exchange of information upon request; automatic
exchange of information as may be agreed between two or more parties;
and spontaneous exchange of information in specified circumstances.41
The Convention also provides for assistance in the recovery of taxes;42
simultaneous tax administrations;43 and tax examinations abroad.44
Regarding taxes covered, the Convention potentially covers all forms of
39 See para 5.5 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 26 (2014).
40 Ghana signed the amended Convention on 10 July 2011 with entry into force on 1
September 2013; South Africa signed the amended Convention on 3 November 2011
with entry into force on 1 March 2014; Nigeria signed the amended Convention on 29
May 2013 with entry into force on 1 September 2015. The list of the participating
countries and the status of the amended Convention can be found on the following link
(status 26 September 2016): http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/
Status_of_convention.pdf (accessed 10 October 2016). 
41 Ch III, sec I, arts 4-6.
42 Ch III, sec II, arts 11-16.
43 Ch III, sec I, art 8.
44 Ch III, sec I, art 9.
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compulsory payments to the general government with the sole exception
of customs duties and all other import-export duties.45 However, de facto
the taxes covered are not homogenous between the different contracting
parties. At signature or upon ratification of the amended Convention,
states are free to declare reservations within stated limits as to the taxes
covered, or as to certain types of administrative assistance that they will
not provide.46 
• In the case of Ghana, the amended Convention applies to income tax;
petroleum income tax; mineral royalties; withholding tax on interest;
withholding tax on dividend; withholding tax on goods and services;
capital gains tax; gift tax; value added tax; and excise tax. 
• In the case of Nigeria, the amended Convention applies to personal
income tax; company income tax; petroleum profit tax; capital gains tax;
value added tax; excise duty; tertiary education tax; and a national
information technology development levy. However, taxes imposed on
behalf of political subdivisions or local authorities, compulsory social
security contributions payable to general government or social security
institutions established under public law and taxes on the use or ownership
of motor vehicles are explicitly excluded in Nigeria. 
• In the case of South Africa, the amended Convention applies to income
tax; withholding tax on royalties; tax on foreign entertainers and
sportspersons; turnover tax on micro-businesses; dividend tax;
withholding tax on interest, effective date 1 March 2015; capital gains tax;
estate duty; donations tax; transfer duty; value added tax; excise tax; and
securities transfer taxes. However, taxes imposed on behalf of political
subdivisions or local authorities, compulsory social security contributions
payable to general government or social security institutions established
under public law and taxes on the use or ownership of motor vehicles are
explicitly excluded in South Africa. 
The resulting asymmetrical application of the amended Convention is not
formally addressed by the Convention itself. However, paragraph 11 of the
explanatory report stipulates: 
The legal principle of reciprocity is another element of balance in the
implementation of the Convention, since a state cannot ask for a form of
assistance that it is not ready to grant to other states. The same principle of
reciprocity is also a factor in the development of mutual assistance, because a
state which wishes to draw more benefits from the Convention will be
encouraged to offer more extensive assistance to other states.
Accordingly, the more a state decides to limit the taxes covered, the less
information it will receive from other states. Hence, one must also assess
the reservations made of the requested party to see the exact scope of the
45 Ch I, art 2.
46 Ch VI, art 30; the list of the reservations at the time of writing can be found at http://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/127/
declarations (accessed 11 October 2016).
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taxes covered. However, irrespective of the reservations made, the taxes
covered by Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa are wide-ranging and the
number of countries participating in the amended Convention are
extensive. Hence, the participation of the three countries in the amended
Convention significantly upgraded their constrained bilateral framework. 
Due to the participation in the amended Convention, the network of
global cooperation partners with broad EoI provisions in compliance with
the international standard covers all relevant trading partners. Since the
US and Panama have not yet ratified the amended Convention and Hong
Kong is not party to the Convention, these wealth management centres are
not part of the network (with the exception of Hong Kong and the United
States with regard to South Africa, since a bilateral framework is in place).
Due to the growing importance of Hong Kong, it is advisable to try to
establish a framework for EoI that includes Hong Kong.
Additionally, since the AEOI will require some time until developing
countries are able to participate, the EoI upon request is the standard for
attaining information. Due to the hurdles of overcoming the ‘foreseeably
relevant’ threshold, receiving taxpayer specific information upon request is
in practice of limited use. To enhance the benefits of the EoI instrument in
the interim period before AEOI is in place, the competent authorities of
Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa could establish specific procedures47, for
instance routine exchange of industry know-how, with timeframes and
types of information to be exchanged. This can be especially helpful if such
a procedure is established with targeted sophisticated tax administrations,
with extensive exposure to industry practices and know-how, such as the
UK, The Netherlands and Switzerland. Since Ghana, Nigeria and South
Africa are all commodity exporting countries, receiving pricing
information or other industry know-how from these countries might be of
value.
3.3.3 Interagency cooperation
Since the tax information exchanged – in whichever mode – is likely not
only to be valuable to the recipient tax administrations, but may be useful
to other government agencies, for instance, to prosecute additional crimes
such as money-laundering, bribery, corruption and terrorism financing,
there is a further international understanding to improve the holistic use of
the information received. This transparency should spread over other
47 In order to encourage the development of methods and techniques for efficient and
effective information exchange, the UN Model includes an additional paragraph 6 in
its art 26 for the establishment of procedures. Although the OECD Model does not
contain such a provision, the OECD Commentary also offers drafting options (para
10, OECD Model: Commentary on Article 26 (2014)). Looking at the DTTs of
Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, neither Ghana nor Nigeria has such an additional
provision in place. Six out of its 76 DTTs in force in South Africa have a similar
provision.
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government authorities. In a world of limited resources and increasing
complexity, different government authorities should not work in a vacuum
but rather should work together in a ‘whole of government’ approach to
pursue shared objectives.48 Accordingly, the role of national tax
administrations has been elevated, constituting a vital cog in the fight
against illicit financial flows. Tax authorities have moved closer to other
authorities, including customs administration, the Financial Intelligence
Unit (FIU) and law enforcement agencies. The enabling legal instruments
increasingly are present in bilateral or multilateral frameworks to facilitate
the better use of the intelligence received by tax authorities and facilitate
the exploitation of information synergies between different authorities.
The bundling of knowledge with closer cooperation between different
authorities is important to inhibit tax and other serious crimes.49 However,
restrictive confidentiality provisions in EoI instruments are an inhibiting
factor for inter-agency exchange. 
Generally, the confidentiality provisions stipulate that information
received through the information exchange mechanism shall be treated as
secret in the receiving state in the same manner as information obtained
under the domestic laws of that state. Since an absolute prohibition on
disclosure would render the information exchange useless, they mostly
enumerate the persons and authorities to whom the information can be
disclosed and for what purpose, which means mainly that the information
received can only be used for tax purposes.50 However, under such strict
confidentiality rules, if the information obtained through the EoI
framework appears to be valuable to the receiving state for purposes other
than tax and outside the scope of purposes mentioned in the EoI provision,
that state may not use the information for such other purposes. Other
means for those non-fiscal purposes need to be utilised, such as a treaty
concerning judicial assistance. This fragmentation can be impractical and
time-consuming due to the additional procedural layers. Hence, in case the
same set of information on the taxpayer is useful to a third country or for
purposes other than tax, for example to prosecute additional crimes such
as money-laundering, bribery, corruption and terrorism financing, a
certain provision needs to be present in the EoI provision. In order to
48 For more information, see OECD Improving co-operation between tax and anti-money
laundering authorities: Access by tax administrations to information held by financial
intelligence units for criminal and civil purposes (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/crime/
report-improving-cooperation-between-tax-anti-money-laundering-authorities.pdf
(accessed 10 November 2016).
49 This is why, in October 2010, the OECD Council’s Recommendation ‘to facilitate co-
operation between tax and other law enforcement authorities to combat serious
crimes’ included a recommendation to establish ‘an effective legal and administrative
framework and provide guidance to facilitate reporting by tax administrations of
suspicions of serious crimes, including money laundering and terrorism financing,
arising out of the performance of their duties, to the appropriate domestic law
enforcement authorities’. For more information, see OECD (n 49 above). 
50 Para 13, UN Model: Commentry on Article 26 (2011).
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facilitate a broader use of the information, the contracting states need to
include the following sentence:51 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, information received by a contracting state
may be used for other purposes when such information may be used for such
other purposes under the laws of both states and the competent authority of
the supplying state authorises such use. 
The incorporation of this sentence into the EoI provision enables the
pooling of knowledge and skills between different government authorities
to make the fight against financial crimes more effective. Subject to prior
authorisation, it could also enable the transmittal of received information
to a foreign authority, to which the information could be of value.
3.3.4 Gap analysis of Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa
Bilateral framework
All EoI articles in the DTTs of Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa contain
confidentiality provisions. Although there are slight variations in the
wording, these provisions generally contain all the essential aspects of the
international standard on confidentiality, enshrined in article 26(2) of the
OECD/UN Model Tax Convention. The Global Forum on transparency
and exchange of information for tax purposes came to the same conclusion
with regard to the three countries. The respective peer review results
further stated that also the complimentary domestic legislation contains
appropriate confidentiality provisions and enforcement measures.52 In
addition, the de facto practice was assessed, coming to the conclusion that
all three countries in practice also have a comprehensive system of
measures in place to assure confidentiality when processing EoI requests;
there are clear handling and storage security measures; and all personnel
are bound by strict confidentiality rules against any disclosure of
information concerning EoI requests. Further information on the domestic
procedures available can be found in the respective peer review reports.
Whether these confidentiality provisions enable interagency cooperation
was not subject to the peer review reports. 
51 Para 13.3, UN Model: Commentry on Article 26 (2011).
52 Ghana: OECD Global forum on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes
peer reviews: Ghana 2014: Phase 2: Implementation of the standard in practice (2014) 90,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264222878-en (accessed 10 November 2016);
Nigeria: OECD Global forum on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes
peer reviews: Nigeria 2016: Phase 2: Implementation of the standard in practice (2016) 121,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264250857-en (accessed 10 November 2016); South
Africa: OECD Global forum on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes
peer reviews: South Africa 2013: Combined: Phase 1 + Phase 2, incorporating Phase 2 ratings
(2013) 71, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264205901-en (accessed 10 November
2016).
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If one examines the DTTs of Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, they
include the amendment to their confidentiality provision only in very
limited cases (see Chart 6.2). Nigeria has none, whereas Ghana has only
one such provision in the treaty with Denmark. South Africa has three
DTTs in force that include such a provision.53
Chart 6.2: Analysis of treaties regarding the presence of interagency 
cooperation provision
Source: Author’s own analysis of relevant treaties.
Multilateral framework
As already stated, Ghana, South Africa and Nigeria have already signed
the Convention, and it has gone through the required ratification processes
and entered into force.54 Accordingly, by being members of the
Convention, all three countries have extensively expanded their network
of mutual administrative assistance partners through one single legal basis.
Also, the Convention includes confidentiality provisions, which restrict
the purpose for which the information may be used. According to article
22, paragraph 1, any information obtained by a party under the
Convention shall be treated as secret and protected in the same manner as
information obtained under the domestic law of that party. This
corresponds to the secrecy obligation included in article 26 of the OECD/
UN Model. The amended Convention, however, goes further by
stipulating that 
53 The DTTs with Norway, India and Austria.
54 Ghana signed the amended Convention on 10 July 2011 with entry into force on
1 September 2013; South Africa signed the amended Convention on 3 November 2011
with entry into force on 1 March 2014; Nigeria signed the amended Convention on
29 May 2013 with entry into force on 1 September 2015. The list of the participating
countries and the status of the amended Convention can be found at (status
26 September 2016) http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_
of_convention.pdf (accessed 10 October 2016). 
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to the extent needed to ensure the necessary level of protection of personal
data, [any information obtained by a party under the Convention shall be
treated as secret and protected] in accordance with the safeguards which may
be specified by the supplying party as required under its domestic law. 
Furthermore, the exchanged information should ‘be disclosed only to
persons or authorities (including courts and administrative or supervisory
bodies) concerned with the assessment, collection or recovery of, the
enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals
in relation to taxes of that party, or the oversight of the above’ (article 22,
para 2). 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the amended Convention includes
the exception to facilitate inter-agency cooperation and the exchange of
such information to a third state. The amended Convention stipulates that
‘information received by a party may be used for other purposes when such
information may be used for such other purposes under the laws of the
supplying party and the competent authority of that party authorises such
use’. In addition, information received by one party could be transmitted
to a foreign authority, subject to prior authorisation of the initial
information sending party (article 22, para 4). Hence, though the
participation of the three countries in the amended Convention, their
constrained bilateral framework with regard to inter-agency cooperation
was upgraded. However, the effective inter-agency cooperation ultimately
will be dependent on the national law of the countries involved.
Since most of the DTTs of Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa do not
include the amendment to the EoI provision which enlarges the scope for
which information can be used, the fact the amended Convention includes
such a provision by default is a huge advantage. Hence, information
received through the EoI mechanism in the amended Convention can be
shared with other agencies, subject to certain conditions. The final
conditions, however, are determined by domestic law. The effective inter-
agency cooperation ultimately is still dependant on the national law of the
countries involved; an analysis which is outside the scope of this chapter.
4 Cross-border assistance in the collection of taxes
The enhanced global cooperation with regard to transparency helps tax
authorities track and trace foreign assets and determine the correct amount
of tax due at a lower cost. However, since the taxpayers may have their
assets spread throughout the world, the collection of the tax can be
difficult. Because of state sovereignty, tax authorities usually cannot work
beyond their borders to collect taxes. However, based on a bilateral or
multilateral legal framework, foreign tax authorities can assist in the
collection of taxes of the other state. Previously, cross-border tax collection
on the basis of bilateral tax treaties was rarely seen and, when present, only
  Gap analysis of legal instruments framework of Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa    153
in a restricted form of assisting some neighbouring countries with strong
economic and political ties (such as the 1952 Benelux Mutual Assistance
Treaty or the 1972 Nordic Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax
Matters). In 2003, the new optional article (article 27) on assistance in tax
collection was approved by the OECD Council for its inclusion in the
update of the OECD Model Convention. Where contracting parties agree
to help in the collection of taxes levied by the other state, they can include
the article in their treaties. The decision will be based on a number of
factors, including the importance of their cross-border investment;
reciprocity; the ability of their respective administrations to provide such
assistance; and the similarity of the level of their legal standards,
particularly the protection of the legal rights of taxpayers.55 In addition to
the potential recovery of taxes, one should not underestimate the deterrent
effect created through such a provision. In some countries, this deterrent
effect might be even more beneficial than the benefit of the actual tax debts
recovered. So far, of the 222 treaties signed between OECD countries and
developing countries between 2007 and 2012, only 20 treaties included a
provision for assistance in tax collection (between 11 developing countries
and 13 OECD countries).56 Accordingly, these OECD countries have the
legal basis for collecting taxes on behalf of their developing country treaty
partners if requested to do so. They need to take the necessary steps to
recover taxes that are enforceable under the laws of the requesting state
and owned by a person who, at the time, cannot, under the laws of the
requesting state, prevent their collection. Such revenue claims need to be
collected by the requested state in accordance with its tax enforcement and
collection laws as if it were its own revenue claim.57
Accordingly, this possibility potentially can provide developing
countries with a valuable tool to combat international tax evasion and
facilitate the actual payment of taxes legally due by their citizens or
companies. One could also say that it constitutes a very practical way for
OECD countries to provide meaningful assistance to developing countries
in mobilising domestic resources.58 However, since its use is dependent on
the knowledge of developing countries on the location of offshore funds to
be able to request such assistance, the real benefits of such instrument will
truly unfold once the AEOI is in place. 
55 OECD (n 1 above) 66.
56 As above.
57 See art 27 of OECD Model (2014) and UN Model (2011). 
58 As above.
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4.1 Gap analysis of Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa
Bilateral framework
In the treaty networks of Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, a legal basis for
the assistance in the collection of taxes is only scarcely present (see Chart
6.3.) Ghana’s treaties with Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and South
Africa include such a clause; Nigeria has one DTT with France that entails
a legal basis for the cross-border assistance in the collection of taxes. South
Africa’s DTTs with the following countries include a relevant legal basis:
Algeria, Algeria, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Denmark, Ghana, India, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mozambique, Namibia, The Netherlands, Norway, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Uganda, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Chart 6.3: Cross-border assistance in the collection of taxes
Source: Author’s own analysis of relevant treaties.
Multilateral framework
Ghana, South Africa and Nigeria have already signed the Convention, and
it has gone through the required ratification processes and entered into
force. Since the amended Convention includes a legal basis for cross-
border assistance in the collection of taxes, all three countries generally
expanded their network for global tax cooperation partners in this regard.
Article 11, para 1 stipulates that at the request of the applicant state, the
requested state – subject to certain conditions59 – shall take the necessary
59 Eg, the assistance applies only to tax claims that form the subject of an instrument
permitting their enforcement in the applicant state and, unless otherwise agreed
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steps to recover tax claims of the first-mentioned state as if they were its
own tax claims.60
However, as indicated above, the amended Convention does not have
a homogenous application between the different contracting parties. At
signature or upon ratification of the amended Convention, states are free
to declare reservations within stated limits to certain types of
administrative assistance which they will not provide, which includes
assistance in the recovery of tax claims.61 Several contracting parties have
made use of such reservations. Hence, only the states listed in Box 6.3 will
provide this form of assistance either broadly or to certain types of taxes.
Source: Own analysis of the list of reservations, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/
search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/127/declarations (accessed 11 October 2016).
The other states either excluded the application of this provision (as
Nigeria did) or reserved their right to decide not to do so, which results in
an asymmetrical application of the amended Convention. Due to the legal
principle of reciprocity as discussed above, this means that those who
60 between the parties concerned, which are not contested. However, where the claim is
against a person who is not a resident of the applicant state, the assistance in recovery
shall only apply, unless otherwise agreed between the parties concerned, where the
claim may no longer be contested (art. 11, para 2).
60 Except in relation to time-limits which are governed solely by the laws of the applicant
state (art 14) and in relation to priority (art 15).
61 Ch VI, art 30; the list of the reservations at the time of writing can be found at http://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/127/
declarations (accessed 11 October 2016).
Box 6.3: Reservations regarding assistance in the recovery of tax 
claims
Albania; Aruba; Australia; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso*;
Curaçao; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominican Republic*; El Salvador*;
Estonia; Faroe Islands; Finland; France; Gabon*; Georgia; Ghana; Greece;
Greenland; Guatemala*; Hungary; Iceland; India; Italy; Jamaica*; Japan;
Kenya*; Korea; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malaysia*; Malta; Mauritius;
Mexico; Moldova; Monaco*; Morocco*; Nauru; Netherlands; New Zealand;
Niue; Norway; Pakistan*; Philippines*; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San
Marino; Saint Maarten; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sweden; Tunisia;
Turkey*; Turks & Caicos Islands; Uganda; Ukraine; and the United Kingdom.
Notes:
*)     signed but not in force;
**)   signed and entry into force latest by 1 January 2017.
156    Chapter 6
reserved their right not to provide these form of administrative assistance,
will not receive such assistance by other contracting states either.
Irrespective of the outreach of the global cooperation partner in this regard,
the actual benefits of such assistance are still rather limited, since they
presuppose a knowledge of the funds located in a different country. Once
the AEOI is in place, the existence of such knowledge will no longer
constitute an impediment.
Before the AEOI is in place, though, a more effective method of cross-
border assistance in the collection of taxes, based on an alternative path,
could be established. Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa could try to
conclude bilateral agreements with major wealth management centres,
under which a withholding tax is levied at source by the bank, acting as
paying agent.62 The withholding taxes applied should correspond to the
rate of tax in the country of residence of the taxpayer and transferred back
to the state of residence, while preserving the confidentiality of the
taxpayer. This method has already been applied by Switzerland, known as
‘Rubik Agreements’ and offered to Austria and the UK.63 It could be a
valuable tool for developing countries to receive taxes on the wealth held
by their residents in offshore jurisdictions. It preserves confidentiality
while also securing tax compliance. Since it does not presuppose the
burdensome administrative request for information and the existence of
knowledge on offshore funds, such a system would be a workable and
practicable alternative as an interim solution, before the AEOI is in place.
Ghana´s network of global cooperation partner for cross-border
assistance in the collection of taxes covers only three of its major trade
partners, namely, India, France and The Netherlands. With the exception
of the UK and some Caribbean islands, the major wealth management
centres are not included. With regard to Nigeria, due to its reservation, it
will not receive administrative assistance in the cross-border collection of
taxes. It only has one bilateral connection with France, which includes a
legal basis for doing so. South Africa has a more extensive network
available. Some of its major trading partners (the US, Botswana, Japan,
the UK and India) are either bilaterally or multilaterally covered.
However, with the exception of the UK, some Caribbean Islands and the
US, no wealth management centre is included.
Since the benefit of such administrative assistance is dependent on a
knowledge of offshore funds and administrative burdens, the three
countries should try to conclude bilateral agreements with major wealth
management centres on withholding taxes levied at source by paying
agents. This would facilitate tax revenues from the funds located and
62 On this topic, see EB Bonanomi & S Meyer-Nandi, ‘Schweizer Doppelbesteuerungs-
abkommen: Aktuelle Politik und Entwicklungsrelevanz’ Jusletter 30 June 2014.
63 For more information on the Rubik Agreements, see X Oberson International exchange
of information in tax matters: Towards global transparency (2015) 143ff.
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managed in these wealth management centres without the passing of the
foreseeable relevant threshold to receive information. Since some of these
centres already offered such a model to some OECD countries (for
instance Switzerland), which implies that the relevant infrastructure is
already in place and due to the current momentum of sincerely trying to
help developing countries in their revenue generation, there could be
sufficient political willingness of states to offer such interim solution before
the AEOI is a viable instrument for developing counties.
5 Conclusion and Recommendations
Based on the gap analysis above, the following recommendations are
suggested to assist Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa in improving their
benefits from the unprecedented peak in global tax cooperation:
• Participate in pilot programmes for AEOI implementation. Since
transparency is the foundation of all other global tax co-operation
instruments, having the AEOI in place as soon as possible is key to
increase tax compliance.
• Focus on the multilateral framework. The bilateral framework of Ghana,
Nigeria and South Africa either does not cover all relevant trading partners
and wealth management centres, the wording is outdated, or the legal basis
for inter-agency co-operation and the cross-border assistance of taxes is
missing. The necessary renegotiation or conclusion of new bilateral
treaties would be very resource and time-consuming. In light of the fact
that the amended Convention already includes the relevant provisions,
devoting resources into the bilateral framework is not necessary. 
• Reconsider reservation. In the amended Convention, due to the principle
of reciprocity, Nigeria should reconsider its reservation on the cross-border
assistance in the collection of taxes in order to benefit from it.
• Include Hong Kong in the network as a global tax corporation partner.
There should be increased effort to have Hong Kong sign the amended
Convention due to its rising importance in the wealth management centre
landscape.
• Establish a specific procedure for routine exchange of industry know-how
with targeted tax administrations. Since in the interim period before the
AEOI is in place, the EoI upon request is the only instrument to receive
cross-border information and its practical benefits for receiving taxpayer
specific information are limited due to the hurdle of passing the
‘foreseeably relevance’ test, the exchange of information mechanism
should be used to receive more generic industry know-how. Such specific
procedures should be implemented with tax administrations, having
extensive industry exposure and know-how, such as the UK, The
Netherlands and Switzerland. 
• Conclude bilateral paying agent withholding tax agreements with wealth
management centres under which a withholding tax is levied on passive
income at source by the bank located in the wealth management centre.
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Examples already exist between OECD countries. Such agreements can be
used as an interim solution before the AEOI. 
Appendix: Wording of art 26 of the UN Model (2011) and the 
OECD Model (2014)
The wording of Article 26 is as follows (the underlined text can only be
found in the Article 26 of the UN Model (2011) and the bold text in the
OECD Model (2014)):
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange
such information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the
provisions of this Convention or to the administration or enforcement of
the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes of
every kind and description imposed on behalf of the Contracting
States, or of their political subdivisions or local authorities, insofar
as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. In
particular, information shall be exchanged that would be helpful to
a Contracting State in preventing avoidance or evasion of such
taxes. The exchange of information is not restricted by Articles 1
and 2. 
2. Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting State
shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information
obtained under the domestic laws of that State and it shall be
disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and
administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection
of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the
determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes referred to in
paragraph 1, or the oversight of the above. Such persons or
authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They
may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in
judicial decisions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, information
received by a Contracting State may be used for other purposes
when such information may be used for such other purposes
under the laws of both States and the competent authority of the
supplying State authorises such use.
3. In no case shall the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 be construed
so as to impose on a Contracting State the obligation: 
(a) To carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State; 
(b) To supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the
normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting
State;
(c) To supply information which would disclose any trade, business,
industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process, or
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information, the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy
(ordre public). 
4. If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance
with this Article, the other Contracting State shall use its
information gathering measures to obtain the requested
information, even though that other State may not need such
information for its own tax purposes. The obligation contained in
the preceding sentence is subject to the limitations of paragraph 3
but in no case shall such limitations be construed to permit a
Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because it
has no domestic interest in such information. 
5. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to permit
a Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because
the information is held by a bank, other financial institution,
nominee or person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity or
because it relates to ownership interests in a person. 
6. The competent authorities shall, through consultation, develop
appropriate methods and techniques concerning the matters in
respect of which exchanges of information under paragraph 1 shall
be made. 
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Maryte Somare
Abstract
The misuse of legal vehicles by individuals is a common technique used for
abusive or criminal tax non-compliance and money laundering. For a long
time information on the natural persons, who are ultimate beneficiaries of
corporate vehicles or legal arrangements, was not readily accessible to tax
administrations. This was due to the fact that the Commentary on the
Model OECD Convention until 2005 was not explicit as to whether the
exchange of information clause may be relied upon by the tax authorities to
obtain ownership information in the cross-border context. Furthermore,
until 2014 there was no internationally agreed standard concerning the
requirement for financial institutions to engage in customer due diligence
procedures for tax purposes. After a series of political priorities arising in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis, access for tax authorities to
information on the ultimate owners or controlling persons of legal vehicles
in the framework of cross-border administrative assistance in tax matters has
become an internationally agreed standard. This contribution provides a
short chronology of policy developments leading to the acceptance of the
concept of anti-money-laundering beneficial ownership in the field of
taxation, and presents the extent of the scope to which this concept has been
included in the instruments for cross-border administrative assistance in tax
matters. 
1 Misuse of corporate vehicles as a prerequisite for 
successful money laundering and tax non-
compliance 
The use of legal vehicles is a technique commonly used for both tax non-
compliance and money-laundering practices. Legal vehicles allow for the
achievement of a high degree of anonymity, particularly in cases where
more than one layer in different jurisdictions is interposed between the
beneficial owner and a country where illicit financial flows originate. The
authorities seeking to establish the trail of illicit financial flows generally
would face legal and administrative obstacles in obtaining adequate
7CHAPTE
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information from the other jurisdictions. Legal vehicles often are used not
only for illegal, but also for abusive tax practices, such as treaty shopping
or the diversion of taxable revenues to low-tax jurisdictions. Not knowing
who the ultimate beneficial owners of legal vehicles are makes the efficient
diagnosis of criminal or abusive tax practices literally impossible. 
2 Beneficial ownership concept under the anti-
money-laundering framework
The identification and verification of beneficial ownership is an inherent
feature of the customer due diligence process under the anti-money-
laundering framework. The obligation to identify beneficial owners under
this framework is deferred to the obliged entities.1 National frameworks
prescribing know-your-customer and customer due diligence procedures
closely follow the international standard developed by the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF),2 which is set out in the document called
International standards on combating money laundering (FATF
Recommendations).3 Although the FATF Recommendations are a soft law
instrument, their acceptance was ensured by means of a mutual evaluation
process.4 
1 The notion ‘obliged entity’ includes credit and financial institutions, as well as
designated non-financial businesses and professions as defined in the 40
Recommendations (2012) (see 113-114).
2 The FATF was constituted on a decision of G7 due to the growing concerns over the
threats posed by international money-laundering practices. Initially, the FATF had 11
members and was set up for one year. The original members of the FATF were
Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European
Commission. The FATF mandate gradually was extended and the number of its
members grew consistently to the current 36 members. Additionally, the FATF counts
22 observers and eight FATF-style regional bodies which allow for extensive
geographical representation. All in all, the FATF AML regime is estimated to have
been adopted by more than 180 jurisdictions. E Tsingou ‘Money laundering’ in
D Mügge (ed) Europe and the governance of global finance (2014) 143.  
3 The first version of the FATF Recommendations is available online at http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommen
dations%201990.pdf (accessed 14 June 2016). For a comprehensive overview of the
development of FATF activities, refer to the FATF Report ‘25 years and beyond’ 2014,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/brochuresannualreports/FATF%20
25% 20years.pdf (accessed 14 June 2016). The FATF Recommendations are from time
to time reviewed to ensure that they provide adequate measures to catch up with
changing facets of money laundering and include new global threats, eg terrorism,
which can be countered through the anti-money-laundering framework.
4 The first mutual evaluation round was started in 1992 and ended in 1995. In 2016 the
FATF launched the 4th round of mutual evaluations. The mutual evaluations are
carried out by FATF expert groups or by the FATF-style regional bodies on the basis of
methodology developed by the FATF. Countries of which the legal systems exhibit
substantial non-compliance with the FATF Recommendations are put on the periodic
supervision process, which generally has proved to be an efficient measure in achieving
the change of national laws and bringing national anti-money-laundering systems to
substantial compliance with the international standard. For a detailed consideration of
the effects of mutual evaluations, see eg KL Gardner ‘Fighting terrorism the FATF
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The FATF Recommendations provide the following definition of a
beneficial owner:5 
Beneficial owner refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or
controls a customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction
is being conducted. It also includes those persons who exercise ultimate
effective control over a legal person or arrangement.
The scope of beneficial owner identification and verification procedures
varies depending on whether the business relationship has been entered
into with a legal person or a legal arrangement, for instance a trust,
foundation or such like. 
Where a business relationship is entered into with a legal person6 the
beneficial owner should include at least
• natural persons who ultimately have a controlling ownership interest in a
legal person; and 
• to the extent that there is doubt after identifying natural persons with a
controlling ownership interest as to whether they are the beneficial
owner(s) or where no natural person exerts control through ownership
interests, the identity of the natural persons (if any) exercising control of
the legal person or arrangement through other means;
• where no natural person is identified, then person holding the position of
senior managing official.
As far as access to the beneficial ownership information of legal persons is
concerned, the FATF Recommendations do not prescribe any mandatory
mechanisms, but recommend several alternatives such as the availability of
information at the level of legal entities, beneficial ownership register or a
combination of different databases already available in a jurisdiction.7
For legal arrangements,8 ‘beneficial owner’ must include at least the
following persons: (i) the settlor; (ii) the trustee(s); (iii) the protector; (iv)
the beneficiaries or classes of beneficiaries; and (v) any other natural
person exercising ultimate control over the legal arrangement by reason of
direct or indirect ownership or by any other means. The recommended
mechanisms for the availability of beneficial ownership information for
legal arrangements include registries; the keeping of information by any of
the competent authorities; or subjecting service providers to keep such
information. 9 
4 way’ (2007) 13 Global governance: A review of multilateralism and international organizations
325-345; R Sansonetti ‘The mutual evaluation process: A methodology of increasing
importance at international level’ (2000) 7 Journal of Financial Crime 218-226. 
5 FATF Forty Recommendations (2012) 110.
6 Interpretative note to Recommendation 10. 
7 Interpretative note to Recommendation 24. 
8 Interpretative note to Recommendation 10. 
9 Interpretative note to Recommendation 25.
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3 Triggers for the adoption of the money-
laundering beneficial ownership concept in the 
tax transparency framework
The financial crisis of 1998 had already prompted the debate on the misuse
of corporate vehicles for money-laundering and tax non-compliance
purposes. Another financial crisis in 2008 was necessary to relaunch the
debate which has successfully materialised into the nearly global
consensus on a set of tax transparency measures also accepted by off-shore
financial centres. 
The origins of international efforts on beneficial ownership
transparency in the tax field could be traced back to 2000, when the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was
tasked by the Financial Stability Forum to make a detailed enquiry into the
ways in which legal vehicles commonly are misused for illicit purposes.
The OECD released its report in 2001 under the title ‘Behind corporate
veil. Using corporate entities for illicit purposes’. This study had a two-fold
purpose: on the one hand, to contribute to the efforts of the OECD in its
work on harmful tax practices and, on the other, to provide the FATF with
insights for the planned review of its Forty Recommendations. 
In 2003 the FATF was the first international body to develop the
international beneficial owner standard and to achieve its nearly global
implementation by means of periodic mutual evaluations. Nearly a decade
later, the beneficial ownership concept, developed under the anti-money-
laundering framework, was imported into several initiatives and legal
instruments concerning international tax transparency and administrative
assistance between competent tax authorities. In 2005 the Committee of
Fiscal Affairs agreed to include an explicit clarification in the Commentary
to article 26 of the OECD Model Convention (OECD MC) that the
competent tax authorities may not refuse to exchange information where
a request concerns ownership information. The Common Reporting
Standard released by the OECD in 2014 adopted a ‘look-through’
approach for financial accounts held by passive non-financial entities,
which requires the identification of natural persons standing at the end of
the ownership chain and having control over such entities. In the first
round of peer reviews, the Global Forum assessed whether jurisdictions
under their laws required ownership information to be available and
accessible to the competent tax authorities. In the second round of peer
reviews planned for 2016-2020, particular attention, in fact, will be placed
on the availability of beneficial ownership information. As a result, today
the ownership transparency is profoundly enrooted in the international tax
transparency agenda. 
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4 Exchange of ownership information under article 
26 of the OECD MC 
Article 26 of the OECD MC is recognised as constituting an international
standard on administrative cooperation in the form of the exchange of
information between the tax authorities of the treaty partners. The main
provision determining the scope of information exchange, to be found in
article 26(1), provides:10 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such
information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of this
Convention or to the administration or enforcement of the domestic laws concerning
taxes of every kind … 
This provision delimits the scope of obligation to exchange information by
clarifying that the information requested must satisfy the standard of
foreseeable relevance either for the purposes of domestic tax laws or for the
purposes of the correct application of the Convention. 
In the past it was not clear whether a request for ownership
information submitted on the basis of article 26 of the treaty would be the
standard of ‘foreseeable relevance’. In 2005 the OECD included paragraph
5 to article 26 in its MC in order to clarify that the exchange of information
may not be refused solely because of the fact that it concerns information
on ownership interest in a person and that such information would
constitute a variation to the laws and administrative practices of the
requested state,11 or would not be obtainable under the laws or in the
normal course of the administration in the requested state.12 However, it
was not clarified whether the term ‘ownership’ was intended to include
only the immediate shareholder of a legal person or whether it should be
interpreted broadly to comprise also the ultimate beneficial owner. 
In the view of the OECD’s work on misuse of corporate vehicles, it is
plausible to expect that a broad interpretation of this term was intended. A
broad interpretation seems to also be supported by the example (g)
provided in paragraph 8 in the Commentary to article 26(1) of the OECD
MC (see Figure 7.1). This example describes a situation where the
competent authority of state A wishes to determine whether the directors
of company A also have a direct or indirect ownership interest in company
B, which is a shareholder of company A. Should this be the case, state A
intends to apply its CFC legislation and would tax dividends paid to
company B by company A as income of the individuals X, Y and Z, all
three of them being residents of state A. 
10 Art 26(1) OECD MC 2014 (my emphasis).
11 Art 26(3)(a) OECD MC 2014.
12 Art 26(3)(b) OECD MC 2014.
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The Commentary clarifies that information on direct or indirect
ownership may be requested and, accordingly, the exchange of
information may not be refused. Where information on ultimate owners is
not available, at least information on shareholders should be provided so
that the requesting state may continue its investigation. Additionally, it is
also clarified that before refusing the exchange of information due to a lack
of ‘foreseeable relevance’, the requested authority should consult the
requesting authority and seek more information. 
Figure 7.1: Example (g) of the OECD MC 2014 Commentary to article 
26 
 
The OECD has consistently aligned its Tax Information Exchange
Agreement13 and the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative
13 The Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement (2005) is much more explicit and
detailed if compared to art 26(5) as far as the exchange of ownership information is
concerned. Art 5(4) provides that ‘[e]ach Contracting Party shall ensure that its
competent authorities for the purposes specified in Article 1 of the Agreement, have
the authority to obtain and provide upon request: (a) information held by banks, other
financial institutions, and any person acting in an agency or fiduciary capacity
including nominees and trustees; (b) information regarding the ownership of
companies, partnerships, trusts, foundations, Anstalten and other persons, including,
within the constraints of Article 2, ownership information on all such persons in an
ownership chain; in the case of trusts, information on settlors, trustees and
beneficiaries; and in the case of foundations, information on founders, members of the
foundation council and beneficiaries. Further, this Agreement does not create an
obligation on the Contracting Parties to obtain or provide ownership information with
respect to publicly traded companies or public collective investment funds or schemes
unless such information can be obtained without giving rise to disproportionate
difficulties.’
168    Chapter 7
Assistance in Tax Matters (Multilateral Convention)14 with article 26 of
the OECD MC. Accordingly, any of these instruments may be used by the
tax authorities that have an interest in discovering the beneficial owners of
the foreign entities. Similarly, as in the case of article 26 of the OECD MC,
the standard of ‘foreseeable relevance’ must be satisfied also when an
information exchange request is made on the basis of these two
instruments. 
5 Common reporting standard 
In 2014 at the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Brisbane, the OECD presented its
Global Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account
Information (Global Standard). The Global Standard consists of two
essential elements: the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) and the
Competent Authority Agreement (CAA). The CRS sets the scope of,
amongst others, customer due diligence and reportable accounts, and the
CAA is an agreement between tax authorities which sets out the terms
under which the automatic exchange of financial account information
should take place.15 
The due diligence procedures provided by the CRS are designed to
identify natural persons having effective control over financial accounts
opened at the financial institutions in jurisdictions where the controlling
persons are not resident for tax purposes. Therefore, not only accounts
held directly by natural persons but also accounts held indirectly through
passive entities generally will be subject to reporting under the CRS. The
CRS defines the term ‘entity’ in a broad sense to encompass not only
companies but also partnerships, limited liability partnerships and legal
arrangements such as trusts or foundations.16 
In the process of identifying reportable accounts, financial institutions
must differentiate between accounts held by active non-financial entities
(active NFEs)17 and accounts held by passive non-financial entities
(passive NFEs).18 For a series of NFEs that are unlikely to be misused for
tax non-compliance purposes by individuals, exclusion rules have been
14 Art 21(4) Multilateral Convention. OECD and Council of Europe The Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters: Amended by the 2010
Protocol (2011) http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115606-en (accessed 14 June
2016). 
15 There must be a legal basis between the two jurisdictions for the automatic exchange of
information in tax matters.
16 For a definition of the term ‘entity’, see CRS, sec VIII, E(3).
17 For a definition of the term ‘active NFE’, see CRS, sec VIII, D(9).
18 For a definition of the term ‘passive NFE’, see CRS, sec VIII, D(8).
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provided. This particularly concerns entities that derive more than 50 per
cent of their gross income from active income sources;19 entities listed on
recognised stock exchanges; financing or holding entities of the groups
transacting only with group members; and entities established for
charitable and non-profit purposes without clauses in their charters
allowing for distributions to natural persons.20
Where a financial account is held by a passive NFE, a ‘look-through’
approach21 must be applied to identify whether there are any controlling
persons who are also reportable persons for the purposes of the CRS.22
Where controlling persons are resident in jurisdictions that have
committed to adhere to the Global Standard, the financial account must be
classified as reportable and financial information on reportable accounts
will be exchanged23 with the tax authorities where the controlling persons
are resident for tax purposes. 
The CRS defines the term ‘controlling persons’ as ‘the natural persons
who exercise control over an entity’,24 and clarifies that the term
‘controlling persons’ should be interpreted in a way consistent with
interpretation of the ‘beneficial owner’,25 as provided for in the FATF
Recommendations.26 The interpretative guidance to the term is provided
in the Commentary to the CRS, whereas the term ‘controlling person’
always should be interpreted in a way consistent with Recommendation 10
‘Customer Due Diligence’ and its Interpretative Note.27 
19 The OECD CRS Commentary on sec VIII at para 126 provides that the term ‘passive
income’ should be interpreted in accordance with the rules of the reporting jurisdiction
and provides the following non-exhaustive list of possible types of passive income:
dividends; interest; income equivalent to interest; rents and royalties other than rents
and royalties derived in the active conduct of a business conducted, at least in part, by
employees of the NFE; annuities; the excess of gains over losses from the sale or
exchange of financial assets giving rise to the passive income described previously; the
excess of gains over losses from transactions (including futures, forwards, options, and
similar transactions) in any financial assets; the excess of foreign currency gains over
foreign currency losses; net income from swaps; or amounts received under cash value
insurance contracts. However, the term ‘passive income’ should not include, in the
case of a NFE that regularly acts as a dealer in financial assets, any income from any
transaction entered into in the ordinary course of such dealer’s business as such a
dealer. However, the OECD CRS does not clarify what types of income should be
considered active for entity classification purposes. 
20 For a complete list, see CRS, sec VIII, D(9).  
21 Each of the interposed passive NFEs have to be ‘looked through’ until it is possible to
determine who is a natural person controlling the passive NFE or that there are no
controlling persons at the end of the control chain.
22 CRS, sec VI, A(2).
23 The reporting financial institutions have to transmit information to their domestic tax
authorities which will then exchange information with tax authorities of jurisdictions
participating in the CRS. 
24 CRS, sec VIII, D(6).
25 CRS, sec VIII, D(6), last sentence.
26 CRS Commentary on sec VIII, para 132. 
27 CRS, sec VIII, D(6).
170    Chapter 7
In the case where a financial account is held by a legal person, the
notion of ‘control’ should correspond to controlling ownership with an
ownership interest equal to or exceeding 25 per cent. When no natural
persons hold the controlling ownership interest in an entity due to diluted
shareholding, it subsequently becomes necessary to determine whether
there are any natural persons who exercise control through any other
means.28 Where no such natural person is identified, then, for the purposes
of the CRS, a controlling person should be a natural person who holds the
position of senior management official.29  
If a passive NFE concerned is a trust or an entity functionally similar
to a trust (for instance, a foundation), the reporting financial institution is
explicitly required to treat the settlor(s); the trustee(s); the protector(s) (if
any); the beneficiary(ies); and class(es) of beneficiaries as ‘controlling
persons’.30 As this is a specific requirement, the determination of effective
control over a trust or any other functionally similar arrangement is not
necessary. In addition, any other natural person exercising ultimate
control over the trust (or any other functionally similar arrangement)
should be considered as a ‘controlling person’. 
In the process of due diligence for CRS purposes, the reporting
financial institutions may be permitted to rely on information collected
and maintained pursuant to anti-money-laundering know-your-customer
procedures provided that such procedures are consistent with
Recommendations 10, 24 and 25 of the FATF Recommendations
(2012).31 Such requirement provides for a motivation for jurisdictions to
closely follow the FATF customer due diligence standard. 
By transposing FATF’s beneficial owner concept in the Global
Standard, the OECD has expanded the scope of its application. Whereas
the anti-money-laundering framework covers only the criminal dimension
of tax non-compliance, the OECD’s CRS has the aim also of improving
tax compliance in general and counter the abuse of the tax system. 
6 Peer reviews and availability of ownership 
information
The origins of the OECD’s initiative to enhance international tax
transparency may be traced back to its initiative against harmful tax
competition launched at the end of the 1990s. A Forum on Harmful Tax
Practices was established to identify tax havens and jurisdictions with
preferential tax regimes on the basis of criteria identified in the 1998 Report
28 No clarification is provided for the term ‘any other means’.
29 CRS Commentary on sec VIII, para 133.
30 CRS Commentary on sec VIII, para 134.
31 CRS Commentary on sec VIII, para 137.
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‘Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue’.32 Next to the
criteria concerning specific substantive tax system elements, the lack of the
effective exchange of information and lack of transparency were named
among the four main criteria that would warrant a jurisdiction to be placed
on a ‘black list’. As a result of this campaign against harmful tax
competition, the black-listed jurisdictions largely had adhered to the
demands of the OECD and had adapted their legal systems by (partly or
fully) eliminating the elements of harmful tax competition. 
The financial crisis of 2008 acted as a necessary trigger to expand the
tax transparency initiatives beyond financial centres and cause this
standard to be a must for any jurisdiction. For this purpose, the OECD’s
Global Forum on Taxation was restructured in 2009 into the Global
Forum for Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes (Global Forum) and opened to all jurisdictions.33 The Global
Forum had enhanced the tax transparency standard and launched the two-
phase peer review process to ensure the adherence to and effective
implementation of this standard by relevant jurisdictions.34 Phase 1 sought
to determine whether information that may be necessary for tax
assessment or enforcement purposes were collected, could be made
available to competent authorities, and whether there was a sufficiently
broad network of information exchange instruments entered into by a
jurisdiction under review (see Figure 7.2). The jurisdictions were also
reviewed in respect of their ability to exchange ownership information in a
cross-border context.35 
32 In the 1998 Report ‘Harmful tax competition: An emerging global issue’ OECD
identified that the main features of tax havens are (i) no or only nominal taxes; (ii) a
lack of an effective exchange of information; (iii) a lack of transparency; and (iv) no
substantial activities (see 23). Additionally, factors identifying harmful preferential tax
regimes were provided. These are low or zero effective tax rates on the relevant
income; the availability of ‘ring-fencing’ provisions banning from the preferential tax
treatment income derived domestically; the operation of the regime in a non-
transparent manner; and no effective exchange of information with other states by the
jurisdiction operating regime (see 27).
33 Although the OECD peer review process was launched in 2009, the Global Forum,
albeit under a different name and with different functions, has existed from the
beginning of 2000. Initially having its membership limited to OECD member states,
the Global Forum has become an open platform for the states sustaining the values
prophesied by it. The mandate of the Global Forum has developed from the strict
focus on the policing tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes to spreading the
culture of jurisdictional transparency through voluntary compliance with a global
standard of tax transparency and exchange of information.
34 For the methodology of peer reviews, see Global Forum ‘Revisited methodology for
peer-reviews and non-member reviews’ (2013) http://www.eoi-tax.org/keydocs/
3a4dca676433deb37b910032fa0848ba#default (accessed 14 June 2016). 
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Figure 7.2: Phase 1 assessment indicators 
Source: Peer Review Methodology, Global Forum
Ownership information in the context of peer reviews was to be
understood broadly and, therefore, not limited to information on
shareholders or legal owners, but also including effective owners of legal
entities. The peer review methodology explicitly provided that for all
companies and bodies corporate ‘[o]wners include legal owners and, in
any case, where a legal owner acts on behalf of any other person as a
nominee or under a similar arrangement, that other person, as well as
persons in an ownership chain’.36 This requirement is similar to what is
required from financial institutions (and other persons) in the customer
due diligence process under FATF standards.37
The Global Forum provided that the availability of ownership
information in jurisdictions should be ensured for a broad range of legal
arrangements and should not be limited to companies and, therefore,
should also extend to
• foundations, Anstalts and any similar structures;
• partnerships or other bodies of persons;
• trusts or similar arrangements; 
• collective investment funds or schemes;
• any persons holding assets in a fiduciary capacity; and 
35 The Peer Review Methodology provides that ‘[e]ffective exchange of information
requires the availability of reliable information. In particular, it requires information
on the identity of owners and other stakeholders as well as information on the
transactions carried out by entities and other organisational structures. Such
information may be kept for tax, regulatory, commercial or other reasons. If such
information is not kept or the information is not maintained for a reasonable period of
time, a jurisdiction’s competent authority may not be able to obtain and provide it
when requested.’ OECD Implementing the tax transparency standards: A handbook for
assessors and jurisdictions (2011) 23 24-26, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264110496-
en (accessed 14 June 2016). 
36 OECD (n 35 above) 24. 
37 OECD 27. 
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• any other entities or arrangements deemed relevant in the case of the
specific jurisdiction.38
Additional clarifications concerning the scope of ownership information
were made in respect of partnerships, trusts and foundations.39
Jurisdictions that under their laws allow partnerships were also assessed in
respect of their ability to access information on the identities of the partners
in any partnership that (i) has income, deductions or credits for tax
purposes in the jurisdiction; (ii) carries on business in the jurisdiction; or
(iii) is a limited partnership formed under the laws of that jurisdiction. 
Jurisdictions that provide for possibilities to set up trusts were checked
against their ability to ensure that information is available to their
competent authorities that identifies the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries of
express trusts (i) created under the laws of that jurisdiction; (ii) administer-
ed in that jurisdiction; or (iii) in respect of which a trustee is resident in that
jurisdiction. Finally, jurisdictions that allow for the establishment of
foundations were checked against their ability to ensure that information
is available to their competent authorities for foundations formed under
those laws to identify the founders, members of the foundation council and
beneficiaries (where applicable), as well as any other persons with the
authority to represent the foundation.
The peer review methodology did not require jurisdictions to have any
specific mechanisms, such as beneficial ownership registers, to ensure the
availability of ownership information. The methodology required that
beneficial ownership information is available at least at the level of
financial institutions or other intermediaries. Should beneficial ownership
information be relevant to respond to a request for information received
under exchange of information instrument, the competent tax authorities
should have access to such information.40 The standard required that any
national legal secrecy provisions are relinquished when ownership
information is requested in the context of an exchange of cross-border tax
information.41 It is important to highlight that jurisdictions would also be
expected to exchange information on any entities in the ownership chain,
as long as information on such entities is in the possession or control of
persons within the jurisdiction’s territorial jurisdiction.42 
The move to phase 2 was conditional on the successful completion of
phase 1. Where the assessors determined that some of the essential
elements were absent, the jurisdictions under review were asked to adapt
their legal and regulatory frameworks to eliminate the highlighted
deficiencies. In phase 2, jurisdictions that had practical experience in
38 OECD 24.
39 As above.
40 OECD (n 35 above) 27. 
41 As above.
42 As above.
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exchanging information with the jurisdiction under review were asked to
provide information and statistics on the efficiency of such cross-border
administrative cooperation. As a result of phase 2, reviewed jurisdictions
were rated as compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant or non-
compliant.43 
Jurisdictions reviewed in the first round of peer reviews most
frequently were found not to be able to completely satisfy the standard on
availability of ownership information. This element was a reason to
provide jurisdictions not commonly referred to as offshore financial
centres with a ‘largely-compliant’ rating. This, for example, occurred in the
cases of Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel,
The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, the Slovak
Republic, the UK and the US, which received the same rating as
jurisdictions widely known as financial centres, such as Aruba, the
Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Liechtenstein,
Niue, St Kitts and Nevis, the Seychelles, and others.   
In the second round of peer reviews, which are to be undertaken
during 2016 to 2020, new and already-reviewed jurisdictions will be
assessed as to the progress made in implementing the standard for
exchange of information on request. In this round of reviews, the Global
Forum will be focusing, among other matters, on the availability of
ownership information. The new methodology explicitly provides that in
order to 
ensure a level playing field and to respond to the G20’s call to draw on the
work of the FATF on beneficial ownership, the Global Forum strengthened its
EOIR44 standard for its second round of review by introducing the FATF
concept of beneficial ownership in its assessments …45 
In line with this statement, the Global Forum also changed the language
in the methodology and no longer refers to ‘ownership information’, but
rather to the term ‘legal and beneficial owners’ with direct reference to the
definition of ‘beneficial owner’ as provided in the FATF
Recommendations (2012).46 It furthermore is extensively emphasised that
the jurisdictions will be assessed also with respect to the availability of
beneficial owner information concerning companies and other bodies
corporate incorporated elsewhere, but having a substantial economic
nexus with the jurisdiction under review. Such nexus would be constituted
by, for example, tax residence or headquarters.47
43 Ratings of the jurisdictions reviewed by Global Forum are available at http://
www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/exchange-of-information-on-request/ratings/
#d.en.342263 (accessed 14 June 2016). 
44 Exchange of information on request.
45 Global Forum Exchange of information on request. Handbook for peer reviews 2016-2020
(2016) 9-10. 
46 Global Forum (n 45 above) 19.
47 As above.
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The Global Forum also acknowledged that its 
standard-setting and evaluation closely relates to areas covered by other
international bodies, and in particular the FATF, the principles developed by
the FATF may be taken into consideration to interpret and apply the standard
where appropriate.48 
Accordingly, it may be expected that in the future the synergies between
the tax transparency and financial transparency frameworks will be
strengthened. 
7 Concluding remarks
The lack of beneficial ownership transparency has been recognised as
constituting one of the major factors contributing to the misuse of
corporate vehicles for both tax non-compliance and money-laundering
practices. The foregoing discussion clearly has demonstrated that the
agendas of the OECD and the Global Forum in countering the misuse of
the legal vehicles increasingly intertwine with the principles of the anti-
money-laundering framework shaped by the FATF. This trend acquired
momentum after the last financial crisis when the peer review process
launched by the Global Forum included in the methodology requirement
that beneficial ownership information is available and accessible for tax
purposes in the reviewed jurisdictions. The availability of beneficial
ownership information remains a priority focus of the second round of
peer reviews which commenced in 2016 and will continue until 2020. 
Whereas the peer review process assessed the availability of beneficial
ownership information on an on-request basis, the OECD’s CRS was
designed to provide on automatic basis information on the controlling
persons of the financial accounts to the jurisdictions where such persons
are resident for tax purposes. Today more than 100 jurisdictions have
committed to adhere to the Global Standard which may be said to be a
manifestation of the first exchange of beneficial ownership information
instigated for tax reasons. 
48 Global Forum (n 45 above) 29.
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Abstract
Technological advances can transform the environment in which
governments enforce compliance with tax legislation and collect tax
revenues. This includes the emergence and rise of mobile money payments,
which have been changing the financial landscape in Africa since the launch
of the mobile money transfer platform, M-Pesa, in Kenya in 2007. The
emergence of this payment platform may present unique opportunities for
driving tax compliance and tax investigations. This article is aimed at
stimulating debate on how this emerging platform can be used for providing
additional information to be used by the tax administration. It uses Kenya
as a case study and highlights how these platforms can provide additional
information that can be used for tracking and monitoring tax payers’
activities, to enable tax administrations to determine whether tax payers’
declarations in their tax returns reflect their economic activities. The article
also highlights how it can provide information on individuals and businesses
that, by the nature of their activities, ought to be included in the tax base,
and also to provide information for identifying individuals and businesses
that do not file tax returns despite being economically active. The article
also highlights that the real-time data that could be made available to tax
administrations could be useful for compliance monitoring, and provide a
more reliable audit trail and, finally, the potential challenges.
1 Introduction
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the overriding objective of tax administration is to
minimise revenue losses due to non-compliance with tax laws.
Compliance with tax laws is not limited to filing tax returns. This covers
a broader range of processes which often takes place outside the view and
8CHAPTE
R TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE TAX
INVESTIGATIONS WITH THE RISE
OF MOBILE MONEY PAYMENTS
* The author would especially like to thank Jonathan Leigh-Pemberton for the
constructive and thoughtful comments.
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control of a tax administration.1 It also notes that the advancement of
technology increasingly has led tax administrations to utilise technological
developments to enhance tax compliance.2 Using Kenya as a case study,
the article examines the emergence of the mobile payments platform and
how revenue bodies can tap into it to enhance tax compliance. 
It is structured as follows: I first examine the emergence of mobile
money payment platforms, and then highlight the challenges posed by tax
administrations, particularly in the informal sector and small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). I then turn my attention to tax compliance strategies
adopted by tax administrations, as proposed by the OECD, and how these
have over time evolved, particularly dealing with the increasing adoption
of technology by businesses. I then look at how the emergence of mobile
money payment platforms presents a unique opportunity to tax
administration for tax investigations and enhancing compliance with a
case study of Kenya. Finally I highlight the potential challenges.
2 Background 
Mobile money payment platforms have been changing the financial
landscape in Africa since the launch of the M-Pesa in Kenya in March
2007.3 However, following the launch of M-Pesa, other mobile money
platforms, such as Airtel money, Orange Money, Equitel, Mobikash and
Tangaza have also emerged to provide robust payment platforms. Adapted
from pesa, the Swahili word for money, and an abbreviation of ‘M’ for
mobile, it translates to mobile money. M-Pesa allows for easy transfer of
money between registered users, whether individuals or businesses,
without using the traditional banking channels. It allows any person
registered on the platform to do almost everything, from paying for routine
grocery shopping to settling utility bills to paying their doctors’ bills.4  
The main effect of M-Pesa, and similar mobile money transfer
platforms in Kenya, is financial sector deepening: Groups that hitherto had
limited access to formal financial services have benefited from the financial
products offered through M-Pesa. Of special interest, M-Pesa has
empowered business creation as many individuals and small companies
1 OECD Right from the start: Influencing the compliance environment for small and medium
enterprises (2012) 3. 
2 As above.
3 J Bright ‘A brief overview of Africa’s tech industry and 7 predictions for its future.
World Economic Forum’ https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/a-brief-
history-of-africa-s-tech-industry-and-7-predictions-for-its-future (accessed 14
December 2017).
4 M-Pesa and the secret of mobile payments (February 2015) https://
www.pymnts.com/in-depth/2015/m-pesa-and-the-secret-of-mobile-payments/
(accessed 13 June 2016).  
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now rely on M-Pesa for nearly all transactions, or provide services
underpinned on the M-Pesa platform.5
Over time, M-PESA has evolved from a money transfer service to a
robust payment platform and driver of financial inclusion for Kenyans.
According to Safaricom, it has grown to incorporate over 19 million
customers, of which 13 million are active and supported by a nationwide
agent network of 81 025 outlets. The key M-Pesa services include Lipa na
M-Pesa (pay using M-Pesa); Lipa Kodi (paying property rent using
M-Pesa); salary disbursements; utility payments (for example water and
electricity); airtime purchase; M-Shwari (a bank account pinned on an
M-Pesa account); linkages to a bank account to facilitate deposits into and
transfers from the bank account without visiting the bank or using an
automated teller machine; and cashless distribution for companies such as
Coca Cola; Unilever; East African Breweries Ltd; British American
Tobacco; Nairobi Bottlers; Nation Media; and the Standard Group.6
Lipa na M-Pesa promotes the use of M-Pesa as a primary tool for
payment collection and is part of the broader M-Pesa initiative to convert
Kenya to a cashless or cash-lite economy (utilising electronic payments
rather than cash). It enables individuals as well as companies to effortlessly
collect and manage cashless payments from M-Pesa’s significant customer
base.7 It also facilitates trade between businesses and their customers while
improving business efficiency. As at December 2014, there were 122 000
merchants on Lipa na M-Pesa of which 24 137 were active. Further, as at
December 2014, M-Shwari’ had 3,6 million active customers with Kshs 4.0
billion in deposit and Kshs 1.2 billion worth of loans issued per month with
non-performing loans (NPLs) at 2,7 per cent.8 Over and above providing
SMEs with a formal electronic payment collection service, the other key
benefits of Lipa na M-Pesa include enhancing record keeping as every
transaction made is readily accessible via till statements. M-Pesa is also
already integrated with 37 financial institutions.9
However, can the data underlying the M-Pesa transactions be useful to
tax administrations to facilitate tax compliance and tax investigations?
Before that question is answered, it is necessary to first consider the tax
compliance challenges of SMEs and the informal economy that are
prevalent in developing countries such as Kenya.
5 D Runde ‘M-Pesa and the rise of the global mobile money market 12 August 2015
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielrunde/2015/08/12/m-pesa-and-the-rise-of-the-
global-mobile-money-market/#4e82e32423f5 (accessed 13 June 2016). 
6 Safaricom Limited Annual Report 2014 42.
7 Safaricom Limited Annual Report 2014 19 43.
8 Safaricom Limited Annual Report 2014 19.
9 Safaricom Limited Annual Report 2014 19 43.
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In many countries, SMEs have been identified as the least compliant
component of the taxpayer population. As a result, they have become a
target for many tax administrations.10 Recent studies have concluded that
there is a considerable risk that SMEs may not report some of their income
in their tax returns with the aim of reducing their tax liability. This may be
prevalent where the income of SMEs may not be subject to third party
reporting to the tax administration and/or where it is difficult for the tax
administration to directly verify the income with third parties, hence
making it easy for SMEs to conceal income. Another risk is that expenses
claimed against business income may be overstated with the aim of
reducing the tax liability. These challenges may be compounded during
audits due to poor-quality, or non-existent, books and records. For these
reasons, it is acknowledged that auditors need a set of tools to indirectly
measure taxpayers’ taxable income.11
Many developing countries also have a significant informal (shadow)
economy that largely operates outside the formal tax system. Many
countries have not been able to tax these sectors, thereby effectively
limiting or shrinking the tax base.12 For example, the Kenya Revenue
Authority (KRA) has projected that the informal sector has been growing
faster than the formal sector. In its Sixth Corporate Plan,13 the KRA
projected that the latter grew at 82 per cent against the former at 18 per
cent, implying that the proportion of the hard-to-tax informal sector will
continue to grow.14 
In a cash economy, it is difficult for the tax administration to identify
players in the informal sector and bring them into the tax bracket. The
records of financial transactions to enable the tax administration to detect
economic activities or to be used for verifying turnover or as confirmation
of transactions are limited. However, if SMEs and the informal sector are
not brought within the tax bracket or if they are not properly taxed, the
burden of taxation will continue to be borne by a small percentage of
businesses. 
It therefore is likely that the mobile money payment platforms could
present an opportunity for developing investigative tools and for
10 OECD Reducing opportunities for tax non-compliance in the underground economy (2012) 4.
11 OECD Strengthening tax audit capabilities: Innovative approaches to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of indirect income measurement methods strengthening (2006) 4.
12 EM Zolt & RM Bird Technology and taxation in developing countries: From hand to mouse
Columbia Law School Tax Policy Colloquium 4 July 2008 7.
13 The Kenya Revenue Authority, Sixth Corporate Plan was launched on 18 September
2015 and covers three years, ie the period 2015/16-2017/18. It was developed by KRA
to provide a road map for attaining revenue collections of up to Kshs 5.2 trillion in the
next three years and also provides a framework for further transforming KRA in its
quest to facilitate Kenya’s ease of doing business ranking scores. For more, see the
press release at http://www.kra.go.ke/notices/pdf2015/PRESS-RELEASE-6TH-
CORPORATE-PLAN.pdf. It is available at http://www.kra.go.ke/index.php/6th-
corporate-plan (accessed 13 June 2016).
14 Kenya Revenue Authority, Sixth Corporate Plan 2015/16-2017/18 21.
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enhancing tax compliance. However, how does this harmonise with the
current thinking on tax compliance? The following part traces the
evolution of tax compliance strategies at the OECD to the current
acknowledgment of the growing role of technology in enhancing tax
compliance with a particular focus on mobile money payment platforms
and SMEs, which will provide a basis of how utilising data from mobile
money platforms could be useful for the KRA.
3 Evolution of tax compliance strategies: 
Perspectives from the OECD
Tax compliance strategies have over time evolved. Since tax
administrations have traditionally been viewed as the enforcers of tax law,
as a result most confined themselves to reviewing filed tax returns,
verifying their correctness and targeting non-compliance by subjecting
taxpayers to audits, which targeted high-risk tax returns.15 The success of
this approach was measured by audit yield and relied largely on the careful
selection of audit cases through a proper identification of risks.16 This
method often targeted past events with the audit deployed as the main
compliance tool. This was a costly and time-consuming process which
required the collection of information from and exchanges of positions
with the taxpayer before the case was concluded. When positions were
disputed, there could be lengthy appeal process before tax dispute
resolution bodies.17
The focus on better selection of audit cases led to an increased interest
in risk management. In 2004 the work of the OECD’s Forum on Tax
Administration (FTA) on compliance risk management18 concluded that
improved compliance rather than audit yield was the desired outcome of
any compliance process and, therefore, it was important to understand the
underlying causes of non-compliance and look at the taxpayer holistically
rather than focusing on audit yield. This led to a shift towards managing
risks, which in turn led to an increased interest in understanding the
compliance behaviour of taxpayers. Consequently, the FTA through its
2010 Information Note entitled ‘Understanding and influencing taxpayer
compliance behaviour’19 concluded that a strategy based solely on
deterrence can have major drawbacks and does not necessarily result in
improved compliance. The key point was that compliance was not about
finding as many errors as possible, but rather about influencing the
15 OECD Tax compliance by design: Achieving improved SME tax compliance by adopting a
system perspective (2014) 21. 
16 As above. 
17 OECD (n 10 above) 3.
18 OECD Compliance risk management: Managing and improving tax compliance (2004).
19 OECD Understanding and influencing taxpayer compliance behaviour (2010). 
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environment of the taxpayer to make it easier for them to comply and
difficult not to comply.20
The compliance risk management approach gave way to the ‘right
from the start’ approach, as elucidated in the FTA 2012 Information Note
‘Right from the start: Influencing the compliance environment for small
and medium enterprises’.21 This approach marked a shift in compliance
strategies and placed the emphasis on influencing the taxpayer’s
environment.22 The conclusions from the work that evolved out of the
2012 FTA Information Note were that, first, there was a tendency to
overestimate the importance of external factors when assessing people’s
behaviour; second, that small changes in a taxpayer’s environment can
have a big impact on their compliance levels.23 
The ‘right from the start’ approach is a way of working and thinking
that encompasses four different dimensions, namely, (a) the tax
administration acts in real time and addresses problems as they occur;
(b) that the tax administration focuses on the taxpayers’ end-to-end
processes and adapts its processes to fit into those of the taxpayers instead
of attempting to make the taxpayers’ processes fit into those of the tax
administration; (c) making it easy to comply and difficult not to comply;
and (d) involving the taxpayers and their intermediaries in the compliance
process.24
The ‘right from the start’ approach recognises that participants, such
as tax intermediaries, third parties, software developers, banks and
industry associations can play a significant role in driving compliance up
by providing additional certainty and/or more cost-effective solutions.25
For example, the information note suggests that tax intermediaries can
transform information on taxable transactions into information on taxable
profit and deliver it to the tax administration; third parties can have
information on taxpayers’ transactions that can substantiate, or verify, the
information from the taxpayer; software developers can provide an
infrastructure for transferring, transforming and storing information in a
secure way; banks can supply information, handle tax payments and
provide support services to the taxpayer; and, finally, industry associations
can have specialised competences regarding the taxpayers’ context that
can support both the taxpayer and the tax administration.26
20 OECD (n 19 above) 19.
21 OECD (n 1 above).
22 OECD (n 1 above) 21.
23 OECD (n 1 above) 22.
24 OECD (n 1 above) 3 10 23. 
25 As above.
26 OECD (n 15 above) 25.
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The ‘right from the start’ approach recognises that compliance is a
main function of tax administrations.27 Compliance with tax laws is not
limited to filing tax returns. It covers a broader range of processes which
often take place outside the view and control of the tax administration.28
This approach seeks to redirect the tax administration’s attention from the
tax return to the taxpayer’s environment. The approach focuses on the
processes that culminate into the tax return. Therefore, it emphasises the
need to create an environment that underpins compliant behaviour and
reduces opportunities for non-compliant behaviour at an early stage in a
taxpayer’s processes, preferably before the tax return is filed.29 The
approach emphasises on getting it ‘right from the start’ by involving and
engaging taxpayers and participants and putting in place more up-front
measures to support compliance and prevent non-compliance as opposed
to reactive measures.30 The main argument for this approach is that up-
front investment in the taxpayer’s environment can foster a culture of
voluntary compliance by influencing all the taxpayer’s processes at the
input stage. This may lead to correct declarations and returns being filed.31
It therefore can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the tax
administrations themselves, while at the same time benefiting the
taxpayers: getting tax issues right from the start means less trouble
(extensive audits, re-assessments and fines) and uncertainty in the end.32
As a result, most tax administrations have over the years adopted
strategies to address tax compliance risks before a taxpayer files a tax
return with the primary aim of creating an environment which promotes
compliance because it is the inevitable result of actions and transactions
performed by taxpayers.33 Although aimed at eliminating errors and
reducing the possibility for non-compliant behaviour, the approach has the
broader objective of reducing intentional tax evasion and strengthening the
overall willingness to comply.34 The approach requires the tax
administration to shift its focus from the past to the present; from reports
of previous fiscal years to ongoing tax-related processes in the taxpayers’
businesses.35 It recognises that intervening at the front end of a taxpayer’s
process could be more effective than checking individual returns
afterwards. The fact that a taxpayer knows that tax compliance is built into
his or her processes could significantly model their behaviour.36 The tools
available for implementing this approach include legislation; cooperation
with stakeholders; the application of new technologies; the use of third
27 OECD (n 1 above) 1.
28 OECD (n 1 above) 7.
29 OECD (n 1 above) 1.
30 OECD (n 15 above) 2 20.
31 OECD (n 1 above) 8.
32 OECD (n 1 above) 1.
33 OECD (n 1 above) 3.
34 As above.
35 OECD (n 1 above) 8.
36 OECD (n 1 above) 35.
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party data; education and support initiatives; field inspections; initiatives
designed to influence social norms; and other tailor-made interventions to
ensure that effective results will arise from a combination of these tools.37
The 2014 FTA study stretches the ‘right from the start’ approach
further to be effective in money payment systems. The FTA notes that the
digital landscape has evolved significantly and that taxpayers, more so
SMEs, are adapting to these technological changes to increasingly manage
their information and payments digitally.38 It recognises that a complete
digital chain of information and payments, where everything fits together
from recording business transactions to bookkeeping and accounting for
tax, can improve processes as well as tax compliance. Hence, business
transactions can be captured digitally and co-ordinated with electronic
payments and electronic bookkeeping and further on with electronic
reporting and payments to the government.39 
The 2014 FTA study recognises that, in an effort to shape the
compliance environment, tax administrations increasingly are utilising
technological developments and are promoting further developments in
order to be more effective. Examples of the initiatives that build on these
developments are certified cash registers; on-line bookkeeping and filing;
and e-invoicing arrangements.40 These measures encapsulate the ‘tax
compliance by design’ concept as recommended by the OECD, which
seeks to make tax compliance a natural part of the day-to-day transactions
of taxpayers as they take place by leveraging technological
developments.41
The ‘tax compliance by design’ concept relies on two principal
strategies, namely, the secured chain approach and the centralised data
approach.42 First, there is the secured chain approach, where the primary
focus is on the taxpayer’s internal processes and how these processes are
supported by trusted intermediaries.43 Using this approach, the collection
of data and processing it into information takes place within the taxpayer’s
business and the intermediaries that support the taxpayer’s business.
Second, there is the centralised approach where data is collected by third
parties and the information is supplied directly to the revenue body which
then transforms it into information about tax liabilities and payments that
is fed back into the business.44 The latter approach is premised on the idea
that tax administrations can capture as many business transactions from
the source as possible in order to determine the right amount of tax to be
37 OECD (n 1 above) 10.
38 OECD (n 15 above) 25.
39 OECD (n 15 above) 25-26.
40 OECD (n 15 above) 30.
41 As above.
42 As above.
43 As above. 
44 OECD (n 15 above) 31.
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paid with minimum information from the taxpayer. Tax compliance
requirements are built into the information technology systems and
processes used by taxpayer and data is delivered by third parties who may
not have an incentive to manipulate it. Theoretically, therefore, this makes
it easier to gain a desired level of certainty as data is not delivered by the
taxpayer.45 The OECD 2014 study notes that although the secured chain
approach and centralised data approaches are different designs under the
‘tax compliance by design’ concept, they are all premised on the need for
real-time collection of data about a business transaction and its use in
automated processes that translate that data into information about taxes
due and, where possible, payment of those liabilities.46
4 Utilising mobile money payment systems data to 
facilitate tax investigations
The evolution of tax compliance strategies indicates that tax
administrations are called upon to leverage technological advancements
and innovations to facilitate tax compliance. More so, recent work by the
FTA indicates that growth in e-commerce, which has been enabled by the
availability of and faster internet connectivity, on the one hand, and the
emergence and continued growth of electronic payment systems, internet
payment services and mobile payment services, on the other, may offer
greater opportunities for concealing income especially from underground
economic activities in both domestic and offshore locations. The flip side
is that these payment systems can also create electronic records that could
prove to be a significant source of intelligence for tax administrations on
unreported business proceeds.47 
The FTA, drawing on the work of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF), concluded that the significant rise in transactions and the volume
of funds using these models require that they be kept under review as they
could be used to facilitate tax evasion practices.48 As a result, the FTA
therefore recommends that tax administrations should be vigilant for
evidence of tax non-compliance facilitated by the use of electronic
payment systems and, where appropriate, to take advantage of electronic
records created by the electronic point of sale (EPS) to identify unreported
business income that may have been earned by those participating in the
underground economy.49
45 OECD (n 15 above) 35.
46 OECD (n 15 above) 30. See 39 for the differences about the secured chain and
centralised data approaches for tax compliance by design concept table 3.1.
47 OECD (n 10 above) 2.
48 OECD (n 10 above) 3.
49 As above.
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In Kenya, mobile payment is used by approximately 90 per cent of the
population, not only to make peer-to-peer payments but also as a broader
‘branchless banking’ platform. This creates an opportunity for tax
compliance mainly in terms of tax payment and data on mobile
transactions that informs the recruitment of more taxpayers.50 
Historically, the primary tax compliance tool in Kenya has been audit
and compliance checks. However, the KRA has noted that audit has a
narrow focus as it mainly targets corporations. The KRA recognises that
the process is mostly manual and takes a long time to complete, leading to
a long list of pending cases.51 Because the traditional methods of
improving tax compliance based on examination and sanctions have been
counter-productive and ineffective, the KRA has had to rethink how to
revamp its recruitment strategy to ensure that more taxpayers are brought
into the tax net.52 
Hence, the combination of a shrinking tax base and the advancement
of technology, more specifically the emergence of mobile payment
platforms, has led the KRA to include a plan to broaden the tax base
through enhanced taxpayer recruitment in its Sixth Corporate Plan. To
this end, the target of the KRA is to recruit an additional two million
taxpayers by targeting, among others, SMEs that transact through mobile
payment platforms or use agency banking, to register for electricity or
water connections or pay for services of which the payments are
automated.53 The KRA has estimated that there are over 2,7 million SMEs
in Kenya that are mainly unregistered for tax purposes.54 
One of the key thrusts of the Sixth Corporate Plan is leveraging
technology to enhance service delivery and promote compliance.55
According to this Plan, the KRA intends leveraging technology to achieve
a fully electronic service, in the hope that this will enhance its operational
efficiency and thus result in greater customer satisfaction.56 The KRA
plans to achieve this by identifying opportunities for digital integration
with partners and stakeholders in the tax system and explore a real-time
automated review of taxpayer submissions.57
Keeping abreast with recent approaches to tax compliance,
particularly the ‘right from the start’ approach and the ‘tax compliance by
design’ concept, the KRA has the opportunity to tap into mobile payments
data and influence the taxpayer environment at the transaction level. This
50 Kenya Revenue Authority, Sixth Corporate Plan 2015/16-2017/18 22.
51 Kenya Revenue Authority (n 50 above) 33.
52 Kenya Revenue Authority 21.
53 Kenya Revenue Authority 30.
54 Kenya Revenue Authority 46.
55 Kenya Revenue Authority xiv xv 3.
56 Kenya Revenue Authority x.
57 Kenya Revenue Authority 23.
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data could facilitate tax investigations under the new approaches to tax
compliance in the following ways: 
4.1 Tracking and monitoring taxpayers
An important task of tax administration is to bring together information
from different sources, both within the administration and from other
relevant government and private sources, in order to verify the information
supplied by taxpayers themselves.58 It usually is difficult to monitor
transactions that are cash-based. However, the use of banking channels for
payment makes transactions easier to observe and monitor. The growth of
the financial sector and its greater role in the market economy broaden the
potential scope of taxation and makes administration of certain taxes
simpler.59
The KRA can leverage technology to use mobile payments data as a
tool for observing and monitoring transactions and taxpayers, thus
detecting economic activity in the informal sector and bringing them into
the formal sector.60 Additionally, mobile payments data can be used to
track receipts and expenditures not only of businesses into focus, but also
of their suppliers and businesses down the economic activity chain. In this
way it provides information about the financial capacity of both the seller
and purchaser, and this can be matched to tax returns to authenticate the
tax position.61 It is reported that in September 2015 alone, Lipa na M-Pesa
transacted Sh15 billion. This, therefore, will enable the KRA to monitor
individual transactions and profile businesses and individual M-Pesa users
to measure the spending habits of an individual or a business, and its
turnover and income levels.62 It therefore presents a huge data mining
opportunity for the KRA.
4.2 Identifying individuals and businesses that fail to file 
returns
When access to mobile payment data has been granted, the KRA will
receive information on a taxpayer’s transactions with other businesses and
information from intermediaries on the mobile payment platforms that
transact with the taxpayer. Access to M-Pesa information can provide an
58 Zolt & Bird (n 12 above) 16.
59 Zolt & Bird 9.
60 Zolt & Bird 8.
61 Zolt & Bird 9.
62 E Okoth ‘KRA targets mobile money to smoke out tax cheats’ Business Daily 9 May
2016, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/KRA-targets-mobile-money-to-smoke-
out-tax-cheats/-/539546/3196228/-/bovukwz/-/index.html (accessed 13 June 2016).
See also ‘KRA now targets mobile money to smoke out tax cheats’ Daily Nation 9 May
2016, http://www.nation.co.ke/business/KRA-radical-plan-to-catch-tax-cheats/-/
996/3196496/-/brq96h/-/index.html (accessed 13 June 2016).
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individual’s expenditure, including bill payments, which can be analysed
and the resulting data matched with tax returns to reveal discrepancies.
The information from mobile money transfer platforms then can be
matched with the taxpayer’s tax records and their filing patterns analysed
using their personal identification numbers (PINs). This could help in
identifying both individuals and businesses that are active but that are not
meeting their tax obligations.63 If properly analysed, it can point out those
that are not registered for tax purposes, while their activity levels indicate
that they should be registered. It can also help to identify those that are
active but do not file returns. Further, it can help to give indicators of those
that are not filing appropriate returns and not paying the correct amount of
taxes. These persons then can be profiled for targeted compliance
monitoring or audits.
4.3 Expanding the tax base
Data from mobile money payments could be used to bring the hitherto
untaxed population into the tax base. This is in line with the Sixth
Corporate Plan, which outlined the KRA’s intention to use electronic data
to suggest incomes of those using mobile money to pay bills and make
purchases as part of the effort to expand the tax net and rope in individuals
and businesses using retail level data.64 The move will enhance the KRA’s
financial data-gathering scheme to unearth income sources which have not
been declared in tax returns and demand full compliance.
4.4 A more reliable audit trail
Tax audits play a critical role in the administration of tax laws through
their detection of non-compliance and by serving as a deterrent to the
wider population of taxpayers who might otherwise engage in non-
compliant behaviour.65 Audits are necessary because it may be the only
way to reveal intentional noncompliance where other means have failed to
reveal underpayment of tax. It involves examining returns filed by
taxpayers as well as supporting documents to determine the correctness of
self-assessed taxes.66 According to Bird and Zolt audits may also be used
for studying the characteristics within a group of taxpayers which serve as
indicators within that group. However, the strategy deployed in auditing
and the success thereof ‘… depend on the quality of the information
available to the auditor, which in turn depends on three factors: the
information gathered from the taxpayer and third parties; the information-
processing capacity of auditors; and the strategy pursued.’67
63 Kenya Revenue Authority (n 50 above) 30-31.
64 Kenya Revenue Authority (n 50 above) 57.
65 OECD (n 11 above) 7.
66 Zolt and Bird (n 12) 21.
67 As above.
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Revenue bodies have been encouraged strongly to be vigilant for
evidence of tax non-compliance facilitated by the use of electronic
payment systems and, where appropriate, to take advantage of electronic
records created by the electronic payment systems to identify unreported
business income that may have been earned by those participating in the
underground economy.68 The third party records created by for example,
the Lipa na M-Pesa transaction till, can therefore create meaningful
electronic evidence that can be used during audits.  
4.5 Pre-filling tax returns
Information from mobile money payment platforms could also be used as
a pre-case investigation tool. For example, the information could be
analysed and, where found to be relevant, used to pre-fill tax returns.69
Using the current system of self-assessment, a taxpayer will be required to
verify this information. This declaration then could be compared to
information obtained from the mobile money payment platform and
which is already hosted in the system to determine whether a true account
of the taxpayer’s activities had been rendered. Where there are mismatches
and where there is no full declaration, further investigations can be
launched into the taxpayer’s affairs.
5 Potential challenges
Access to mobile payment data needs to be anchored in law. To this end,
the KRA has planned to propose legislation that will grant it full and
regular access to data collected by other organisations for the purpose of
tax administration, specifically targeting mobile companies.70 In the 2016
Budget Statement, the Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury
announced:71 
In order to make it easier for taxpayers to submit their tax returns in the i-Tax
system, I propose to amend the Tax Procedure Act to grant Kenya Revenue
Authority powers to collect information in advance from identified persons
for purposes of pre-populating the information in the i-Tax system. 
However, any proposed amendment to the law may face challenges, and
there is a need to widely sensitise and lobby both the National Assembly
68 OECD (n 10 above) 3.
69 OECD (n 15 above) 35.
70 Kenya Revenue Authority (n 50 above) 31.
71 Republic of Kenya ‘Budget statement for the fiscal year 2016/2017 (1 July-30th June)’
by Mr Henry K Rotich, Cabinet Secretary for The National Treasury, para 148 30-33.
See also ‘KRA hopes to attain target by netting mobile cash tax evaders’ Sunday Nation
12 June 2016, http://www.nation.co.ke/business/KRA-hopes-to-attain-target-by-
netting-mobile-cash-tax-evaders/-/996/3245552/-/vnq1oh/-/index.html (accessed
13 June 2016).   
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and the Senate and the mobile money payment platform operators on the
advantages that may be brought about by granting such access.72
Another potential challenge to access to mobile payments data is
invasion of privacy.73 Following this announcement, concerns have
already been raised about the plan going against the right to privacy as
enshrined in article 31 of the Constitution of Kenya. Banking and
microfinance laws also provide for confidentiality of data and may require
to be amended for access to be granted. 
It has also been noted that the mobile payment data may be abused by
government officials and others.74 Therefore, there is a need for proper
safeguards to ensure that data from mobile payments is used only for
intended purposes.
Lastly, because of the significant data that is available on mobile
payments, there is a need for proper infrastructure, both software and
hardware, and analysis so as to derive any meaningful value from this data.
There will be a need to train and equip KRA officers with appropriate skills
to enable them to handle the data gained from such access and properly
analyse it so that it gives out information that is useful for tax compliance
monitoring.
6 Conclusion 
The advances in technology have the potential to alter the economic
environment in which governments seek to collect tax revenue. In
developing countries, the upsurge in mobile payments may make it easier
to move some individuals and businesses from the informal to the formal
economy. Data from this payment platform can be used as an investigative
tool to enhance compliance. However, there are obstacles such as the
enactment of enabling legislation; overcoming privacy concerns; and
assembling an enabling infrastructure before the revenue bodies can use
the available data as an aid to compliance.
72 C Munda ‘Tax experts laud KRA on its bid to access M-Pesa, bank accounts to nab tax
cheats’ The Star 20 May 2016 http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/05/20/video-
tax-experts-laud-kra-on-its-bid-to-access-m-pesa-bank-accounts_c1354133 (accessed 13
June 2016). 
73 Zolt  & Bird (n 12 above) 36.
74 As above.
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Alicja Majdanska*
Abstract
In the aftermath of a succession of data leaks, insufficient accuracy and
accessibility of basic and beneficial identification and ownership
information have been identified as an enabler of illicit financial flows. As a
result, many have called for greater transparency around corporate data.
The purpose of this chapter is to present the current transparency initiatives
that are aimed at improving access to this data. Different registers have been
proposed, not only internationally but also in many domestic fora. These
should help counter the use of corporate vehicles for illicit purposes. They
are expected to address especially money laundering, bribery and
corruption. In this chapter, three new initiatives are discussed: the European
Union (EU) register as implemented under the 4th AML Directive; the UK
register of beneficial owners; and the Global Legal Entity Identifier (LEI)
system. The primary issue is how ready these instruments are to be put into
effective operation. This chapter analyses their pros and cons, as well as a
number of challenges that regulators will have to face.
1 Why are these transparency initiatives important?
Illicit financial flows thrive on secrecy.1 Shell companies, complex
ownership and control structures, trusts and other legal arrangements are
commonly used to obscure the true beneficial ownership of assets.2 These
1 Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa commissioned
by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/iff_main_re
port_26feb_en.pdf, 42 (accessed 01 September 2016).
2 The classical example of the role corporate vehicles might play in transactions
involving illicit financial flows is the Abacha case. Sani Abacha was Nigeria’s former
President and is estimated to have stolen up to USD5 billion during his rule from 1993
to 1998. Part of the money was held in trusts in Guernsey which had bank accounts in
London, secret bank accounts in Europe, and shell companies in British Crown
Dependencies. Source: OECD Report on the Misuse of Corporate Vehicles for Illicit Purposes
2001 92.
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are not only channels for money laundering, tax avoidance and tax
evasion, but are also used to hide the proceeds of corruption. Not many
jurisdictions collect information about beneficial ownership at the time a
company is set up. This makes international cooperation more difficult.3
Not surprisingly, substandard beneficial ownership requirements are
perceived as a dangerous legal deficiency which must be addressed. 
Considering this, many international bodies have urged governments
to take specific actions to enhance the transparency of corporate vehicles.
The G8 Leaders were the first to demand action against corporate secrecy.
In Lough Ernie in 2013, the G8 Leaders recognised data as a key
instrument to assist government effectiveness, efficiency and
responsiveness to citizens, whereas the lack of transparency was perceived
as an important obstacle to sustainable development.4 The Leaders
formulated eight ‘Action Plan Principles’ to prevent the misuse of
companies and legal arrangements. In their Communiqué, first, they
indicated that companies, as well as trustees of express trusts, should retain
adequate, accurate and current information on who owns and controls
them and their beneficial ownership. Second, law enforcement, tax
administrations and other relevant authorities, including, as appropriate,
financial intelligence units, should be provided with access to beneficial
ownership information on companies and trusts. Additionally, they
requested that domestic agencies work together effectively. The
cooperation should take place not only at the domestic but also the
international level. These operations should address illicit activities
stemming from the abuse of companies and legal arrangements. 
In response to existing loopholes in legal frameworks, the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) also initiated significant steps to improve the
transparency of corporate data. Considering the abuse of legal persons and
arrangements for the purpose of illicit activities, the FATF added
standards on transparency of beneficial ownership information concerning
corporates and legal arrangements to its Forty Recommendations and
Interpretative Notes (FATF Recommendations).5 Currently, the body
requires countries to ensure that tax administrations can access adequate,
accurate and timely information regarding the beneficial ownership of
corporate vehicles and legal arrangements. The recommendations by
FATF which incorporate these principles were endorsed by the G20.6 
3 OECD Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: Measuring OECD response 2014
41.
4 G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, Lough Erne, 18 June 2013.
5 FATF Recommendations 24 and 25. 
6 G20 Leaders’ Declaration, St Petersburg Summit, 6 September 2013, and the G20
Communiqué from the Meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors, Moscow, 19-20 July 2013, G20 High-Level Principles on Beneficial
Ownership Transparency 17 November 2014.
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The request to improve transparency of corporate data elicited direct
responses from national governments as well. A number of countries
committed to establish public registries of corporate ownership
information (for example, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Norway).
The EU also took significant steps by proposing domestic public registers
under the new 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive.7 
At the same time, the transparency of corporate vehicles was also
recognised as beneficial for financial stability in the wake of the financial
crisis. This was why the legal entity identifier (LEI) was introduced. This
should improve the measurement and monitoring of systemic risk. The
LEI is a unique and exclusive identification code based on basic data
regarding an entity that is held in a register. The vision is that the LEI will
obtain global reach and enable the worldwide recognition of transaction
parties. 
The existence of several parallel initiatives to improve transparency
does raise some questions. Will these initiatives satisfy the relatively high
standards of adequate, accurate and current information that are necessary
to support the efforts to curb illicit financial flows? The purpose of this
chapter is to examine three of these initiatives (the UK register; the 4th
AML Directive registers; and the LEI) to identify challenges that
regulators could face when implementing them. All these instruments have
the potential to curb illicit financial flows by improving transparency. 
2 The misuse of legal persons and arrangements 
and the FATF recommendations
The FATF8 recognised the need to tackle the misuse of legal persons and
arrangements to facilitate illicit activities and added to its Forty
Recommendations and Interpretative Notes (FATF Recommendations).9
Although the FATF standards for transparency of beneficial ownership
7 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May
2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money
laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the
European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC. JO
L/2015/141/73 (4th AML Directive). 
8 The FATF is an inter-governmental body. It was established in 1989 by the Ministers of
its member jurisdictions. The FATF is currently seen as the main standard-setting
organisation in the field of legal, regulatory, and operational measures for combating
money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the
international financial system.
9 FATF International Standards of Combating Money Laundering, and the Financing
of Terrorism and Proliferation, the FATF Recommendation, February 2012. The
FATF Recommendations do not constitute a legally-binding instrument under
international law. However, they have been globally recognised and, therefore, can be
considered to be soft international law. In order to comply with the FATF
Recommendations, countries are expected to implement them in their national legal
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information were designed to prevent misuses of corporate vehicles for
money laundering or terrorist financing, they also support the efforts to
prevent and detect other illicit activities, such as tax crimes and corruption.  
FATF Recommendation 24 establishes standards on transparency in
respect of legal persons. The standard states the following: 
Countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of legal persons for
money laundering or terrorist financing. Countries should ensure that there is
adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and
control of legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by
competent authorities. In particular, countries that have legal persons that are
able to issue bearer shares or bearer share warrants, or which allow nominee
shareholders or nominee directors, should take effective measures to ensure
that they are not misused for money laundering or terrorist financing.
Countries should consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial
ownership and control information by financial institutions and DNFBP10s
undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendations 10 and 22.
The interpretative note to Recommendation 2411 explains that the
subjective scope of the standard refers not only to legal persons but also to
foundations, Anstalt, and limited liability partnerships. Recommendation
24 also clarifies the minimum basic information that should be obtained
9 systems in compliance with a regular procedure established in their constitutional
laws. The enforcement of the FATF Standard is ensured by on-site visits and off-site
reviews of the documentation provided by reviewees. The mutual evaluations are
being conducted by the assessors who are appointed by FATF itself, the Committee of
Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of
Terrorism (Moneyval), the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), and the
other FATF-like regional bodies.
10 Under the FATF Recommendations, the term ‘designated non-financial businesses
and professions’ is defined with an exhaustive list of subject persons that are expected
to have an increased probability to be exposed to the proceeds of crime in their regular
professional activity or business: (i) casinos; (ii) real estate agents; (iii) dealers in
precious metals; (iv) dealers in precious stones; (v) lawyers, notaries, other
independent legal professionals, and accountants – this refers to sole practitioners,
partners, or employed professionals in professional firms; it does not refer to ‘internal’
professionals who are employees of other types of businesses nor to professionals
working for government agencies who may already be subject to AML/CFT
measures; (vi) trust and company service providers refers to all persons or businesses
that are not covered elsewhere under these Recommendations and which, as a
business, provide any of the following services to third parties: (a) acting as a
formation agent of legal persons; (b) acting as (or arranging for another person to act
as) a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar
position in relationship to other legal persons; (c) providing a registered office;
business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address for a
company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement; (d) acting (or
arranging for another person to act) as a trustee of an express trust or performing the
equivalent function for another form of legal arrangement; (e) acting (or arranging for
another person to act) as a nominee shareholder for another person. Further, it should
be noted that designated non-financial businesses and professions have been included
in the FATF Recommendations in 2003. The FATF Recommendations 2003 are
available online at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommen
dations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202003.pdf (accessed 10 September
2017).
11 FATF Recommendations 2012 84.
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and recorded, which includes (a) company name; proof of incorporation;
legal form and status; the address of the registered office; basic regulating
powers (for example, memorandum and articles of association); a list of
directors; and (b) a register of its shareholders or members containing the
names of the shareholders and members as well as the number of shares
held by each shareholder and categories of shares (including the nature of
the associated voting rights). 
FATF Recommendation 25 refers to the transparency of legal
arrangements and reads as follows: 
Countries should take measures to prevent the misuse of legal arrangements
for money laundering or terrorist financing. In particular, countries should
ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on express
trusts, including information on the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries that can
be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities.
Countries should consider measures to facilitate access to beneficial
ownership and control information by financial institutions and DNFBPs
undertaking the requirements set out in Recommendations 10 and 22.
The interpretative note to Recommendation 2512 indicates that the
standard refers to both trusts and other types of legal arrangements that
may have a similar structure or function. The minimum scope of
information which should be recorded encompasses the identity of the
settlor; the trustee(s); the protector (if any); the beneficiaries or class of
beneficiaries; and any other natural person exercising ultimate effective
control over the trust and information on other regulated agents of and
service providers to the trust, including investment advisors or managers,
accountants and tax advisors. 
Both Recommendations recognise the necessity of international
cooperation on exchange of beneficial ownership information between
competent authorities. Therefore, the standards recommend easing and
smoothing the access to basic information that is held by registries for
foreign competent authorities. They also call for exchanging information
between foreign competent authorities. Finally, they encourage the
making use of powers to obtain beneficial ownership information
prescribed in domestic law. This may be the way to help a foreign
counterpart in accessing beneficial ownership information.
Thus far, the implementation of the FATF standards on transparency
of beneficial ownership information has not been that simple, as evidenced
by the FATF Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership
(Recommendations 24 & 25) issued in 2014, aimed at assisting countries
in the implementation of Recommendations 24 and 25. Moreover, the last
OECD report measuring responses of the OECD countries to illicit
12 FATF Recommendations 2012 89.
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financial flows13 revealed that compliance with Recommendations 24 and
25 was substandard. Regarding all FATF Recommendations, average
OECD country compliance is the lowest for transparency of legal persons
and arrangements.14 The report indicates that several OECD countries do
not require beneficial ownership information on all types of legal structures
and particularly not in respect of trusts.15 
Nonetheless, the G20 has endorsed the FATF standards on
transparency of beneficial ownership and encouraged countries to address
the risks raised by the opacity of corporate vehicles. In their 2013 public
declaration they stated:16 
We commit to take measures to ensure that we meet the FATF standards
regarding the identification of the beneficial owners of companies and other
legal arrangements such as trusts that are also relevant for tax purposes. We
will ensure that this information is available in a timely fashion to law
enforcement, tax collection agencies, and other relevant authorities in
accordance with the confidentiality legal requirements, for example, through
central registries or other appropriate mechanisms. We ask our Finance
Ministers to update us by our next meeting on the steps taken to meet FATF
standards regarding the beneficial ownership of companies and other legal
arrangements such as trusts by G20 countries leading by example.
3 New European Union legislation on corporate 
ownership information
The move to beneficial ownership registers has been quickened by the
European Union. The 4th AML Directive imposed an obligation on
member states to store beneficial ownership information a central register,
aligning its policy with FATF Recommendations. The new directive must
be transposed into national laws by the member states within two years
from 26 June 2015. 
The basic concept for the analysed obligation is that of the ‘beneficial
owner’ which, according to the 4th AML Directive, is ‘any natural person
who ultimately owns or controls the customer and/or the natural person(s)
on whose behalf a transaction or activity is being conducted’.17 The
directive also specifies how to identify beneficial ownership in the cases of
corporate entities, trusts and other legal entities such as foundations.18
13 OECD (n 3 above).
14 OECD 27. 
15 OECD 35.
16 G 20 Leader’s Declaration, St Petersburg Summit, 6 September 2013.
17 Art 3 para 6 of the 4th AML Directive.
18 Art 3 paras 6(a), (b) and (c) of the 4th AML Directive. 
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The 4th AML Directive obliged member states to establish two types
of beneficial ownership registers, including one for corporate and legal
entities and another for trusts. For this purpose, member states can use a
central database that already is in place, provided that it collects beneficial
ownership information, business registers, or any other central registers. It
is worth noting that neither form of these registers is relevant to
foundations that are not legal persons.
As for registers of corporate and legal entities, the information they
contain shall be accessible to competent authorities and FIUs in all cases
without any restriction; to obliged entities within the framework of
customer due diligence in accordance with the 4th AML Directive; and to
any person or organisation that can demonstrate a legitimate interest for
acquiring the information. Certain limitations to access is permitted on a
‘case-by-case basis in exceptional circumstances where such access would
expose the beneficial owner to the risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail,
violence, or intimidation or where the beneficial owner is a minor or
otherwise incapable’.19 Member states are also allowed to ensure the
protection of personal data that is included in the registers. 
A separate register is provided for trusts. The 4th AML Directive
differentiates obligations imposed between trusts governed by the law of a
member state, trustees in general, and trusts that generate tax
consequences.20 The first type of entity is required only to store data but
not to report it anywhere. The second type must disclose its status and
provide basic information in the event that they form a business
relationship or perform an occasional transaction above the thresholds
stipulated in the 4th AML Directive. Only the last type, trusts that generate
tax consequences, is required to provide certain data to a central register.
This apparent loophole in the new European Union legislation is discussed
below. 
Access to the data held in the trusts register is restricted by comparison
to the register for corporate and legal entities. Only competent authorities
and financial intelligence units are granted timely and unrestricted access.
Timely access may be also granted to obliged entities within the framework
of customer due diligence in accordance with the 4th AML Directive.21
The 4th AML Directive will increase the transparency of company
ownership. It should also enhance control to both regulatory and criminal
enforcement agencies in the European Union. Registers that member
states have been required to introduce should reduce illicit financial flows,
particularly money laundering. They are expected to help identify
potential misconduct and those businesses that are either intentionally, or
19 Art 30 para 9 of the 4th AML Directive. 
20 Art 31 para 4 of the 4th AML Directive. 
21 Art 31 para 4 of the 4th AML Directive. 
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unintentionally involved in illicit activity. This will be possible because the
central registers will enable different enforcement agencies to access a
broad scope of information to conduct due diligence. Masking money
laundering transactions and other illicit financial flows will be much more
difficult, as the registers listing information about the ultimate beneficial
ownership of the parties to financial transactions will enable greater
transparency in these transactions. 
Nevertheless, some important issues still need to be addressed. 
First and foremost, the new directive proposes registers but only at the
national level. As most illicit financial flows involve cross-border
transactions, it will be necessary to access data held in the registers of other
countries to piece together a complete picture of a transaction.
Consequently, the exchange of information between competent authorities
and FIUs from different member states will be essential. To address this
issue, the 4th AML Directive suggests that member states use the system
of interconnection of central registers established via the European central
platform established by article 4(a)(1) of Directive 2009/101/EC. At this
time it is difficult to assess whether it will be sufficient to address the needs
of competent authorities. The 4th AML Directive obliged the Commission
to provide a report on the conditions and the technical specifications and
procedures for ensuring safe and efficient interconnection of the central
registers by 26 June 2019. This allows two years for testing how beneficial
owner register will function in practice.
In addition, so far the 4th AML Directive is very limited in terms of
who gains access to data stored in registers and the purposes for which the
information may be used. It does not grant unrestricted access to tax
authorities, asset recovery offices, other law enforcement services and anti-
corruption authorities. Information cannot be accessed for the purposes of
law enforcement investigations, including asset recovery and tax offences.
The Commission is, however, considering whether to change that in the
future.22
There are also doubts concerning the protection of personal data under
the 4th AML Directive. The Directive attempts to strike a balance between
addressing the risks of money laundering and the protection of each
individual’s personal data and right to privacy. The Directive explicitly
stipulates that the processing of personal data ‘should be limited to what is
necessary for the purposes of complying with the requirements of’ the 4th
Directive. It is worth noting that the 4th AML Directive does not explicitly
require the member states to make these registers public. The member
states have the option to choose between a central or public register. In
22 European Commission, Questions and Answers: Anti-money Laundering Directive,
Fact Sheet, Strasbourg, 5 July 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
16-2381_en.htm (accessed 10 March 2017).
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either case, they are obliged to ensure that the information is available to
individuals with a ‘legitimate interest’ in the information. Moreover,
member states are allowed to at least partially restrict access, for instance
by requiring some form of registration in order to obtain information, or by
imposing a fee. To the extent that access is conditional on being able to
demonstrate a ‘legitimate interest’ in acquiring the relevant data, the
practical impact of this requirement will depend on how the concept of a
‘legitimate interest’ is construed. 
The serious privacy implications of a public register of beneficial
owners have sparked an intensive debate about the scope of the register.
The ‘obliged entities’ that must be included do not cover only legal entities
but also trusts. In common law countries trusts are regularly used to protect
vulnerable beneficiaries, some of whom could be at significant risk should
their identities be published. There were some concerns that if a new
register applied to all trusts, it would be at the expense of the right of
individuals to privacy. In addition, it would impose significant
administrative burdens and costs on families. The current text of the 4th
AML Directive applies only to taxable trusts and will not be made public.
It means that only trusts that generate tax consequences will be captured
by new regulations. It will only contain information that in any case is
made available to tax authorities as part of international initiatives for
automatic exchange of tax information. In this way, the interests of trusts
used for protection of family wealth should be kept protected. 
Some questions may arise with respect to the recognition of foundations by
the 4th AML Directive. According to the Preamble:23 
In order to ensure a level playing field among the different types of legal
forms, trustees should also be required to obtain, hold and provide beneficial
ownership information to obliged entities taking customer due diligence
measures and to communicate that information to a central register or a
central database and they should disclose their status to obliged entities. Legal
entities such as foundations and legal arrangements similar to trusts should be
subject to equivalent requirements.
Foundations are also mentioned in the definition of beneficial owner. In
the case of foundations, the 4th AML Directive defines a beneficial owner
as ‘the natural person(s) holding equivalent or similar positions to those
referred’ in the case of trusts. Although this seems to indicate that
foundations should be listed in a central register, it is not very clear in the
text of the 4th AML Directive. This may be an issue of interpretation that
may only be resolved if a dispute is referred to the courts. 
23 Para 17 of the 4th AML Directive.
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4 UK law on new register of corporate ownership 
information
Among the member states, it has been the United Kingdom that has led the
way with its central register.24 Its proposal of a central open registry of
information on companies’ ultimate controllers and owners came as a
result of the commitment of the UK government at the G8 Summit in June
2013. In the Communiqué issued after the summit in Lough Erne, G8
Leaders agreed as follows: ‘We agree to publish national Action Plans to
make information on who really owns and profits from companies and
trusts available to tax collection and law enforcement agencies, for
example, through central registries of company beneficial ownership.’25
As a follow-up, the UK launched a process to establish a register of
beneficial ownership information. The legislation received royal assent in
March 201526 and entered into force on 6 April 2016.
The new law as implemented in the Small Business Enterprise and
Employment Act 2015 requires companies to maintain a register of
individuals who have significant control over a company.27 The proposed
register is known as the PSC register and is directed only to unlisted
companies from the UK, since listed companies are already encompassed
within the disclosure requirements provided for under the DTR 5.28 
The key definition under the new law is ‘a person who has significant
control over the company’. A person is perceived as holding significant
control if he or she has met one of the following conditions: 
• the individual directly or indirectly holds more than 25 per cent of the
nominal share capital; 
• the individual directly or indirectly controls more than 25 per cent of the
votes at general meetings; 
• the individual is directly or indirectly able to control the appointment or
removal of a majority of the board; 
24 The UK initiative has been followed by other European states, namely, by Denmark
and Norway. The announcement of the Danish government as of 7 November 2014 is
available at http://borsen.dk/nyheder/avisen/artikel/11/97562/artikel.html
(accessed 17 July 2015). The Norwegian government pledged to introduce a ‘publicly
available, digital registry for information on shareholders of companies’ on 14 May
2015, http://www.taxjustice.net/2014/05/14/norway-pledges-introduce-public-regis
try-company-ownership/ or in Norwegian: https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-
publikasjoner/Saker/Sak/?p=61945 (accessed on 17 July 2015).
25 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/20
7771/Lough_ Erne_2013_G8_Leaders_Communique.pdf (accessed 30 August 20160.
26 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, Royal Assent 26 March 2015.
27 Sec 81 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.
28 Notification of major shareholdings under the Disclosure Rules and Transparency
Rules.
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• the individual actually exercises or has the right to exercise significant
influence or control over the company; or
• the individual actually exercises or has the right to exercise significant
influence or control over any trust or firm (which is not a legal entity) that
has significant control (under one of the four conditions above) over the
company.
The unlisted company is required to identify and maintain an up-to-date
register of persons with significant control. However, the scope of
information is quite broad. The register includes a name; a residential
address; date of birth (this information is protected from disclosure to the
public, thereby making identity theft more difficult); a service address; and
information about the way in which they have significant control. The
information must be updated on an annual basis. 
Companies are obliged to keep a register of people with significant
control from January 2016 onwards and, as from 30 June 2016,
companies’ annual returns (in the future to be known as ‘confirmation
statements’) to Companies House have to include beneficial ownership
information. This information will constitute a central register. The
register will be made public. This means that it will be publicly accessible.
A special protection regime is also in place.29 The UK legislation includes
many provisions designed to ensure the non-disclosure of personal data.
For example, the residential addresses of all individuals with significant
control will be kept by the company. These addresses will not be available
to the public and will not appear in the central public register. 
The British initiative is ground-breaking. It is claimed to be the first law
to introduce the public register into domestic legislation.30 It is expected to
improve transparency over company ownership and control to both
regulatory and criminal enforcement agencies in the UK and abroad. It is
estimated that the UK register will affect approximately 2,5 million
companies and partnerships.31 Following the adoption of the 4th AML
Directive, the UK law will need to be revised, but this may not happen if
the UK leaves the EU.32 First and foremost, the scope of a register of
individuals with significant control will need to be extended to encapsulate
29 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Register of People with
Significant Control Guidance for Registered and Unregistered Companies, Societates
Europaeae, Limited Liability Partnerships, and Eligible Scottish Partnerships (Scottish
Limited Partnerships and Scottish Qualifying Partnerships) https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/621571/170623_NON
STAT_GU.pdf (accessed 12 December 2017) 29.
30 C Gascoigne ‘Landmark UK transparency law raises pressure on White House’
Congress, GFI blog, http://www.gfintegrity.org/press-release/landmark-uk-trans
parency-law-raises-pressure-on-white-house-congress/ (accessed on 15 July 2015).
31 V Houlder ‘Tax havens told to drop opposition to UK call for central register’ Financial
Times 27 March 2015.
32 In a referendum held on 23 June 2016 the majority of UK citizens voted for the ‘leave’
option. The UK is currently in the process of discussing with the EU the terms and
conditions of its exit from the EU. 
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other entities in addition to companies. Also, updates of information
stored in a register of people with significant control will need to occur
more often to ensure that the information is current.33
Although the UK initiative is striking, its impact necessarily is limited
because, in common with all purely national registers, it can only tell part
of the story. As long as registers are limited to one jurisdiction, or even to
the EU, it is difficult for stakeholders and regulators to get a full picture of
the global activities of all of the entities under the control of a specific
individual or individuals. This is why the UK also initiated international
cooperation on sharing information about the ultimate owners of
companies. In its letter to the G20 countries, the UK, joined by France,
Germany, Italy and Spain, indicated:34 
We need to take firm collective action on increasing beneficial ownership
information transparency, building on our actions to date … We commit to
establishing as soon as possible registers or other mechanisms requiring that
beneficial owners of companies, trusts, foundations, shell companies and
other relevant entities and arrangements are identified and available for tax
administration and law enforcement authorities … As a next step, we should
also call for the development of a system of interlinked registries containing
full benefit ownership information and mandate the OECD, in co-operation
with FATF, to develop common international standards for these registries
and their interlinking.
Currently, 55 countries have committed to participate in the pilot on
exchange of information about beneficial ownership.35 A global exchange
33 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Register of People with
Significant Control Guidance for Registered and Unregistered Companies, Societates
Europaeae, Limited Liability Partnerships, and Eligible Scottish Partnerships (Scottish
Limited Partnerships and Scottish Qualifying Partnerships) https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/621571/170623_NON
STAT_GU.pdf (accessed 12 December 2017) 23.
34 As at 14 December 2016, 55 countries (including Crown dependencies) were
committed to the initiative for the systemic sharing of beneficial ownership
information: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Anguilla,
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Bulgaria,
Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, Gibraltar, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Isle
of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico,
Moldova, Montserrat, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turks and Caicos Islands and
United Arab Emirates. See updates on https://www.gov.uk/government/publi
cations/beneficial-ownership-countries-that-have-pledged-to-exchange-information/
countries-committed-to-sharing-beneficial-ownership-information (accessed 10 March
2016).
35 As at 8 June 2016, the following countries committed to sharing beneficial ownership
information: Afghanistan, Anguilla, Austria, Belgium, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Cayman
Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Gibraltar, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy,
Jersey, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Arab
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of beneficial ownership information will complement the Common
Reporting Standard.36 Nevertheless, even this initiative is highly
dependent on the consistency of implementation and may need to be
supported by a process of peer review, along the same lines as already
existing for EOI for tax (through the Global Forum). 
5 Global LEI system
5.1 Rationale of the initiative 
The idea of the Global LEI system was developed in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis. The fragmented system of firm identifiers and the
lack of a standard identification system for financial counterparties were
blamed for the inability of market participants to form a consistent and
integrated view of their exposures. In 2009, the G20 called for the
strengthening of financial markets and the harmonisation of existing
standards.37 Later, in 2012, it supported the creation of the Global LEI
system and mandated the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to deliver
concrete recommendations. The LEI was designed to become a global
standard governed within the Global LEI system to support authorities
and market participants in identifying and managing financial risks. Thus
far, the initiative has been endorsed by many countries as well as the EU.
At the moment, the standard is being developed at domestic levels. 
5.2 Scope and purpose
As stated by the FSB,38 financial stability demands improved risk
management; better assessment of micro and macro-prudential risks;
facilitation of orderly resolution; containing market abuse and curbing
financial fraud; and enabling higher quality and accuracy of financial data
overall. The Global LEI system attempts to achieve these objectives by
offering harmonised standards of entity recognition. The system is based
35 Emirates and the United Kingdom. See updates on https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/beneficial-ownership-countries-that-have-pledged-to-exchange-informa
tion/countries-committed-to-sharing-beneficial-ownership-information (accessed
8 June 2016). 
36 The Common Reporting Standard (CRS) is the single global standard for the
collection, reporting and exchange of financial account information on foreign tax
residents developed in the context of the OECD. It addresses banks and other financial
institutions. These two types of institution are obliged to collect and report financial
account information of non-residents to the tax administration. This information will
be exchanged by the tax administration with the participating foreign tax authorities of
those non-residents. Simultaneously, financial account information on residents from
the tax authorities of other countries will be received. The results of CRS should be
twofold. This should work as a deterrent to tax evasion. In addition, residents with
financial accounts in other countries should be encouraged to comply with tax law. 
37 G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, 24-25 September 2009, Pittsburgh.
38 Financial Stability Board A global legal entity identifier for financial markets 8 June 2012.
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on ascribed unique codes, namely, the LEIs. It facilitates the creation of a
robust data framework offering information on positions, exposures and
risks between financial groups.  
Technically speaking, the LEI, which is the core of the Global LEI
system, is an alphanumeric code that enables identification of entities
participating in global financial markets. Currently, it relies on a standard
published by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) on
30 May 2012 (ISO 17442:2012, Financial Services – Legal Entity Identifier
(LEI)). It consists of 20 characters (numbers or letters), and their allocation
within the code is not random. The first four characters reflect a prefix
allocated uniquely to each Local Operating Unit (LOU) issuing LEIs. This
prefix identifies (except for LEIs issued before 30 November 2012) the
LOU that first issued the LEI, which helps to avoid the assignation of the
same LEI to different LOUs. The entity may transfer its LEI to a different
LOU. The next two characters (numbers 5 and 6) are always specified at
zero. The following 12 characters (numbers 7 to 18) are the identification
code of an entity. This part of the code is then entity-specific and is
assigned by the particular LOU. The last two characters (numbers 19 and
20) are two check digits that are designed to prevent typing errors. They are
assigned according to the standard ISO/IEC 7064 (MOD 97-10). Figure
9.1 presents the architecture of the code.
Figure 9.1: Architecture of the Legal Entity Identifier
Example: ERSTE Securities Polska SA.
There are two fundamental features of the LEI which reflects its character.
First, it is unique, which indicates that a particular code is assigned to a
specific entity and, even if this entity ceases to exist, the code cannot be
reassigned to another entity. Second, the LEI is exclusive. The same entity
can obtain only one LEI. The entity may decide to change its LOU, but
even then the LEI will remain the same. 
Not all entities may obtain the LEI. According to the ISO standard, the
LEI identifies only legal entities involved in financial transactions. The
term ‘legal entities’ refers to unique parties that are legally or financially
responsible for the performance of financial transactions or have the legal
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right in their jurisdiction to enter independently into legal contracts
regardless of whether they are incorporated or constituted in some other
way (for instance, by means of a trust, partnership, or other contractual
mechanism). It also includes governmental organisations and supra-
nationals, but natural persons are excluded from its scope.
The Global LEI system is being built in a few stages. In the first phase,
legal entities applying for a LEI need to provide only the reference data
(the ‘who is who’). The reference data consists of the basic information
about the entity (see details in Table 1). Currently, the Global LEI system
is moving to the second stage. Entities applying for the LEI (or who
already have one) will be obliged to provide a much wider scope of
information, namely, relationship data (‘who owns whom’). Relationship
data will cover first data on direct and ultimate parents of legal entities39
as well as data about branches (see Box 9.1). There are already plans to
develop a new policy with respect to individuals acting in a business
capacity.40 In the future we may expect that the third step will cover
financial data (‘who owns what’).
39 Currently, the technical specifications for recording the relationship data are finalised
in consultation with LEI Issuers. It was expected that by 1 May 2017 all LEI Issuers
will have developed the capacity to record relationships with direct and ultimate
parents. See LEI ROC, Update by the LEI ROC, 12 January 2017. 
40 This will refer to independent business activity as evidenced by registration in a
business registry, eg, a sole trader. 
Box 9.1: The LEI reference data
The code is linked to data that refer to the basic information about the entity.
The reference data include:
• the official name of the legal entity; 
• the address of the headquarters of the legal entity; 
• the address of legal formation; 
• the date of the first LEI assignment; 
• the date of last update of the LEI; 
• the date of expiration, if applicable; 
• for entities with a date of expiration, the reason for the expiration
should be recorded and, if applicable, the LEI of the entity that
acquired it; 
• the official business registry where the foundation of the legal entity is
mandated to be recorded on formation of the entity, where applicable; 
• the reference in the official business registry to the registered entity,
where applicable.
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Data on direct and ultimate parent legal entities will be provided based on
the accounting definitions. This means that a direct parent legal entity will
be identified as a ‘direct accounting consolidating parent’ and the ultimate
parent legal entity as the ‘ultimate accounting consolidating parent’. The
‘relationship’ is explained in Figure 9.2.
Figure 9.2: Relationship Data
Source: GLEIF website: https://www.gleif.org/en/lei-data/access-and-use-lei-data/level-2-
data-who-owns-whom.
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5.3 Infrastructure for operating LEI
The ultimate responsibility for the system was entrusted to the Regulatory
Oversight Committee (ROC).41 This body was established by the Charter of
the Regulatory Oversight Committee for the Global Legal Entity Identifier
(LEI) System on 5 November 2012.42 It is comprised of representatives of
public authorities from around the globe. The ROC is responsible for
upholding governance principles and for overseeing the entire system. It
releases guidance, standards, high-level plans, policies and protocols.43 
The operational arm of the whole system is served by the Global LEI
Foundation (GLEIF) which provides a centralised database of LEIs and
corresponding reference data that can be downloaded free of charge. Since
October 2015, the GLEIF has been evaluating organisations that issue
LEIs to legal entities engaging in financial transactions, and is responsible
for the accreditation of LEI organisations. The GLEIF annually verifies
whether organisations that are accredited to issue and maintain LEIs
continue to meet the requirements regarding service orientation and
quality as established in the Master Agreement. It aims at optimising the
quality, reliability and usability of LEI data.
To obtain the LEI, an entity must register with one of the LOUs.44
Each LOU may differ with respect to the available languages, facilities to
register many entities in bulk, and price, among others. Nevertheless,
certain requirements are common. In particular, each LOU needs to
collect a minimum set of reference data (as presented above) about the
entity that must be confirmed or certified by the entity seeking an LEI.
Entities are requested to periodically verify whether the reference data are
accurate. A LOU is in charge of ensuring the quality of data. It is obliged
to examine each entry against reliable sources (public official sources such
as a business registry or private legal documents) before the LEI and
associated reference data is published.45 It should ensure that an entity
reviews the accuracy of this information at least once annually and
promptly submit any changes. LOUs may charge a fee for issuing the LEI
as well as for validating the reference data upon issuance and after each
yearly certification. Figure 9.3 sets out the LEI hierarchy.
41 The ROC is composed of the Plenary, the Executive Committee, the Committee on
Evaluation and Standards and other committees, working groups or panels. Moreover,
it has a Secretariat located in Basel, Switzerland.  
42 http://www.leiroc.org/publications/gls/roc_20121105.pdf (accessed 30 May 2015).
43 Art 2(b)(1) of the Charter. 
44 The list of pre-LOU is available on the website http://www.leiroc.org (accessed
10 January 2017).
45 The ultimate responsibility for data accuracy falls upon the registrant.
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Figure 9.3: LEI Hierarchy
5.4 Regulatory application 
Consistent with the goal to implement the LEI as the global standard and
create the Global LEI system, the tool has already been employed in many
regional legal frameworks. Approximately 40 regulatory actions require
use of the LEI. So far, the standard is being used in the securities, banking
and insurance sectors.46 Two examples of its implementation are
presented below.
The first regulator to mandate the use of an identifier in regulatory
reporting was the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
The first regulation, which entered into force on 12 October 2012, effected
OTC interest rates and credit derivatives. It was later extended to OTC
foreign exchange, commodity and equity derivatives. The rule requires the
identification with standard identifiers of the parties, their counterparties,
and any underlying reference entities of the contracts. The CFTC requires
the use of a CFTC Interim Compliant Identifier (CICI) until the global LEI
programme is implemented. To facilitate compliance with this
requirement, a special utility was introduced by the CFTC. Market
participants who are required to obtain a CICI can use the CICI website
http://www.ciciutility.org. The website can be used at no charge and is
available to the public. It is owned, managed and operated by DTCC-
SWIFT.
Apart from the US, the use of the LEI has been mandated by the
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) for reporting
derivative transactions to Trade Repositories under the European Market
46 LEI ROC, Progress Report by the Legal Entity Identifier Regulatory Oversight
Committee (LEI ROC) 5 November 2015 10, http://www.leiroc.org/publications/
gls/lou_20151105-1.pdf (accessed 10 September 2016).
210    Chapter 9
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). According to delegated regulations
adopted under the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EU) No
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012,
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories which
impose the reporting obligation, an LEI is required for reporting details of
concluded derivative contracts to a trade repository.
The LEI as a standard in financial transactions has also been
implemented in many other legal fora. It appears that the tool is gaining
increasing worldwide recognition. According to the Global Financial
Market Association (GFMA), as of January 2017, approximately 490 000
LEIs have been issued.47 Of these, more than 90 per cent have been issued
in Europe and North America.
5.5 Considerations and challenges in implementing the LEI as 
a global standard
The LEI is a public-private initiative. Certain benefits are expected for both
regulators and business. The former demands an effective tool that can
assist them in data aggregation and analysis between financial market
participants. It should also provide the ability to identify trading patterns.
Moreover, it should also offer an accurate risk assessment to the financial
system. The key functionality should be the ability to analyse risk at an
aggregate firm level. From the perspective of business, the Global LEI
system should make it easier to more effectively measure and manage
counterparty exposure. This could be achieved through a common
perspective of legal entities across the organisation. It should improve the
speed and accuracy of data aggregation for risk analysis and for managing
corporate actions. 
Some challenges still need to be addressed to ensure that the Global
LEI system will be a successful experience for all market participants. Size
matters: The Global LEI system was developed with an ambition to
become the global standard. As a result, the success of the Global LEI
system requires a significant commitment from all stakeholders. Because
the benefits of the system are collective, they may only be fully realised
once there is broader public participation. The fundamental question is
how to ensure that the system is widely adopted. One way is to promote
the benefits that the global standard could generate. However, it is not
certain whether a voluntary solution could create wider buy-in and become
an internationally recognised standard. It would certainly require intense
political pressure. It seems that establishing LEI as a global system would
be much more likely if it were established as a compulsory condition to
enter certain markets. Consequently, regulators around the globe need to
47 Webinar slides The Legal Entity Identifier System 1 February 2017 (accessed 10 March
2017).
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be encouraged to make use of the LEI as one of their compulsory
requirements whenever a legal entity is to be identified and established as
a market participant. 
As far as risks are concerned, there are some concerns that suppliers of
LEIs will exploit their position by overcharging registrants or by restricting
access to data. Therefore, regulators must ensure that public interest will
be protected in a manner that will make the system fully efficient and
effective. To do so will demand introducing clear principles and standards
governing this framework. This should be assured and monitored within
the accreditation process governed by the GLEIF. To have a competence
to issue a LEI, an authority must obtain a certificate of accreditation from
the GLEIF. 
The system will facilitate integration of different jurisdictions with
varied regulatory, legal systems, and local languages from around the
world. The Global LEI system should be responsive to these differences,
while enabling the cooperation of all jurisdictions within a common
framework. As a corollary, it should have enough capacity to be able to
expand across the globe, including to the least developed countries. This
dimension seems to be very dependent on political discretion. At the end
of the day, it is up to domestic regulators to decide whether or not the LEI
is required. 
The need for integration of different regulatory and legal systems has
very practical implications for the development of the Global LEI system.
It has been evident in discussions on relationship data. Adding data on
parent entities first required identification of what is meant by the terms
‘direct parent’ and ‘ultimate parent’. For this purpose, the ROC reviewed
existing international standards, principles and best practices.48 To
minimise the potential for overwhelming complexity, it was decided to
base definitions on the accounting definition of consolidation applying to
this parent.  
The Global LEI system, first and foremost, will be a significant source
of data about market participants from around the world. The first concern
is how this data will be updated. This was already an issue when the
concept of LEI was first presented. The burden was divided between a
LOU and an entity. The LOU validates and publishes data and next
annually revalidates data. The entity registers and provides the reference
data and then provides an annual update. In light of the new standard of
relationship data, the process may become more complex. In particular,
the validation of data may require more efforts from LOUs. As some
48 The review covered different standards ranging from those used for the purpose of
banking supervision to anti-money laundering and countering the financing of
terrorism. See LEI ROC ‘Collecting data on direct and ultimate parents of legal
entities in the Global LEI Systems – Phase 1’ 10 March 2016 4.
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indicate, this may be not sufficient. An independent source of entity
corporate actions may be required to govern and manage the reporting
process.49 
There are also concerns about the costs involved. The more complex
the structure of a group of companies, the more significant the costs
involved. This may be a particular issue for least developed countries.
Scarce capacities pose a real issue there. For these countries, ensuring a
reliable process of validation of data may be an obstacle to joining the
Global LEI System. To achieve accreditation from the GLEIF, the LOU
needs to be able to comply with the operational and technical standards
and protocols.
Moreover, simply collecting data is not a solution. Analysts needs a
tool that would allow them to track the links existing between companies
located in different national jurisdictions. This would require additional
capacities for connecting and analysing databases. 
Of even greater concern is the issue of data protection. Confidentiality
and privacy restrictions could pose an enormous challenge when
structuring such a system to function on a global scale. In order to avoid
the abuse of information, a proper system of protection must be ensured.
However, finding an effective solution could be a challenge to regulators.
The question is whether lessons can be learnt from the EU experience with
the 4th AML Directive. As discussed, in order to avoid any abuse of the
information collected under this Directive, member states are not required
to make their registers public. Moreover, in addition to specified
authorities, only those with a ‘legitimate interest’ in the information
contained in the registers will be allowed to access to the registers.
Numerous other exceptions designed to protect the confidentiality of
information are provided for. In the UK legislation, there are special
provisions addressing the issues of data protection. 
5.6 Blockchain as a potential solution
Perhaps the answer to these challenges can be found in the digital sphere.
In particular, Blockchain technology may be an appropriate platform for
the Global LEI system. 
Blockchain is a decentralised ledger that tracks transactions of digital
assets. It can be applied for tracing currency, stocks and bonds, or identity
details. The network is made up of a chain of computers, each of which has
a copy of the ledger and is able to see whether any changes have occurred.
49 AP Dolaney (ed) ‘The global LEI System: A solution for entity data?’ December 2013,
ReferenceDataReview.com. 
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Blockchain technology is seen as secure as all the computers in the network
must verify and approve each transaction as it takes place. 
Blockchain technology has already proved relevant to identity
databases. Blockchain technology relies on data stored by individuals in a
type of locker or escrow account, allowing people to access it on a need-to-
know basis. In this way, it reveres the traditional method for establishing
identity. Typically, identity is conferred by a national government, which
certifies who an individual is and records this in a database. Using
Blockchain technology, individuals create and store their own identity on
networks of computers that no one person or entity controls, establishing
a ‘self-sovereign identity’.
This could be a way of establishing a truly global LEI system. Entities
could create and store their own identity on networks of computers. The
requirement for registration would be embedded in the structure of the
network, eliminating the need for actively supervising the registration
process. It would establish a ‘self-sovereign identity’. This could eliminate
the need for validation of data which is the greatest source of concern in
the context of LEI. It may ensure a relatively smooth process of ensuring
that data is up-to-date. As a result, Blockchain technology has the potential
of significantly minimising any costs that the Global LEI system may
imply. Blockchain technology could drive simplicity and efficiency across
the entire process of setting, managing and updating the Global LEI
system.
Moving to digital identity underpinned by Blockchain technology
would also mitigate the current risk of information loss or theft. It
streamlines and de-risks completion of public and private transactions.
Currently business often suffers fraud resulting from stolen or incorrect
data or poor identification.50 
However, regardless of how beneficial it may be for building the
Global LEI system, it requires a concerted and co-ordinated effort. The
implementation of digital identity is still perceived as a sensitive issue and
addresses situational, operational and cultural factors, all of which are
important for the development of digital systems. These are some of the
non-technical barriers that implementation of the new technology would
need to answer. Political consensus as well as agreement among market
participants would be essential. 
50 World Economic Forum ‘A blueprint for digital identity. The role of financial
institutions in building digital identity, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_A_Blueprint_for_Digital_Identity.pdf (accessed 14 March 2017).
214    Chapter 9
The GLEIF recently launched a research project called GLEIS 2.0.51
The project is considering the potential of using Blockchain technology. 
6 Global LEI system and curbing illicit financial 
flows
The LEI and the Global LEI systems collect data that may contribute to
the prevention of money laundering and other types of illicit financial
flows.52 These systems could play a significant role in increasing the
effectiveness of know-your-customer due diligence, particularly in
correspondent banking. Since the know-your-customer due diligence
process is complex, costly, time-consuming and labour-intensive, special
utilities were designed with the intent of storing relevant due diligence
information in a single repository. The Global LEI system could become
an efficient global standard for the purpose of these utilities and
information sharing mechanisms by offering a centralised database. 53
Moreover, the widespread use of LEI could assist financial institutions to
identify specific entities with a high level of certainty and increase the
effectiveness of automatic screening packages, particularly for identifying
sanctioned entities. 54 The LEI may also facilitate the consolidation of
information received in financial intelligence units by more easily
identifying transactions undertaken by the same entity but reported by
different financial institutions. 55
7 Global LEI system and a Global Beneficial 
Ownership Register
The Global LEI system is a model that was developed by a regulatory will
with a global reach. Currently, many discuss the need for developing
another global register. A number of scandals, from the Swiss UBS bank
scandal and the Lichtenstein tax data leak, to the Offshore Secrets leaks
and the Panama Papers, have revealed the need for more transparency
with respect to beneficial ownership information. The question is what the
lesson is to be drawn from the experience with the Global LEI system to
design of a Global Beneficial Ownership Register. 
51 GLEIF, Minutes GLEIF Board of Directors Meeting, https://www.google.at/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&ved=0ahUKEwimq9av98zSAhWK
iSwKHXMVABIQFghbMAY&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gleif.org%2Fcontent%2F
1-about%2F6-governance%2F7-board-minutes%2Fminutes-gleif-board-meeting-26-20
16-10-27.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEFfJEXN430xEM_6HaDegEx-VIX6A&sig2=YBRyFF
icUcAwhU_i2F0KpA (accessed 10 March 2017).
52 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, Consultative Report.
Correspondent banking, October 2015. 
53 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (n 52 above) 16.
54 As above. 
55 As above.
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Undoubtedly, the Global LEI system proved that the current
technology allows to build a global system. It is possible to gather global
interests and incentivise different entities from around the globe to sign up
for a global register. Nonetheless, the current framework has some
significant limitations. These limitations may have significant implications
for the idea of a Global Beneficial Ownership Register. 
First, the Global LEI system excludes natural persons. The LEI does
not identify who a natural person in control of an entity is. It refers only to
entities that belong to the same corporate group. Also, the latest update on
scope of information available within the Global LEI system, which is the
implementation of relationship data, does not cover who a beneficial
owner is. The collection of data about parent entities under the LEI is
distinct from the identification of the beneficial owner as defined under the
FATF Recommendations56 or under the Common Reporting Standard.57 
Second, the LEI captures a well-defined group of entities. Only the
population of regulated market participants are obliged to apply for a LEI.
In the case of the Global Beneficial Ownership Register, it is practically
impossible to define who the group of beneficial owners are. It certainly
goes beyond the scope of entities obliged to apply for an LEI. 
Third, market participants who are obliged to get a LEI have a clear
motivation for registration. They have an interest in acquiring information
about their counterparty. This explains why the Global LEI system gained
the support of many regulators across the world. It would not be the case
for beneficial owners registered in the Global Beneficial Ownership
Register. In the current legal, institutional and regulatory framework,
beneficial owners have no motivation to disclose their data and be a part
of any registry. This raises the question of what benefits should be offered
to beneficial owners to support this initiative. 
This comparison illustrates that establishing the Global Beneficial
Ownership Register, although a feasible task from a technological point of
view, may need to overcome more practical hurdles. What may these be? 
The first issue refers to trusts. As was seen, the Global LEI system
relies on a common interest of capital market participants in assuring
financial stability. Trusts that do not participate in the regulated capital
market, especially those set up by wealthy individuals in offshore
jurisdictions, do not share this interest. What incentives could then be
provided to them?
56 LEI ROC (n 46 above) 18.
57 In the process of identifying the owner of the financial account, the Common
Reporting Standard relies on the FATF definition of beneficial owner. See OECD
Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information on Tax Matters
204 57.
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The second question addresses the conditions for regulation of retail
investments. The current framework does not require retail investors to
register. In fact, the scope of LEI is limited only to investment firms. It
means that as long as someone invests in his own capacity, and not as an
intermediary, there is no obligation to report using a LEI. It is a significant
limitation to a scope of entities potentially covered by the register. How
can that be changed? It seems that it is up to regulators to decide whether
retail investors should also use a LEI. 
Finally, the third doubt is whether we can unknowingly agree on the
designatory data to be supplied. Perhaps the Common Reporting Standard
can provide an interesting example. The Common Reporting Standard is
built upon the FATF definition of beneficial owner.58 This means that
reporting persons obliged by the standard to provide information to
financial institutions are any natural persons that meet the definition of a
beneficial owner as set by the FATF. It means that the standard captures
all beneficial owners that own a specified financial account. There is still a
need for a register that supplements the available information by providing
some data on other beneficial owners that will not be captures by the
standard. 
8 Opportunities for developing countries 
The promotion of a global register could be especially beneficial for
developing countries that suffer from market abuse, tax evasion, aggressive
tax planning and other types of illicit financial flows. Many of the least
developed countries have substandard institutions and inadequate
regulatory structures. The existence of legal loopholes and financial
secrecy exacerbate the situation, making them even more susceptible to
abuse. All of these factors contribute to entrenched impunity of those
benefiting from illicit flows, which substantially weaken their economies.
The ineffective response to this challenge is too often the responsibility of
a fragmented network of different law enforcement agencies, tax
administrations and financial intelligence units that neither cooperate nor
undertake coherent operations.59 This is why setting up a domestic register
– as is the case in the EU – might be not feasible at the moment in many of
the least developed countries. 
The Global LEI system could offer developing countries several
effective solutions to existing problems. The system has the capability to
improve the efficiency of their resource-constrained agencies. At the same
58 As above.
59 Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa commissioned
by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development 13, http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/iff_main_
report_26feb_en.pdf (accessed 10 June 2016) 13 (UNECA Report 35).
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time, the increased uniformity on available information would also
simplify procedures and make them much less expensive. The cost of
participation in the Global LEI would be limited to the issuance of the new
law imposing obligations on market participants to employ the LEI when
concluding contracts. From the perspective of developing countries, the
crucial advantage of the Global LEI system is that it is financed by fees
paid by legal entities. Countries deciding to rely on the LEI within its
regulatory framework do not have to bear any additional costs. In this way,
participation in the Global LEI system would directly impact developing
countries’ ability to access information.
Since the Global LEI will aggregate information from most
jurisdictions, the limited treaty network that currently appears to be a
critical issue and prevents an intensive exchange of information would
disappear as a barrier for tracing or detecting illicit activities. Although it
is now changing and many less-developed countries joined the Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance,60 the capacity to safely
store and use data is still a common issue. These countries are not able to
track financial flows. The Global LEI system could solve this problem by
offering access to the collection of data. 
9 Conclusions
Accomplishing genuine change and improving the transparency demands
global answers. It appears to be a prerequisite of building the effectiveness
of legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks with respect to beneficial
ownership transparency. Only those solutions having worldwide scope
will effectively prevent tax avoidance, tax evasion and other types of illicit
financial flows.  
Most regulators have insufficient data and this is a particularly crucial
issue for developing countries. Although many countries are now moving
for domestic registers, the question remains of how to access data cross-
border. Developing one common register would overcome these issues. It
would minimise the need for the exchange of information and
substantially contribute to a better allocation of scarce resources.
Additionally, it would contribute to aligning standards in different
regulatory areas, for example, taxation or finances. From this perspective,
the 4th AML Directive may be a good example, but its regional scope may
prove to be its most significant weakness.
The Global LEI system could be the answer. Although it was designed
to address only specific types of abuse, it could be of benefit to all
regulators and contribute to minimising all types of illicit activities.
60 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/convention-on-mutual-admi
nistrative-assistance-in-tax-matters.htm (accessed 20 October 2016).
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Drawing a distinct line between market abuse and other types of abusive
practices is sometimes difficult. For example, money laundering activities
usually also involve market abuse, whereas aggressive tax planning
schemes constitute financial abuses. Considering this, the Global LEI
system could serve as a powerful source of data which could be utilised by
financial regulators, financial intelligence units, tax administrations, and
different law enforcement agencies to detect, track, and investigate not
only market abuse but all types of illicit activities. Already it has the
ambition of becoming relevant for statistics on the balance of payment or
in the tax area, in competition laws, combatting financial crime or in
public procurement.61 
The Global LEI system is the best evidence that it is a feasible task to
establish a global register. The digitalisation of the LEI could facilitate
many processes and mitigate some risks the standard is currently facing.
The Global LEI system, when underpinned by the Blockchain technology,
particularly could address some security risks and ensure up-to-date
information. 
However, there are many doubts as to how to create a Beneficial
Ownership Register out of it. The Global Beneficial Ownership Register
would require to capture a much wider scope of entities than is currently
covered by the Global LEI system. As long as wholesale investors only are
obliged to use a LEI, the relevance of the Global LEI system is limited.
Regulatory willingness is essential to change the rules of the game and
obligate other entities to participate in this register. These and other issues
will have to be addressed if the global Beneficial Ownership Register were
to be established. 
Currently, there is no alternative international tool of a global reach.
Certain interesting features may be found in the Common Reporting
Standard. It gathers data on beneficial owners of financial accounts from
all countries around the world that committed to the standard. However,
the standard will neither collect data in a global register nor cover all
beneficial owners. 
Increasing transparency about corporate entities is highly relevant.
The global initiative, such as the Global LEI system, provides a unique
opportunity to connect corporate dots from all around the globe. Although
the Global LEI system is still moving rather slowly, undoubtedly the
initiative contributes to making the scenario of global corporate activity
slightly less opaque. Therefore, at least it deserves support. 
61 LEI ROC ‘Collecting data on direct and ultimate parents of legal entities in the Global
LEI Systems – Phase 1’ 10 March 2016 5.
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